These perceptions, in turn, are not just consequences of an examination or analysis of judgments of experience into their inseparable parts. According to Kant, before “a judgment of perception can become a judgment of experience; it is requisite that the perception should be subsumed under some concept of the understanding.” (41) From this perspective, perceptions would supposedly lead us to make our judgments and that synthesis appears only in so far as the priori conceptions of the understanding enable us to go beyond the particular judgment of perception and to turn them into universal judgment of experience. To prove, according to Kant, the possibility of experience in the context of the a priori concept of understanding, one needs to represent what belongs to judgments in general and the various moments of the understanding in them. (42)
Kant explained that understanding provided us with the categories that we could use in order to judge experience. He argued that this is particularly useful in judging ideas, such as the soul, God or freedom – things that are beyond experience. Understanding in his philosophy is not unlike judging, specifically when the act is done to unite representations in a consciousness.
Again, the fundamental elements here are the intuition as well as Kant’s concept of the noumena or things in themselves, existing outside our intuitions such as Kant’s metaphysical knowledge which abstracts from all experience. “Experience,” wrote Kant, “consists of intuition, which belong to sensibility, and of judgments, which are solely the understanding’s business.” (43) This explanation is one of Kant’s depictions of interrelating and interdependent elements required in order to achieve knowledge. To clarify possible confusion, Kant summed his analogies in this way: “the business of the senses is to inuit; that of the understanding, to think.” (Kant