The functions of the IMF, WB and WTO have expanded in ways unforeseen to eventually affect a wider than ever range of policies and programmes. Necessarily, the international organizations exerted influences over national jurisdictions, which generally fell into two categories. The first is in the form of expansions in broader and deeper conditions applied to borrowing members, including each nation’s domestic and municipal governance, and the policy-setting framework of their economic institutions. The second has to do with the set of commitments binding upon the member states upon establishment of the World Trade Organization in 1995, extending further into other areas traditionally governed by local legislation (Woods & Narlikar, 2001).
Financial intrusions. The first kind of interference was intensified during the 1990s upon the occurrences of the regional financial crises during the 1990s, prompting the industrialized and powerful members of the IMF and World Bank to call for “forceful, far reaching structural reforms” and correct the perceived weaknesses in the domestic financial systems in the member countries – referring, in retrospect, to the weaker member nations of the IMF and World Bank. Kapur (2001) determined that the international financial institutions’ (IFI’s) “performance criteria” which formed the condition for loans, for a sample of 25 countries, rose from some 6 to 10 in the 1980s, to 26 measures in the 1990s. The number of programme objectives likewise increased, requiring countries to mobilise, redefine, strengthen or upgrade an expanding range of government processes (Wood & Narlikar, 2001). Many have protested that the level of conditionality being imposed by the IFIs was never intended in their original mandates, which in al aspects gave deference to the absolute sovereignty of states within their jurisdictions. In the late nineties, the conditionality and policy-based lending expanded from what