Legal Aspects of Exploiting the Weaknesses of Terrorists - Research Paper Example

Legal Aspects of Exploiting the Weaknesses of Terrorists I will put my here I will put my the of my school here I will put the of my subject here I will put the name of my teacher here 08/20/2011 Legal Aspects of Exploiting the Weaknesses of Terrorists Abstract Several organizational weaknesses of terrorist organizations can be exploited through a number of measures. In general the measures are within the ambit of the laws of the United States or can be asserted to be consistent within the laws of the United States. There are prospects for improving the laws of the United States to accommodate wider latitude of actions that can be done to exploit the organizational weaknesses of terrorists. Nevertheless, the laws that the United States have on hand are generally sufficient. Legal Aspects of Exploiting the Weaknesses of Terrorists It does not need an authority to point out and be convinced that terrorism continues to be a threat in the United States and many countries of the world. The September 11 bombing, popularly known as the 9/11 bombing in 2001 was only the worst terrorist attack in the United States homeland. It was a wake-up call for the American people as thousands of innocents were killed in a conflict they knew nothing about and on which they had no involvement. Suddenly, it occurred to the American people that they are vulnerable to attacks not only abroad but also in their homeland where they are supposed to be safe. Nobody among the American people is safe. The terrorists blend themselves incognito among civilians and the innocents. A purely military or conventional police approach will not fully work as terrorists blend themselves deep among office workers, employees, workers, business people, mothers, commuters, pedestrians, and in all walks of life. America has to confront the threat of terrorism comprehensively. America must face the threat of terrorism at home and confront terrorism whenever it tries to displays its ugly head. However, to defeat terrorism, America must do more. Terrorism is like any of the deadly mosquitoes of the world. It must be stopped or neutralized on sight but America must also destroy its breeding places, its network, its organization, and its personnel. Thus, America must be proactive. It must do what it can to proactively destroy terrorism----its organization, network, supply and logistic lines, and personnel. America must search for the terrorist breeding areas and destroy its network in-situ or on-site. The obligation of America to combat terrorism is an obligation not only to her citizen but also to the international community as well (Carillo-Salcedo, 2009, p. 13). In destroying terrorism at their breeding places, destroying their organizations including the ideological foundation that provides the reason for their (wrong) existence is an important route. Terrorist organizations operating in America have to use secrecy to survive. They operate far from their supply and logistical bases and have to use banking and commercial institutions for their supply lines. As terrorist organizations operate in an ocean of people that is opposed to their existence, they have to use codes and have to operate in small autonomous groups whose list of membership must be secret or unknown to other terrorist organizations. The terrorist organizational set up will have to be autonomous and generally secret with each other because investigation authorities are capable of identifying linkages once the organizational documents of the terrorist organization becomes available to investigation authorities. If the autonomous organizations are not generally unknown with each other, casual communications can happen among themselves that can provide either an electronic or paper trail of the whole terrorist network thereby exposing themselves to security risks. Fortunately for the United States and unfortunately for terrorist organizations, however, the very means that they use to protect their existence create the vulnerabilities that America can use to nip out their existence in the bud. As Day (2009, p. 31) pointed out, “organizations are always vulnerable at some point.” We can identify at least six ways of exploiting the organizational weaknesses that arise from the nature of terrorist organizations, particularly from their characteristics as secret organizations that rely on distant supply bases as they operate on sea of people that is opposed to their existence and as they rely on an ideology that provides a reason for their existence as terrorists organizations. The first organizational weakness that can be exploited among terrorist organization is the secret nature of their operations. This provides an opportunity for law operatives of the United States to plant covert operatives in their midst posing either as sympathizers or terrorists. Of course, homeland security operations like this would likely not last for long as terrorists probably have a system for verifying the identifying their fellow terrorists. Nevertheless, the prospects for using this type of operations remains bright as one or several autonomous groups of terrorists are cut off from their links with their network as a result of police or military operations in progress. The operatives posing as terrorists or terrorist sympathizer can exploit a brief period dislocation or de-linkage of one or several autonomous terrorist groups or operatives to extract information or leads from autonomous terrorist bodies or operatives that are temporarily de-linked from their terrorist organization. Under Title II of Public Law 107-56 or The Patriot Act of 2001 of the 107th Congress, homeland security operatives have the authority to enhanced surveillance against terrorists. The authority to conduct surveillance includes the “authority to intercept wire, oral, and electronic communications relating to terrorism” (Section 201 of the US Patriot Act of 2001). The second organizational weakness of terrorist organizations that anti-terrorist operatives can exploit is the distance of the autonomous terrorist organizations from their main supply bases. This implies that weapons and ammunitions dumps will have to