John Rawls's Principles of Justice - Assignment Example

 John Rawls's Principles of Justice In order to determine if John Rawls's principles of justice should begin with the “maximin” assumption in a community, it is important to note that his two principles of justice, and the “original position”, from which the “maximin” principle was derived, was intended on his part only as a thought experiment, which he developed from the basic idea of liberal and democratic social contract traditions held by traditional philosophers like Locke, Rousseau, and Kant (Rawls, 1999: 10). He therefore, invited us to draw on hypothetical situations, in which hypothetical persons were placed in a condition specially designed to help them think about justice (Ibid: 11). Rawls was primarily concerned with questions of how best social justice could be organized as a “basis structure” in a liberal and democratic society (Ibid: 6). For Rawls, his idea of justice was directed at how a society's main political, social, and economic institutions should cooperate together in distributing fundamental rights and duties to everyone in an ordered society (Ibid: 6). His objective of A Theory of Justice, published in 1971, was to provide an alternative solution to the then dominant utilitarian principle of justice, which held that, a society is “right and morally just,” if major institutions maximized what is intrinsically good, to the satisfaction of the vast majority of people in a society (Ibid: 21). In rejecting the utilitarian principle of utiltiy, Rawls set forth his conception of justice, which was egalitarian in nature. It would perhaps be helpful to look at some definitions of justice, before analyzing Rawls's conception of justice. The dictionary of legal theory define justice as the set of moral and political constrains on human interactions (Bix, 2004: 108). There have been significant debates about the nature and source of standards of justice, and some sceptical thinkers argued that standards of justice were grounded only in the conventional views of society, or in a community's traditions (Ibid: 108). Other theories viewed the principles of justice as a general agreement among people under certain ideal conditions. A traditional view of justice described standards that are eternal and unchangeable, established by God, the nature of the universe, human nature, or some combination of these (Ibid). D.D.Raphael (2001:1), a theorist of justice, recognized justice as a complex concept 2 that pervaded social thought, and is basic to law, ethics, and politics alike (Raphael:1). In social and political ethics, justice is one virtue or ideal among several, and so far as society is concerned, justice is the most fundamental and most important virtue (Ibid). Rawls seemed to echo Raphael's definition of justice as a virtue, when he said that “justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought (Rawls, 1999: 18). Rawls's own statements concerning the nature of a conception of justice was that a set of principles was necessary to foster a system of social cooperation among individuals of conflicting interests (Ibid: 4). As society was a “cooperative venture” for “mutual advantage,” individuals of “collective interest” enter into social arrangements, which established “rights and duties,” and distribute the “benefits and burdens” which would not otherwise be available to them (Ibid: 4). This system of rules and institutions, upon which “the basic structure” of a given society was based, constituted its conception of justice (Ibid: 4). As Rawls's arguments in his theory of justice are complex and detailed, a distillation of his main ideas on his two principles of justice, his “original position,” and his “maximin” principle, will be focused here. His first principle of justice stipulated that “each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all” (Rawls, 266). This principle has been referred to as the “liberty principle,” and the easiest to interpret (Talisse, 2001: 41). The basic liberties Rawls had in mind, were typical of a liberal approach to political philosophy, which included the right to vote and hold office, freedom of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience and freedom of thought, freedom of person, etc (Ibid:42) Rawls's aim was to define a democratic ideal of free citizens who have equal civic status with powers to fairly and effectively influence legislation, and take part in public political life (Freeman, 2007: 45). The second principle of justice stipulated that “social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the 3 just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair and equality of opportunity” (Rawls, 266). The first part of this principle is better known as the “difference principle,” while the second part is called the “equal opportunity principle.” While the idea of equal opportunity could be easily explained, the difference principle has drawn much controversy among political theorists (Talisse, 2001: 43). The basic equal opportunity principle called for political institutions to take positive steps in ensure that persons with similar skills and motivation were given similar opportunities in all sector of societies (Ibid:43). The idea was that positions were to be held open to everyone to compete for, on grounds of qualifications revelant to performing the tasks of that position, regardless of people's racial, ethnic, or gender group, religious or philosophical views, or social or economic position (Freeman, 2007: 88). In the “difference principle,” Rawls explained that the idea “is a very special criterion,” as it applied “primarily to the basic structure of society through representative individuals whose expectations are to be estimated by an index of primary goods (Rawls,1999: 72). Another words, He suggested that society has an ongoing duty to fairly distribute income