Media in China: Construction and Deconstruction of a National Chinese Community - Essay Example

Media in China: Construction and Deconstruction of a National Chinese Community Past studies on Chinese media have mostly portrayed it in extremes, either as a controlled agency of the state or as a struggling, but staunch advocate of Chinese interests and needs (Hassid, 2008, p.53; Scotton and Hachten, 2010, p.2). Several media scholars, however, insist on understanding the media from a more nuanced perspective, particularly through the critical perspectives of some Chinese media authors (Tong, 2010; Lin, 2007) and cultural studies of audience effects (Ruddock, 2005, p.37; Yang, 2011). Chinese media refer to media agencies, both public and privately organised and managed, that operate in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This paper examines the role that media plays in the construction of a national community in China using Centralised Media Control Theory, Agenda-Setting Theory, Marshall McLuhan’s Media Theories, and Culture Industry theories. Chinese media play an active role in constructing and deconstructing a national community in China, where the former strengthen and threaten the power and influence of the Chinese government on its citizens because the audience is divided among the various, at times opposing, roles of the media in shaping their personal and collective perspectives on their socio-economic, cultural, and political interests and issues. Before these theories are applied on Chinese media, a brief history of the development of Chinese media is discussed because it provides the contextual and historical foundations of the former. Newspapers were published in China during the 1890s, though they were mostly controlled by missionaries and foreigners (Hachten, 2010, p.20). Progressive young Chinese thinkers later on participated in newspaper writing, as they practiced the objective ideals of journalism (Hachten, 2010, p.20). After the May Fourth Movement, books were published, alongside the formation of financially and politically autonomous newspapers in Chinese (Hachten, 2010, p.20). Nationalist censorship, nevertheless, curtailed the development of autonomous Chinese media in the 1930s, which began with the domination of the Kuomintang (KMT) throughout the 1920s (Hachten, 2010, p.20). The KMT enforced strict media censorship, where media were expected to promote KMT doctrine, although the KMT lacked an organised control of the media (Hachten, 2010, p.20). Though these events supported the Authoritarian Theory of the Press, the media had greater freedom of press during the KMT than throughout the ruling of the Communist Party or the Chinese Communist Party (CPP) (Hachten, 2010, p.20). Under the Communist Party, Chinese media developed in four stages. The first stage happened in 1949, after Communist troops controlled mainland China and persevered until 1966, when the Cultural Revolution took place (Hachten, 2010, p.21). Private ownership of the media was terminated and the media became an organ for government propaganda. Manipulation of the press increased during the “Great Leap Forward,” wherein significant emphasis was put on social classes and the news reported inaccurate stories, such as the embroidery of crop production in newspapers, while millions of Chinese peasants died from starvation (Hachten, 2010, p.21). The second stage of Chinese media history started, when only 43 newspapers continued publication throughout the Cultural Revolution, and where all of them acted as party organs (Hachten, 2010, p.21). Provincial party papers merely copied the People’s Daily in content and perspective, so many Chinese saw the media as a source of “false, exaggerated, and empty” news (Hachten, 2010, p.21). The third and fourth stages ranged the open policies of China and the Tiananmen incident. The third stage started with the Third Plenary Session of the convention of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP in December 1978. Deng Xiaoping’s open door policies encouraged the development of the media (Hachten, 2010, p.21). The most significant media changes were the call for press freedom and representation of all sectors, production of journalistic policies, and independence of some news agencies (Hachten, 2010, p.21). State subsidies for media agencies dropped, so advertising and other kinds of financing increased (Hachten, 2010, p.21). The fourth and last phase happened during the student uprising at Tiananmen Square in Beijing in 1989. The army stopped the students’ demonstrations and the state reversed some of the earlier modest gains in press freedom (Hachten, 2010, p.21). The central government charged the media for promoting bourgeois sentiments, affecting public opinion, giving false information, and emphasising entertainment (Hachten, 2010, p.21). The post-Tiananmen media history represents a paradox, where economic incentives enabled media commercialisation, while the government controlled political coverage and news that affects the political image of China (Hachten, 2010, p.21). Hachten (2010) calls this a “mix of Party logic and market logic,” an idiosyncratic trait of media in China up to present times (p.21). Thus, the ruling Chinese Communist Party strives to preserve its orthodox Leninist principles, while supporting the prosperity and financial independence of Chinese media. One of the foremost theories on Chinese media is the Centralised Media Control Theory because it supports the