created and located in their areas of operations. In other words, weapons and ammunition dumps or storage places will have to be established in United States for use against the people of the United States. Expectedly, terrorists will have a few weapons and ammunitions in their homes (but some may have none at all in their homes). However, for more effective kills and also because they know that law enforcement authorities are on their trail, terrorists will have to maintain weapons and ammunition dumps or storage places that are of considerable distances from their homes. The implication of this matter on anti-terrorist work is that anti-terrorist units must be on alert for the possible locations of the weapons and ammunitions dumps and must factor this matter in their interrogation of terrorist suspects as well as in monitoring the movements of terrorists or suspected terrorists. On the second organizational weakness, Title V of the US Patriot Act of 2001 removed several obstacles to the investigation of terrorist activities. Although the removal of obstacles is not enough, the removal represents an advance in the strengthening of laws to investigate terrorism and locate terrorist weapons and ammunition dumps. The third organizational weakness of terrorist organizations is their considerable distance from their supply base. Thus, terrorist organizations will have to rely on banks and financial institutions for their existence and operations. This situation provides a window from which military and police operatives can work on. Computer and internet technology provide ways through which we can identify ultimate fund sources for finances that may be somehow linked with a few terrorist personalities. Identification of such linkages will enable military and police authorities to identify the other members of a terrorist network as well as other financial routes through which other autonomous terrorists groups are financed. The appropriate homeland security target for the long run is to eventually identify the list of financial conduits that are used for funding terrorist units in the United States. Of course, the list of the financial conduits is probably fluid and can continually change over time. We have to continually recognize this and must and must continually update our list of financial conduits for terrorists operations and implement proactive measures. Under Title III of the US Patriot Act of 2001, there is an explicit prohibition for US correspondent accounts with foreign shell banks. The US Patriot Act of 2001 also provided for anti-terrorist forfeiture protection, long-arm jurisdiction of over foreign money launderers, forfeiture of terrorist funds in US interbank accounts, measures against corporation represented by terrorist/fugitive, inclusion of foreign corruption offenses as money laundering crimes, a system of financial reports for monitoring the possible use of funds to finance terrorist activities, a reporting system for suspicious financial transactions, a system of penalties for violations on following the requirements for financial reports, money smuggling, illegal money, and extraterritorial jurisdiction (Sections 313 to 377 under Titles II and III under the US Patriot Act of 2001). Section 805 and 806 of the US Patriot Act of 2001 also strengthened the laws that can be invoked for seizing the assets of terrorists. According to the United States Attorney Bulletin (2003, p. 7), the laws against using finances for terrorism has been in the US Statutes even as early as 1994 and that “before 1994, such conduct can only be redressed through money laundering prosecution.” The fourth organizational weakness of terrorist organizations is their likely relative physical looseness when not in active operations like blowing up a train, an airline, a building, and the like. Out of desire to swim like a fish in an ocean of innocents and remain incognito or non-recognizable by law enforcement authorities, terrorists would probably impose some distance from one another and carry on civilian lives for legal fronts as they carry out intelligence work, espionage, identify targets, and plan their kill. This provides several windows of opportunity for homeland security authorities to make secret arrests and interrogate sure suspects or targets whose links with terrorism is at least 100% certain. The arrest information must be as secret as possible so members of the terrorist organizations do not scatter for cover. The arrests and interrogation should even be preferably implemented in a manner that provides false security for terrorists so they do not fly farther from places where they can be most conveniently arrested and detained. This implies low profile arrest, detention, and interrogation of terrorist suspects. Section 213 of the US Patriot Act 2001 supports low profile or less publicize arrests by allowing the for delays in the notice of execution of a warrant. Although the section of the law can be interpreted in various ways, one possible way to interpret the law is that the warrant for surveillance and arrest (and therefore interrogation) need not be known by many as delays of notices and perhaps even of applications for warrants can be delayed. The fifth organizational weakness is the dependence of terrorist organizations on ideology that does not have adequate grounding even in the fundamental source of their ideology---Islam. There is a “radical Islam” that is identified with terrorism and attacks on the innocents in the name of holy war. However, there is also a section of Islamic believers that do not promote terrorism and the killing of the innocent. A possible course of action that is open to anti-terrorist programs in this regard is to support the moderate elements in their interpretation of their Islamic beliefs. This may mean funding the moderate elements of Islam in attacking and discrediting the radical or terrorist elements of Islam. Funding moderate Islam for actions that are not contrary to US laws is, of course, legal under US laws. For example, moderate Islamic groups may be funded for development projects and infrastructure programs and mass base of support among adherents of Islam can be built in the process. Moderate Islam can also be