Yet, the labour objected taking the same job classification out of the bargaining unit. This indicates the inherent suspicion that characterizes labour union-management relations and is partly responsible for the fall in job performance of the job testers. The labour union clearly showed this at the hearing. It blamed the management for not only disciplining the defaulting employees but also offering the same job classification to the same defaulting employees when the job classification was removed from the bargaining unit. This suggest the unions ‘I don’t care’ attitude because the testers handled only a job classification in the production process. Their poor performance would not have been undetected by other salaried employees. But the feeling that the management should be responsible for its ‘experimental’ decision might have informed the ‘I don’t care’ attitude. The testers were not considered part of the labours or other employees’ purview.
In addition, one of the differences between salaried job under the non-bargaining unit and hourly job under the bargaining unit is the lack of supervision of non-salaried employees. The company management expressed its inability to discipline the testers despite having knowledge of testers’ poor performance. It means that ‘casualized’ employment focuses on cost minimization measured in terms of output of employees at the expense of employees’ conduct.
Negotiating the issue of the failure of experimental program would have been the normal (or moral) thing to do. The management informed the union in the first place, when it intended to experiment the program. This gave rise to the side bar agreement. Under this agreement, the movement of the tester job classification to the bargaining unit was based on the condition of program success (quality of product). Given this and the subsequent failure of experimental program, the management ought