Even with the good press associated with the Marshall Plan, revisionists and diplomatic historians from both the United States and the sixteen involved nations from Western Europe—even more than fifty years after its ratification and implementation—still debate on its origins, motives and effects (Agnew and Entrikin 2004, p. 1). For instance, historical revisionists have found that “the economic impact of the plan has been significantly downgraded as scholars concluded that the crisis of 1947 in Europe was less grave than American policy-makers had thought” (Hitchcock n.d.).
With these considerations in mind, two of the most substantial and celebrated books on rethinking and revisiting the Marshall Plan will be reviewed in this paper in order to shed some light on what the real purposes and effects of the Marshall Plan are in relation to the United States’ supposed gigantic role in the economic recovery of Europe. The book by Michael Hogan and two chapters from Agnew and Entrikin’s volume will be compared against each other through their contributions to the rethinking of the Marshall Plan. While the former is very detailed, the message that Hogan wants to state is somewhat lost within the detailing of the various facets of the creation of the Marshall Plan. On the other hand, Agnew and Entrikin’s chapters are composed of separate papers that present an all-encompassing view of the Marshall Plan and its effects. These separate chapters that can stand on their own present a more comprehensive and understandable argument as to the significance of the Marshall Plan in history. It can be said then that quality and readability of a work does not depend on the length and an extreme attention to detail, but on a concise presentation of facts and figures that would make the reader understand and accept the argument presented as true. Although there are a lot of differences between the two books, one of the main causes