Could the US Government Have Prevented the Rwanda Genocide - Research Paper Example

Could the US Government have prevented the Rwanda Genocide? Introduction The extremely fast paced nature of the genocide almost succeeded in eliminating the entire Tutsi population of Rwanda. Genocide could have been prevented. However, during the initial weeks of the genocide the United States and the whole international community responded with indifference and misunderstanding, erroneously believing the atrocities to either be part of renewed hostilities between the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR), or as a result of renewed ethnic tension and civil war. Thus, the main contributing factor to the slow response of the United States was the inability or disinclination to recognize that what was occurring was genocide. Early Warning Signs: Disregarded and Discarded While an initial misunderstanding of the situation contributed to a sluggish response, warning signs of an impending catastrophe were evident prior to April 1994. As early as 1992 there was evidence that genocide was in the planning stages, negating Western claims that the genocide was not predictable. From November 1993 to January 1994 there were more signs and signals that something terrible was about to transpire. In December 1993, Romeo Dallaire received information from various sources that something was about to occur, including: a letter from high-ranking Rwandan military officials warning of planned massacres; a press release from a bishop stating that guns were being disseminated to civilians; intelligence reports recording secret meetings detailing plans for coordinating attacks on Tutsis, opponents of Hutu power, and UN peacekeepers. Additionally, the killing of Tutsis was being encouraged while anti-Tutsi sentiment was being disseminated in newspapers and over the airwaves (Carlsson et al., 10-12). Perhaps the most famous warning of genocide came from Dallaire himself, who sent a cable to UN headquarters in New York on January 11, 1994. However, the contents of the so-called genocide fax fell on deaf ears. Despite these warnings, countries still feigned indifference when the genocide began. Regardless, international community and particularly the US were relatively well ­informed of the conditions in-country prior to the outbreak of genocide (Burkhalter ‘The 1994 Rwandan Genocide’ 45) The US Role: Hindrance and Inaction During the genocide the US impeded actions within the UN that would have facilitated an international response, namely by "raising one objection after another to various Security Council proposals to upgrade UNAMIR" (Burkhalter ‘A Preventable Horror’ 20). Okbazghi Yohannes, an international relations scholar, notes that, "The Clinton Administration began to play an obstructionist role at the UN Security Council for reasons of political expediency and fear of the cost that UN intervention might entail." (Yohannes 36-37). The Clinton Administration sought to escape involvement in Rwanda by continuing to deny that genocide was occurring. By not using the "g-word", as it was referred to at the State Department, the US felt it would not be obligated to act under the terms of the Genocide Convention (Stanton 7). A June 15 New York Times editorial noted that, "What really seems to worry the Clinton team is that talk of genocide may increase clamor for doing something more to stop it, especially since the US is a party to the Genocide Convention" (New York Times 1). However, even before June 15 a number of sources were already calling the atrocities genocide. Oxfam, the British aid agency, had termed the killings genocide by April 30, while Alison Des Forges of HRW wrote an editorial in which she termed the atrocities genocide and urged President Clinton to act. In her passionate plea, she advocated that if troops were found the US and other nations should pay the costs of the mission (Des Forges 154). Despite these determinations that genocide was occurring, it did little to sway American policy. While traditionally endorsing the pledge of "never again" the actions of the US and other states are incommensurate with respect to the atrocities that occurred in Rwanda in 1994, especially in light of the existence of the Genocide Convention. Though the Clinton Administration refused to label the slaughter genocide until June, there was early recognition in the US government that genocide was occurring. In fact, an April 26 intelligence estimate issued by Carl Pendorff termed the Rwandan massacres genocide (Stanton 7). Another US intelligence analyst noted in late April that, "The plan appears to have been to wipe out any RPF ally or potential ally, and thus raise the costs and limit the possibility of an RPF/Tutsi takeover….No end to the unprecedented bloodshed is yet in sight" (cited in Ferroggiaro, 1). While discussions were ongoing in the State Department on how to respond to the "conflict", trepidation concentrated on the word "genocide". According to Gregory Stanton, the Legal Advisors Office in the State Department opined that officials should avoid using the word genocide because 1) the intent of the perpetrators could not be determined; and 2) doing so would oblige the US to do something (Stanton 6). Amnesty International USA reports that the decision from the Legal Advisors Office to refer to the atrocities merely as "acts of genocide" was undertaken in a bid to "first and foremost avoid negative public reactions triggered by the intervention in Somalia; but the second reason was to avoid the legal obligation to prevent genocide and to punish those responsible, as outlined in the Convention on Genocide" (cited in Cushman 328). Furthermore, a May 1 discussion paper on Rwanda warned US officials to "be careful" and avoid using the word "genocide": "Legal at State was worried about this yesterday - Genocide finding could commit USG (US government) to