fore I am) which implies that one’s consciousness, set of thoughts or thinking or ability to doubt would give proof of his own existence because of the ‘I’ or ego that conceives it (The Meditations).
The argument is a representational development in response to Meditation I and indicates that one’s own existence is certain only within a first-person context, exclusive of any other existences beyond this point. It does not also state the necessity for existence, except the principle that if someone thinks, then he exists necessarily. “I am, I exist”—proposition follows as the third in support of the main argument (Cogito). It would, however, only hold true in effect as it is preferred to be entertained by being deceived and having thoughts whether to accept deception in mind or not. From here, a stronger basis for truths is then established with absolute certainty. Descartes had sought to conclude that ‘I’ is a thinking thing or something that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, and makes use of sensory perceptions which goes well beyond defining within explicit limitations (Meditations). The evidence shown herewith through his wax example may then draw his recognition in which ‘I’, though could possibly exist without a body, cannot be separate or wholly distinct, as a thinking entity, from the body.
In the case of bundle theory of the self on the other hand, David Hume had rather asserted, in the absence of identity, that objects are a bundle of their properties, which in relation to the mind applies the common logic in the sense that an individual is a product of his thoughts and experiences (Droar). He was, nevertheless, unable to come up with his version of an entity or the ‘I’ that any normal rationale considers as fundamental in collecting or holding the bundles. While Hume, after a period of contemplation, admitted to have employed “looking within” only to find out a series of perceptions, the medium or the idea necessary to