In agreement with the board, the judge denied Kane’s application as the petitioner’s derivative claim, lacked stance when rallied alongside the existing and cognizable immigration laws.
Prior to analyzing and as such, satisfactorily asserting a conclusion to Kane’s petition for review what needs to be addressed first, is the jurisdictional issues that arise as a result. In the petitioner’s briefs to the court as well as the Board of Immigration Appeals, the petitioner claimed that the Immigration Judge (IJ) was obligated as spelt out under 8 C.F.R § 1240.11 (c) to bring to his knowledge the fact that he met the qualification requirements for asylum application. As such, as Kane observed, by virtue of the fact that the Immigration Officer failed to notify him of his eligibility with regard to asylum seeking, it followed that at the time of the case appearing before court, he qualified to apply for asylum. In responding to this the department of Homeland security, established by former President Bush, exemplified that under the existing United States laws, the judge lacked lawful precedence to provide guidance on Kane’s assertion. This was because the concern raised by Kane, had not been raised before the Board of Immigration Appeals. It therefore followed that only matters that had been raised when the board convened were admissible for the courts ruling.
The court was empowered to review Kane’s final removal order (8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), 8(b). The United States judicial system with regard to reviewing such an order only permits the said reviewing in the event that the applicant had gone through all available administrative remedies of right. A petitioner’s failure of exhausting his concern through the established administrative structure, which is ideally set to resolve arising cases, creates a bar for the court (Wang v. Ashcroft, 2001). This is because the court is only mandated to step into