authoritarian approach of the government toward the media. This theory promotes a national image of China according to Communist principles and agenda. Chinese media studies have created a “centralised media control theory” that describes the close relationship between the media and the government, which began since the Central Propaganda Department (CPD) became the seat of the Chinese national propaganda system (Tong, 2010, p.925). The CPD represents the principles and opinions of the Chinese Communist Party, where it provides instructions and oversees cultural production in Chinese society, so that “all societies in China should speak with one voice” (Tong, 2010, p.925). The marketisation and globalisation of the media, especially with new media, have not hampered the monopolisation of media control (Lin, 2007; Kennedy, 2009; Stockmann and Gallagher, 2011). The CCP applies two interrelated principles in managing the media and the public in general. The first principle is totalitarianism of the state–society relationship. The state controls every domain of social life because a strong centralised leadership is argued as critical to national welfare (Tong, 2010, p.927). The second principle is the customary Chinese Marxist normative theory of the role of media. This theory argues that the media system should be integrated into the political system as its propaganda tool. The ruling party must monopolise media content, so that a uniform ideology can be spread among the populace to ensure consistent governance and to curb opposition (Huang, 2006). These two principles indicate that the Chinese media should behave as the voice of the party. It represents the party and promotes its policies and principles to ensure the unity of the Chinese society. Journalists are seen as government employees, who enjoy public privileges, as long as they do not criticise the government (Hassid, 2008, p.53). Media control is centralised in the ruling party’s hands, thereby promoting the latter’s power and influence over the populace (Scotton and Hachten, 2010, p.2). The role of the media is to construct and to reinforce a national image that is aligned with CPP agenda and principles. Through media monopolisation, the Chinese government strongly influences media effects on its populace. Kennedy (2009) examined how an authoritarian regime like the PRC acquires and maintains the support of the majority of its citizens, including educated ones. He proposed that the exposure-acceptance model can help explain high public support for the Chinese government. The model consists of two components, “exposure to political news and level of education” (Kennedy, 2009, p.518). The model indicates that educated citizens who have political awareness tend to exhibit high political support for authoritarian ruling, but citizens with the highest educational levels are inclined to resist political messages, so they have lower levels of political support (Kennedy, 2009, p.518). Kennedy (2009) employed the China national sample, which was gathered during the 2000 WorldValues Survey (WVS), to check the validity of the exposure-acceptance model, where he categorised the data into urban and rural sub-samples. Findings showed that education and media exposure have significant impacts on public support for Chinese leadership among rural citizens, and that there is a curvilinear relationship between education and regime support; however, this curvilinear relationship is not found significantly among urban Chinese participants (Kennedy, 2009, p.531). Kennedy (2009) concluded that despite having a high level of education, media exposure to government-controlled media can result to high support for the government, particularly when education is a controlled aspect of Chinese society (p.532). The media serves the propagandistic purposes of the state, where audience effects are maximised through media and education control (Ruddock, 2005, p.19). Thus, where the government effectively controls media exposure and educational curriculum, the Centralised Media Control Theory can hold true for Chinese media. Centralised Media control theory, however, is mediated through local political power. Tilt and Xiao (2010) underscored that not all local media organisations bend to centralised media control because some local news agencies expose government inefficiencies and corruption too. Tong (2010) studied the crisis of centralised media control in China, where he argues that local power affects media control as well. He asserts that “the intrusion of local power stratifies Chinese media control” and “Chinese propaganda control is no longer the homogeneous, top-down sort that dominated the media in the past” (Tong, 2010, p.926). Local governments drive economic power, and economic power provides power over local masses, as well as the local media (Tong, 2010, p.928). Economic decentralisation can lead to some level of political decentralisation, thereby reshaping centralised authoritarian political structures (Chien, 2010). Tong (2010) argues that the local media is closely linked with local power, where local media is subservient to locally powerful elites because of either the goal of supporting local political and economic status quo, or the goal of involvement in local interest activities (p.929). Local power structures seek to uphold their political hegemony and to defend their economic interests, which they can attain through propaganda control. Tong (2010) provides the example of the 2006 Zuoyun mine