Soul Theory and Personal Identity - Essay Example

Soul Theory The Two Questions that the Theories of Personal Identity Attempts to Answer Personal identity theory is a philosophical confrontation that has ultimate question concerning our existence that is, who we are and if there is life after death. A personal identity criterion is given over time if the changes in a person that constitute death can be distinguished from the changes that constitute survival. The criterion only goes to an extent of specifying the sufficient and necessary conditions that are required for the survival of the person (Korfmacher, 2006). There is one question that persists in personal identity; the question of life and death. The answer to this question goes to an extent of providing the conditions under which we cease to survive and the conditions under which we survive in the process of particular adventures. The adventures do not have to look fancy as the cases of either brain swaps or human fission. Personal identity theory attempts to tell us if we can exist through the possession of cognitive capacities from fetus to person development or if we could have survived accidents if we found ourselves in a constant vegetative condition (Korfmacher, 2006). The personal identity theories have significant metaphysical and ethical implications and in association with particular normative premises, they can support the condemnation or justification of certain issues such as euthanasia or infanticide, or they could falsify or prove certain characteristics of the religious outlook. These implications assist in making decisions such as whether and how we can be resurrected and if we are the true possessors of souls in which their existence is similar to ours (Korfmacher, 2006). Many of the philosophers have attempted to find the solutions to the problem of personal identity or have dedicated themselves to metaphysical systems that have significant implications in regard to the personal identity problem. Other than the philosophers, majority of the religious belief systems have attempted to offer explicit answers to the question of persistence. It is not surprising that almost everyone holds the notion of pre-theoretical personal identity theory in the sense that they believe in life after death and know the meaning of death (Korfmacher, 2006). The task of solving the metaphysical problem of personal identity essentially involves answering the question of how the phenomenon or principle in virtue of which “entities like us” persist through time is to be specified, under the widely but not universally accepted premises that there is such a phenomenon or principle and that it can be specified. We are concerned, in other words, with the truth-makers of personal identity statements: what makes our judgment that an entity X at time t1 and an entity Y at time t2 are identical true, if X and Y are entities like us? (Korfmacher, 2006). Soul Theory According to this theory, A is the same person as B if and only A has the same soul as B. To know if A is the same individual as B, there is need to know if A has a similar soul as B. According to this theory, the possession of a soul is the basis for an individual’s feelings, desires and memories and this is the whole basis for an individual’s personality. When an individual loses memory or the personality changes, the soul remains unchanged and this supports the basis that it is the same person over time (Drury University, n.d.). An example is the notion we have that a victim of amnesia is the same person as before. The actions of these people may be different but we often say that they are still the same people. Amnesia victims have complete loss of their memories and they are unaware of their surroundings although these surroundings were familiar before the disease. Since none of the desires, personality or the memories of the old individual remains, then it seems that the soul is the one offering the criterion of identity (Drury University, n.d.). Soul Theory Objections The first objection to this theory concerns the identification problem of what actually souls are. The other objections are criticisms in regard to personal identity; the necessary conditions for personal identity and the insufficient conditions for personal identity. Leibniz asks a significant question on our willingness to have our souls switched into the bodies of prominent people such as Bill Gates. According to soul theory, the individual would become extremely rich and he would have all the desires and the memories of Bill Gates. Leibniz thinks that no individual would agree to the switching of souls and this proves that no one finds it insightful that the same soul can be sufficient enough for personal identity (Drury University, n.d.). Locke Nestor asks what we would think if some aspects of our soul were removed and placed into another individual’s body and soul. If such a case happens, then our desires and memories would be present in the other person. Locke asserts that our intuitions have moved our location to the other person’s body and thus, our instincts provide a suggestion that souls are not mandatory conditions for personal identity (Drury University, n.d.). My Response to these Objections None has been able to identify what souls are and if they are similar in all individuals. Personal identity has to be unique in order to be able to distinguish an individual from the rest. I totally agree with Leibniz that that no individual would agree to has his soul switched. We all want to maintain our personal identity and this proves that the same soul cannot be used for personal identity. On the other hand I would not agree with Locke’s idea; souls are very unique and thus, they are enough conditions for personal identity. The reason is that even if our desires and memories are present in the other person, the soul remains with the original body and it is only the desires and memories that would have moved their position and not the soul. A good example is an amnesia victim, the desires and memories are lost but the soul remains within that individual and it can be used for personal identity. References Drury University. (n.d.). Section 4.1: The self as substance. Retrieved from http://www2.drury.edu/cpanza/soul-theory.html Korfmacher, C. (2006, May 29). Personal identity. Retrieved from http://www.iep.utm.edu/person-i/ Read More