was extremely slow points towards false representation and it is arguable that this misrepresentation gives Abigail the right to repudiate the contract on the misrepresentation constituting a condition (Poole, 2006). The burden would be on Abigail to prove this, which may be difficult on grounds that there is no record of her telephone conversation with CableFast.
Additionally, as the contract was for the supply of services, the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 implies terms into Abigail’s contract, which cannot be excluded and therefore enforceable against CableFast. The 1982 Act provides that in a contract for the supply of services and where the supplier acts in the course of a business, there will be an implied term that the supplier will exercise reasonable skill and care in delivering the services.
The 1982 Act requires the services to be provided to a satisfactory quality and fit for the purpose intended. Therefore, if Abigail can establish breach of these implied terms she will have a claim for breach of contract. The fact that the broadband connection was very poor will operate in Abigail’s favour in establishing breach.
Alternatively, as the contract is a business to consumer contract and was concluded via telephone, it will constitute a contract at a “distance” under Regulation 3 (1) of the Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations 2000 (the Regulations). Most importantly for Abigail is the 7 day cooling off period provided by the Regulations, which enable consumers to cancel the contract during a seven day period. Whilst the Regulations permit businesses to stipulate the conditions and procedures for withdrawal, the right to cancel cannot be derogated from and information regarding the procedure for cancellation must be supplied to the consumer (Regulation 11). As Abigail’s contract was for the provision of services, Regulation 12 provides her with the right to cancel within 7 working days from when the order is