disaster, where the local media reported that five were killed, when actually 56 died. During this time, the central government blamed the local media for distorting facts, while the local media charged the cross-regional media for attacking them for misreporting (Tong, 2010, p.934). Tong (2010) inferred that the local media serves local political interests more than centralised political interests. Hence, local governments can be seen as using hegemonic practices that the centralised government used in the past, thereby controlling local media organisations more powerfully than the latter at some instances. Local media contests the power of the centralised and cross-regional media in providing local community images for local citizens. Local politicians can further be seen as setting the agenda for local media, as in the agenda-setting theory of the media, although the agenda can be connected to the national image of China. In the National Conference on Propaganda Work in 2004, Li Changchun, the leader of this effort, required all party officials to practice a steady control over the “correct” supervision of public opinion and to enhance ways of shaping it (Chan, 2007, p.547). “The guidance of public opinion (yulun daoxiang)” dominated Chinese media policy since the 1990s, as the state focused on influencing social opinions through media controls (Chan, 2007, p.547). Chan (2007) calls this as agenda-setting that has shifted from “what people think to what people think about” (p.548). The goal of the state is to control what people think about, such as diverting their focus from one issue to another. Chan (2007) studied the publicly recorded agreements of political leaders regarding issues that deal with public opinions using a triangulated research design. Findings showed that in mass media, the party state concentrates more on affecting social agenda than advocating political ideology (Chan, 2007, p.558). The state wants to set the social agenda for the people, which consist of the more subtle ways of politically shaping the public than imposing its political ideology (Chan, 2007, p.558). The state provides the social agenda that supports its political ideology regarding the state, its goals and the outcomes of its actions. Another study investigates the impact of agenda-setting for the TV coverage of a mega sports event on national image. Zeng, Go, and Kolmer (2011) used media content analysis and case study research design to determine, if the media coverage of the Beijing Olympics 2008 changed the national image of China in international TV. They employed data from the database of news coverage from the Media Tenor Institute for Media Content Analysis (Zeng et al., 2011, p.325). Media Tenor gives international media content analysis of print, TV, radio, online blogs and news groups that can be accessed by journalists, scholars, politicians, and managers (Zeng et al., 2011, p.325). Findings showed that though the Chinese government wanted a better image for China after the Olympics, the sports event did not significantly advance the national image of China because the “Breadth and Attribution of China’s image [remained] relatively stable” (Zeng et al., 2011, p.333). Still, media coverage increased interest in China and the Chinese, especially before and during the Olympics, but not afterwards. Political agenda do not always attain its target social and political interests in the long run, considering the complexity of how the international community and national Chinese community form their perceptions of what China is all about. Aside from the agenda-setting theory, McLuhan’s Media Theories have influenced some Chinese media scholars in their media effects on national identity formation and development. Minglian (2011) investigated the appeal of McLuhan’s theories to Chinese scholars and citizens. He argued that there are six aspects that supported these theories, and the first is the appreciation for McLuhans writing. Minglian (2011) believed that the rapid popularity of the Internet among Chinese users reinforces McLuhan’s idea of a global village that connects all tribes (p.2). The medium is critical to the global village: “The messages being sent are quite secondary to the importance of being able to send and receive written messages all over the world” (Minglian, 2011, p.2). Chinese netizens appreciate the idea that they can access a wide range of information, despite the existence of Chinese government controls on media, including the Internet. The second aspect is that Chinese Internet users are aware of their global village citizenship. Around 457 million Chinese Internet consumers believe that they are part of the “global village,” where they can expand “their central nervous systems” (Minglian, 2011, p.2). Electronic media extends their thinking and affects their behaviours. The third aspect is that an increasing number of Chinese people think that the media can transform traditions. The Internet is perceived as more trustworthy than centralised news agencies: The Internet provides not only inexhaustible and timely information resources for Chinese to study and as a source of entertainment; it also acts as a reliable and convenient source for Chinese to access whatever the local public media has not reported and to check the truth and accuracy of whatever it has covered. (Minglian, 2011, p.3). An example of using the Internet to find out the truth and to spread it is when Zhou Jiugeng, the former director of Jiangning District