These treaties cover various agreements and concessions between and among countries involved. The Treaty of Pelindaba is a treaty set in accordance with the establishment of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZs) around the world. It was signed in 1996, and took effect last July after its 28th ratification. This paper seeks to evaluate why it took Africa 32 years to sign this treaty. More specifically, it shall address three fundamental questions: (1) what was the process of negotiations that led to the signing of the treaty establishing an African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, (2) how does it differ from the negotiation processes leading to similar treaties, and (3) what were the determinant factors that weighed in on the signing of these treaties and how likely would such factors influence negotiations in the future. This paper shall trace the timeline of this treaty from 1964 when the Denuclearization of Africa was declared until 1996 when the treaty was signed. This treaty shall be compared to other treaties, paying attention to whether regions who promptly signed these treaties had incentives in doing so; and if they did, what those incentives were, and whether or not they were applicable to Africa.
In July 1964, the Organization of African Unity adopted the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa (Stott, et.al., p. 4). This declaration came about in response to the United Nation’s call for unity against the testing of nuclear weapons in Africa; this declaration was triggered by the events that followed the nuclear testing of France in the Sahara Desert (Academie de Droit International de la Haye, p. 121). Upon the UN’s urging different regions in the world sought to comply with the call to declare Africa a nuclear free zone. The African region followed suit with their June 1964 declaration. A year later, the UN General Assembly endorsed