actually do something" (Discussion Paper 1). While the word "genocide" first appeared in the French newspaper Liberation on April 12, it was not until June 10 that the US government officially referred to the Rwandan slaughter as genocide (Stanton 8). Human Rights Watch released a report in May 1994 which labeled the slaughter genocide and urged the international community to clearly and forcefully condemn genocide in Rwanda by calling the horror by its rightful name (Human Rights Watch, 14). US government documents from the spring of 1994, released through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), demonstrate inconsistencies in what the State Department and Pentagon knew and what it was ready to tell the American people and the world. As previously mentioned, intelligence reports had determined that genocide was occurring by April 26. Yet Secretary of State Christopher did not publicly refer to the atrocities as genocide until June 10. A May 9 Defense Intelligence Report, for example, states that the violence that broke out immediately following the downing of Habyarimanas plane was not spontaneous, but rather, directed by top officials within the government, while identifying the army as pursuing genocide to demolish the leadership of the Tutsi community. (Defense Intelligence Report 1-7). Other documents prepared for the State Department focus on public utterances of the term genocide. A May 16 draft legal analysis from the Office of the Legal Advisor was prepared for Christophers decision regarding the public use of the word "genocide" to describe events in Rwanda. It notes that, "There can be little question that the specific listed acts [of genocide] have taken place in Rwanda" since acts have been undertaken with the intent of destroying the Tutsi group in whole or in part (Draft Legal Analysis 1). At this point the US government recognized (at least internally) that the Hutu-perpetuated atrocities in Rwanda met the definition of genocide as outlined in the Genocide Convention but preferred not to make this finding public. The author of the memo also noted that the number of dead (which was estimated at 200,000 - 500,000 in the memo) was irrelevant in determining whether or not genocide had occurred, presumably because the intent was now obvious. Moreover, the memo recognized that the genocide was being perpetrated by government officials (Draft Legal Analysis 1-3). In fact, Deputy Secretary of State for African Affairs, Prudence Bushnell, was in contact with Colonel Theoneste Bagosora, one of the main coordinators of the genocide, to urge an end to the killing, while Bagosora contended that the killing was subsiding and that a cease-fire was needed (Ferroggiaro 1). Lower level State Department officials also contacted Rwandan officials on a regular basis to plead for an end to the killing but to little effect. Another memo, dated May 21, was directed at Christopher from a number of his subordinates who believed that "[State] Department officials should be authorized to state the Departments conclusion that acts of genocide have occurred in Rwanda" (Action Memorandum 3). This memo represents the internal debate that was taking place on the wording of the atrocities. Christopher responded by finally allowing State Department officials to admit that "acts of genocide have occurred". The memo also finds that stating that "acts of genocide" were occurring "would not have any particular legal consequences," since the memo concludes that the US has no recourse to try people for genocide committed in foreign countries, by non-Americans. The memo further states that, "We believe… that we should send a clear signal that the United States believes that acts of genocide have occurred in Rwanda" since not doing so would undermine the credibility of the US "with human rights groups and the general public, who may question how much evidence we can legitimately require before coming to a policy conclusion" (Action Memorandum 3). Such an action, however, was not forthcoming Despite evidence that genocide was occurring the Clinton Administration still avoided the "g-word" and still refused to respond. This reluctance to outright term the killings as genocide seems to reinforce a general preference of the Clinton Administration to not become involved, as it was unwilling to invest and round-up the requisite political will. Such an attitude can be partially attributed to the US experience in Somalia, which apparently had such a profound effect on US foreign policy that the White House was prepared to ignore another genocide on its watch (Bosnia, where there was a finding of genocide, being the first one). Whether or not the effects of Somalia were actually felt this deeply in Washington, it definitely afforded a convenient excuse to avoid intervention in Rwanda while providing the rationale for what basically amounted to genocide denial (in public) for fear of being forced to act. While US officials argued over terminology, hundreds of thousands of Tutsis were slaughtered. As April turned into May, the Clinton Administration "dithered and prevaricated," finally acquiescing and voting in favor of the UN compromise plan on May 17, establishing UNAMIR II (Power, ‘A Problem from Hell’, 377-380). However, the US refused to participate in this force and later went back on its pledge to provide equipment, vehicles, and training until the genocide was long over (Burkhalter ‘A Preventable Horror’ 20). As one author noted, "Washington doomed effective United Nations action. Weeks were lost while the US quarreled with the UN over costs and terms of using American vehicles." US policy, however, did more than just fail to send troops (Burkhalter ‘A Preventable Horror’ 20). It led a successful effort to remove most of the UN peacekeepers that were already in Rwanda (UNAMIR)... [T]he United States in fact did virtually nothing "to try to limit