Housing Authority, gave a speech on 28 December 2008. His speech angered the public because of his luxurious life, when his salary as a public official cannot possibly sustain such a lifestyle (Minglian, 2011, p.3). Chinese netizens exposed further information about Zhou Jiugeng’s luxury houses and bribes he accepted. A few months after, the party expelled him and sued him for bribery and other crimes (Minglian, 2011, p.3). Thus, this is an example of how the media can change negative local practices and promote positive new community ideals. The fourth aspect is that Marshall McLuhans theoretical writing allows Chinese scholars to expand their media theories and practices too. Minglian (2011) stresses that while Western critics show that McLuhan’s highly theoretical language lacks logical details, this “weakness” is seen as a form of strength among some Chinese scholars. He underscores that theoretical thinking inspires creativity and innovation in media theories in China: Not only Marshall McLuhans highly theoretical style of writing provides an opportunity for Chinese academics to extend their academic research, and to expand their own thoughts as well, but also Marshall McLuhans academic ethic demonstrates for Chinese academics how to seek the new findings and produce creative merits. (Minglian, 2011, p.4). He believes that the repression during the Cultural Revolution hampered creative scholarly thought, but thanks to the encouraging media principles of McLuhan, several Chinese scholars have practiced independent thought in analysing media effects and functions in society. The fifth aspect pertains to the enlightenment that comes from McLuhans concepts of “hot medium” and “cold medium.” “Hot medium” refers to media that provide clear and high-definition information, where the media is hot enough to not necessitate imagination and audience participation (Minglian, 2011, p.4). Hot medium is compared to hitting audiences like large waves, where they feel overwhelmed with the information (Minglian, 2011, p.4). On the opposite, “cold medium” gives fuzzy but comfortable, low-definition information, and so the audience can participate and offer their own knowledge to fill up missing details (Minglian, 2011, p.4). Minglian (2011) explains that the trend nowadays is to replace hot shows with cold ones, a reform that the Chinese masses readily embrace (p.4). The Chinese audience are not passive consumers of the media, but intend to participate more fully in conversations that affect their lives. The sixth aspect is the effect of McLuhans theories on Chinese media theories, including teaching methodologies and techniques, specifically in culture and communication fields. Minglian (2011) provides the prevailing sentiment of many Chinese academics on McLuhan’s writings. He stresses that in culture and communication fields, these theories have rise in popularity: Chinese academics in the fields of culture and communication are trying hard to liberate their research and teaching from being text/content-centred and plunge into being reader/audience-centred — focusing on the audiences feeling, the audiences receptive effects; also they are combining their new teaching methodology and technique with a close co-operation with the media. (Minglian, 2011, p.5). On the one hand, Chinese educators use McLuhan’s theories to focus more on reader concerns and interpretations. They understand individual and social thoughts on diverse social and political issues. On the other hand, Chinese scholars exemplify praxis, where they improve media theories through interacting and learning with media practitioners. Armchair theorising no longer suffices, as theory and practice merge together. Another impact of McLuhan’s writings on Chinese education is the shift toward studying the interrelated effects between the media and the audience (Minglian, 2011, p.5). Xiu Yaokui underscored: “McLuhan paid great attention to the inter-relationship between the individual audience and communication technique. For him, it is a private affair between the communication media and the individual audience” (Minglian, 2011, p.5). McLuhan’s theories provide a way for scholars and Chinese citizens to use media for their diverse collective and individual interests. These theories offer a framework for integrating the role of media in deconstructing national identity into national identities, where deconstruction pertains to perspectives that oppose grand narratives or existing ideologies (Balkin, 1996). The final media theory concerns the cultural industry. This culture includes both the media culture and national culture of China. Adorno (2003) defines the culture industry in a more expansive and evolving way. He says: “The culture industry fuses the old and familiar into new quality” (p.55). It is an industry that grows and develops throughout time. The culture industry exists in a binary opposition. High art is seen as superior to low art that aims to either copy or deconstruct the former. Furthermore, the masses are not the subjects, but the objects of the culture industry (Adorno, 2003, p.55). Using this theory, Chinese media fit the cultural industry of the state to some extent. They are used to espouse communist culture. The effectiveness of the partnership between state-controlled media and Chinese government can be seen in the study of Liua and Bates (2009). They reviewed secondary research to compare American and Chinese public trust in their news media. Findings showed that