funded to correct the “mistaken views” of radical or terrorist Islam and can therefore directly serve the interests of the United States of America. This is similar to the point raised by the Center for Combating terrorism (2006, p. 43) in that through the funding, “we bring into question the theological justifications for actions as well as the legitimacy of key leaders within Al Qaida.” Finally, the sixth way of exploiting the organizational weaknesses of the terrorist organization is to exploit all rifts within terrorist organizations to incite one group against another group or all the other groups. Other than destroying the organizational effectiveness of terrorist organizations through splits and factions within their ranks, an important benefit from encouraging rifts and factions among their ranks is that we promote demoralization and disillusionment within their ranks. If their war is a holy war, the existence of splits and factions within terrorist organizations can be taken by insiders as indication that nothing is holy in their war against the United States. This can be an important condition or requisite in promoting desertions and abandonment of posts within terrorist organizations. Through espionage and inciting one group against another, we destroy the terrorist organization from within. The Center for Combating Terrorism which is based in the Department of Social Sciences in the US Military Academy has revealed that there are rifts and factions in the terrorist movement and recommended several actions that can be used against terrorism. One of this is to disrupt Al Qaida control of operations and limit its financial efficiency (2006, pp. 41-42). This is possible to do base on the US Patriot Act of 2001 and the US and global community’s anti-money laundering laws. Another recommendation of the Center for Combating terrorism (2006, p. 43) is for United States to “make credible punishment of operatives harder for Al Qaida.” According to the Center for Combating Terrorism (2006, p. 43), “this is most easily done by providing an exit option for members other than indefinite detention or death.” In the Center for Combating Terrorism, this “will make it harder for groups to enforce discipline-hence control-through the use of force against their own members.” Further, according to the Center for Combating Terrorism (2006, p. 43), “offering well-publicized amnesty or reduced punishment for defectors will encourage those dissatisfied with the organization to leave by reducing the perceived cost of exit” from terrorist organization. This particular recommendation of the Center for Combating Terrorism does not appear to contradict US laws and may be useful for destroying terrorism from within through demoralization and promoting internal fights within terrorist organizations. In conclusion, there are at least six ways of exploiting the organizational weaknesses of terrorist organizations. Some of the specific ways through which we can exploit the organizational weaknesses of terrorist organizations can be supported by law or laws can be invoked such that we can use the weakness to destroy the terrorist organization. However, there are also weaknesses that can be exploited but which is difficult to justify under the laws of the United States of America. On this matter, homeland security operations may just have to stretched the meaning of the applicable laws and execute what can justified through an stretched out interpretation of the US laws until the acts are declared either legal or illegal by a competent court of the United States. It must be pointed out, however, that there are actions that can exploit the organizational weaknesses of terrorist organizations that are essentially extremely difficult to justify under our current laws. As the United States is one of leading countries of the world who is proud of her existence as a country ruled by law, then perhaps the best course of action is to refrain from such actions that would interpreted as going against the rule of law. America must maintain a moral high ground in combating terrorism. Depriving ourselves of the moral high ground in combating terrorism will likely weaken the resolve of many of our citizens in the fight against terrorism. If we do not maintain our moral high ground, we may have no sacred principle to defend and we may deprive ourselves of a high morale and moral high ground in the fight against terrorism. Thus, while Reid’s recommendation (2004, p. 2) to treat terrorists as enemy combatants who can be killed rather than as criminals who must be brought to the courts seems plausible, it seems more appropriate nevertheless to avoid killing terrorist. Instead, we must bring terrorist to courts when bringing them to court is possible. This way we are able to attract the Islamic masses to the side of the US on a long term basis rather than having the Islamic masses to be transformed as an enemy of the US for some long time to come. In general, the measures that can be used to exploit the organizational vulnerabilities of terrorist organizations are defensible within the laws of the United States of America. We can use them in our fight against terrorism. References Carillo-Salcedo, J. (2009). Terrorism and general principles of international law. In: P. Fernandez-Sanchez, International legal dimension of terrorism. Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 9-14. Combating Terrorism Center. (2006). Harmony and disharmony: Exploiting Al-Qaida’s organizational vulnerabilities. United States Military Academy: Combating Terrorism Center, Department of Social Sciences. Day, D., Jr. (2009). Exploiting terrorist vulnerabilities: A law enforcement approach to fighting terrorist organization. A Monograph. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies. Scott, R. (2004). Terrorists as enemy combatants. Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College. United States Attorney’s Bulletin. (2003). What is terrorist financing? Terrorist Financing, 51 (4), 7-14. US Congress. (2001). Uniting and strengthening America by providing appropriate tools required to intercept and obstruct terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001. Public Law 107-56, 21 October. Read More