and wealth among people engaged in social and economic cooperation, without regard as to whether they are poor or not (Freeman: 87). Many classical liberals and libertarians rejected the idea of distributive justice because of its threat of assessing the distribution of income and wealth from free markets and private enterprises (Ibid: 87). Rawls, however, viewed the difference principle as necessary, if justice as fairness is to achieve its aim of making distributive justice a matter of pure procedural justice (Ibid: 88). Rawls's “maximin” principle was a presentation of alternatives and strategies of choice to “parties in the “original position.” By “parties,” Rawls was refering to hypothetical perosns, and by “original position,” Rawls was refering to the “state of nature,” of those persons (Rawls:10). The aim of the original position was to prescribed a hypothetical social contract, where hypothetical people, described as fairly situated and as free, equal, and rational, were given the task of agreeing 4 together principles of justice that were to be applied within their ongoing society (Rawls: 10-11). Under Rawls's social contract, the “parties” were fairly and impartially situated by the “veil of ignorance” and other conditions (Ibid:11). The “veil of ignorance” thus deprived the contracting parties of information about themselves and their particular interests and desires. No one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, his intelligence, strength, and the like (Ibid:11). In this way, the “veil of ignorance” eliminate the “arbitrariness of the world” (Ibid:122), by its guarantee that none of the “parties” was in the position to tailor principles and social circumstances to their advantage (Ibid: 120-121). In his “maximin” principle, Rawls presented a hypothetical situation, whereby “parties” in the “original position” was given the least choice of adopting the strategy of the very worst off in society (Rawls, 1999: 133). The aim of the maximin rule was to “maximize the minimum.” To follow this strategy, Rawls explained that you should “choose as if your enemy were to assign your social position in whatever kind of society you end up in” (Ibid). Compared to his other strategy of the most advantaged position, that we should “maximize the maximum,” critics of theories believed that a different strategy than either of these, would be suitable for all choices, regardless of the circumstances (Freeman: 169). He acknowledged that his “maximin strategy was “not, in general, a suitable guide for choices.” Rawls admitted that the maximin principle was an “irrational” strategy under the most circumstances of choice uncertainty (Ibid: 172). Many critics of Rawls have focused their attention on the ways in which Rawls derived his principles of justice from his statements of the initial position of the rational “parties” situated behind the “veil of ignorance.” Critics such as Michael J. Sandel, asked the question “Is Rawls's thought experiment the right way to think about justice?” “How can principles of justice possibly be derived from an agreement that never took place?” (Sandel, 2009: 142). He argued that Rawls views posed a problematic theory of the self that can be exposed and refuted (Ibid: 142). Others claimed that his project was incomplete, and in need of further philosophical support (Ibid). 5 In responding to these critics, Rawls formulated a new framework for liberal theory in his “Political Liberalism,” where he explained “justice as fairness” as a strictly political liberalism, instead of “metaphysical,” as his critics claimed (Rawls, 1996: xiii). In his new work, he retained all of the essential features of justice as fairness. The original position, the veil of ignorance, and the two principles of justice remained “substantively the same” (Ibid: xvi). The nature of his theory of justice, however, differed from that of his earlier work, A Theory of Justice. In Political Liberalism, Rawls articulated a coherent conception of justice that accomodated the “considered convictions” of citizens of liberal-democratic society (Ibid: 8). In liberal-democratic societies, Rawls contended that citizens concieve of themselves and of each other as being “free and equal” (Ibid: 19). Their freedom and equality derived from certain psychological abilities. Rawls claimed that persons have two “moral powers,” namely the “capacity for a sense of justice” and “the capacity for a conception of the good” (Ibid: 34). Although his theory on Political Liberalism has also come under much criticism, and almost nobody agreed to his hypothetical conception of justice, John Rawls was nevertheless hailed as the greatest political philosopher of the twentieth century (Talisse, 2001: 5). Critics have referred to his work A Theory of Justice, as a revolution in political philosophy. Rawls's achievement was not only recognized by professional philosophers; he was among the few contemporary philosophers whose work has exerted considerable influence over academic disciplines other than philosophy. Rawls work are studied in departments of economics, political science, sociology, and in law schools throughout the world, and his ideas have helped to shape and develop these areas of inquiry (Ibid). 6 References: Bix, Brian H., 2004, A Dictionary of Legal Theory, NY: Oxford University Press. Freeman, S., 2007, Rawls, NY: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group Rawls, John, 1999, A Theory of Justice, Revised Edition, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Raphael, D.D., 2001, Concepts of Justice, NY: Oxford University Press. Rawls, John, 1996, Political Liberalism, Paperback Edition, NY: Columbia University Press. Sandel, Michael J., 2009, Justice, England: Penguin Books Ltd. Talisse, Robert B., 2001, On Rawls: A Liberal Theory of Justice and Justification, NY: Hunter College, The City University. 7 Read More