what occurred." Indeed, staying out of Rwanda was an explicit US policy objective (Power, Bystanders to Genocide, Section 1). The US post-genocide response to the problems created by the genocide was completely opposite to its response during the genocide. In fact, President Clinton referred to the emerging refugee problem as the worlds worst humanitarian crisis in a generation, and then added, strangely, that "from the beginning of this tragedy, the United States has been in the forefront of the international communitys response." (cited in Ronayne, 184). The only forefront the US was at was the forefront to prevent any sort of response. Unless, of course, he was only referring to the refugee problem, not recognizing that his and the failure of others to act during the genocide had contributed to the humanitarian problems that now presented themselves. Nonetheless, the US responded to the refugee crisis with gusto, as President Clinton requested some $320 million in emergency relief funds from Congress and deployed 4,000 troops to aid in the humanitarian crisis in the refugee camps in Goma (in the DRC). The Clinton Administration was quick to point out that US troops would only be used to provide humanitarian relief and not, under any circumstances, be used to keep the peace (Power, ‘Problem from Hell’ 381). By August 1994 the US had deployed 2,000 troops to participate in Operation Support Hope (Ronayne, 184-185). In a July 22, 1994, speech Clinton noted all the efforts being undertaken by the US, including the infusion of money and supplies. Ironically, all of the efforts that Clinton announced would have been most helpful during the actual genocide, including counteracting Hutu propaganda radio broadcasts, the deployment of UN peacekeepers, and the delivery of needed equipment (such as APCs). The language of Clintons speech conveys his recognition of the severity of the situation, as he spoke about the steps necessary to improve the situation for the millions of refugees. However, earlier recognition by his administration that genocide was occurring in Rwanda would have minimized the need to deal with a refugee problem in the first place. Conclusion While the genocide itself was perpetuated with a swiftness and efficiency never before seen, the response of the international community was sadly lacking. Despite a number of indicators predicting genocide in Rwanda, the genocide caught the international community by surprise. While the international community was ill-prepared to respond to the genocide, it was soon evident that there was also a lack of political will at the UN, and most especially within the US government. United States could have prevented genocide. However, during the course of the genocide US leaders continued to deny that genocide was occurring and refused to label it as such. As State Department and Pentagon documents show, there was a great reluctance to invoke the word genocide. It would take more than two months before the State Department was prepared to state in public that "acts of genocide" had occurred, as the Clinton Administration seemingly feared the repercussions of what doing so entailed. Despite this lackluster response to the genocide, the US response to the humanitarian crises that emerged as a result of the genocide was much more forthcoming. Work Cited Books Cushman, Thomas. A Matter of Principle: Humanitarian Argument for War in Iraq. University of California Press, 2005. Des Forges, Alison, Leave None To Tell The Story, Genocide in Rwanda, Human Rights Watch & FIDH, New York, 1999. Power, Samantha. Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide. New York: Basic Books, 2002. Ronayne, Peter. Never again?: the United States and the prevention and punishment of Genocide since the Holocaust. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001. Journals Burkhalter, Holly. "A Preventable Horror?" Africa Report 39, no. 6 (November/December 1994): 17-21. Power, Samantha. "Bystanders to Genocide: Why the United States Let the Rwandan Tragedy Happen." Atlantic Monthly 288, no. 2 (September 2001): 84-108. Stanton, Gregory H. "Could the Rwandan Genocide Have Been Prevented?" Paper presented at the "Generations of Genocide" conference sponsored by the Institute of Contemporary History and the Weiner Library. Yohannes,Okbazghi. "The United States and Sub-Saharan Africa after the Cold War: Empty promises and retreat." The Black Scholar 32, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 23-44 Other Sources Action Memorandum "Has Genocide Occurred in Rwanda?". May 21, 1994. Secret. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/rw052194.pdf Burkhalter, Holly. "The 1994 Rwandan Genocide and US Policy: Congressional Testimony of Holly Burkhalter, Physicians for Human Rights, Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Operations." May 5, 1998. http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Urgent_Action/apic_52698.html Carlsson, Ingvar Sung-Joo, Han Kupolati, Rufus M. Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the UN During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, S/1999/1257. New York: United Nations, 1999, 10-12. Defense Intelligence Report, Defense Intelligence Agency, "Rwanda: The Rwandan Patriotic Fronts Offensive," May 9, 1994 http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/rw050994.pdf Discussion Paper, “Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East/Africa Region,” Department of Defense, May 1, 1994. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/rw050194.pdf Draft Legal Analysis, “Office of the Legal Advisor, Department of State, drafted by Assistant Legal Advisor for African Affairs Joan Donoghue”, May 16, 1994. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/rw051694.pdf Ferroggiaro, William. The US and the Genocide in Rwanda 1994: Evidence of Inaction. 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