the Chinese had higher trust in their news media more than Americans. Liua and Bates (2009) understand that cultural differences arise, where Americans tend to be more critical-minded of the news and their government than the Chinese. The Chinese can be seen as respecting authority and news credibility more than Americans. Their media culture reflects their cultural beliefs about authority and power. Bird (2005) talks about media culture, which is embedded in the cultural domains of its target audience (p.3). Like other scholars, she explores audience studies, where the media has a role in affecting the audience in different ways. For the Chinese, they may question state media’s credibility at times, but they may generally trust their government to consider their social interests over personal interests. These theories bring the paper to the ontological and epistemological issues of media theory and media research. What people know and how they come about to know what they know depend on existing beliefs and attitudes about knowledge and people, as well as other factors that impact how people think and what people write about. Ruddock (2005) reminds scholars and readers that their research design and methods, as well as analysis, is not value-free. Instead, they have preconceived values and notions that impact the research questions they pose and the research methods they prefer and use (Ruddock, 2005, p.21). Furthermore, Ruddock (2005) explores the weaknesses of media studies and theories when they are based on an initial misunderstanding of the relationship between media and their audiences (p.39). Media in itself do not shape people’s thoughts and behaviours in the same degree and ways. Morley (1991) underscores the changing paradigms in audience studies that go beyond uses and gratifications theories (p.17). He believes in the existence of tension between media agenda and political agenda and between media effects and media consumer autonomy. Seiter et al. (1991) agree that the polarity between media consumer passivity and activity is naive and simplistic understanding of media effects and roles. For the Chinese, the tension among different views of the media and how they affect Chinese values and behaviours is highly complex that no single media theory can explain it. Madger (2006) argues that international economic agreements shaped media policies and practices in China. Social, individual, and a myriad other possible factors can be antecedents or mediators of human behaviour. Using these criticisms on media theory, the national community of China cannot be monolithic. People and the media interact with one another and with other forces in constructing and shaping their personal and collective ideas of the Chinese national image. Liebes and Katz (1991) argue that people should not overemphasise critical abilities. Some individuals or cultural groups may be more critical than others, depending on their educational level, nature of education received, cultural values and habits, and personal traits. Thus, the Chinese can have differing views on how they assess and see media roles because of these social, demographic, and individual differences. Moreover, scholars should be careful in holding a deterministic view of technology and the media. Media can use technology for different purposes, which they may or may not achieve. The role of media in affecting national images of China can be mediated through technology, if not fully affected by it. Yang (2011) argues that though many of the Chinese youth use the internet for fun and relaxation, it does not mean that these actions are not part of their political processes. Internet play may also be an example of new political plays. Yang (2011) provides examples of how the Chinese government realises the value of “online public opinion” (p.1045). The authorities seek greater social influence on community aspirations through using the Internet, as a way of directly interacting with Chinese individuals (Yang, 2011, p.1045). One more example is a government employee of Sichuan province, who made a humorous poem that satirised corrupt local officials and sent it to his friends through text messages. The local authorities arrested him and charged him with rumour and slander, but these allegations were dismissed after netizens disputed this illogical abuse of power (Yang, 2011, p.1045). Thus, technology and the media are tools for Chinese expression and empowerment too. The media have an active role to play in shaping sentiments about the Chinese community. Nevertheless, Centralised Media Control Theory, Agenda-Setting Theory, Marshall McLuhan’s Media Theories, and Culture Industry theories suggest that this role is not one-way and it cannot be delimited in its sources, processes, and audience effects. The Chinese state aims to homogenise a strong communist image, but its efforts are not always uniform in the face of contending local political forces and Chinese social and individual forces. The society interacts with media in ways that they also affect the roles of the latter in the promotion of their socio-economic, cultural, and political interests and issues. Hence, the media play evolving roles in how the Chinese continuously shapes its national image because of its interplay with other social and individual forces. Reference List Adorno, T.W., 2003. Culture industry reconsidered. In: W. Brooker and D. Jermyn, eds. The audience studies reader. 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