Richelsons The Wizards of Langley - Book Report/Review Example

Richelson’s The Wizards of Langley Introduction In this paper, the book titled The Wizards of Langley: Inside the CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology will be reviewed. Instead of a subjective approach, the general treatment of the topic will be based on the key objective aspects of this book in question. For example, the objective of describing CIA’s evolution with respect to the organizational aspects of the Directorate of Science and Technology (or DS&T) will remain at one of the main trajectories of this book review. Jeffrey T. Richelson a reputed intelligence community historian, and this book of his emphasizes the organizational history and structural dynamics of DS&T in a wholesome manner. Who and What the DS&T Is Although the United States had not participated in World War II from the very beginning of the conflicts in Europe, it was finally attacked and harassed by the Imperial Japanese forces in 1941. Henceforth, taking lessons from the experiences of World War II, American bureaucracy started to believe correctly that they needed a dedicated intelligence agency for collecting information from and operating across foreign countries. Hence, the Central Intelligence Agency was established in 1947 by contemporary US President Truman. “The new agency would report to the President and be headed by the Director of Counter Intelligence (DCI).” (Richelson, 1) By helping the reader to comprehend the purpose of CIA in a concise manner, Richelson actually focuses on the background of DS&T. In order to implement optimal technological methods to gather intelligence and military information from foreign countries, CIA formed the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) in December 1948. This opened the era of bureaucratic reorganization within CIA, which successfully catered with the changing needs of satellite based foreign intelligence with the launch of CORONA spy satellite 1960. In the next two years, other departments like the Office of Special Activities, Office of Research and Development, etc. were merged into one organization. In this way, Deputy Directorate of Research (DDR) was formed in 1962, while maintaining OSI still as a part of the Directorate of Operations. (Richelson, 40-61) So at this point while reading The Wizards of Langley, it becomes clear that the American leadership was unable to create a coherent organization for harnessing technology-based espionage even in the early 1960s. However, this dangerous bureaucratic indecisiveness did not prevail for too long. By the year 1965, OSI was merged into DDR and the organization was rechristened as DS&T (Wheelon, 73-76). Therefore, although the journey of DS&T officially began in the mid 1960s, it can be disputed that who is the real predecessor of the organization: Is that DDR or OSI? Richelson rightly attributes DS&T’s organizational resilience to DDR as he focuses on its capacity to endure and survive internal bureaucratic and political struggles (Richelson, 61). But analytic espionage is something that this directorate inherited from the OSI. DS&T has diversified its concerns continuously over the passage of time. It has made invaluable contributions in developing the primitive form of stealth reconnaissance aircraft (e.g. A-12) into the world’s most advanced Mach III reconnaissance systems (e.g. SR-71) (for details, see Lockheed’s SR-71''Blackbird'' Family by Goodall and Miller). It has formulated and geared secretive mind control projects like BLUEBIRD and ANTICHOKE (Yeadon and Hawkins, 397-401). It has used its expertise athwart interdisciplinary topics ranging from psychiatry to toxicology (Richelson 10, 38). Evolution and Survival of DS&T How has DS&T evolved and why has it survived? By the middle of 1950s, America had developed sophisticated information and communication technology frameworks. But these frameworks acted separately from each other and many of them were in private hands. So even in the context of technology-based espionage and investigative operations in foreign countries, CIA had to reach out for private contractors and partners. How can public private partnership work so well in a sensitive sector like that of overseas military intelligence? The answer lies in CIA’s moralistic approach. CIA contacted professionals in the private sector. One such person was Albert D. Wheelon, who enthusiastically “offered moral and technical support” (Richelson, 49) for missions like the ELINT effort. Later on, in the late 1990s, Wheelon states that the underlying motto behind projects like ELINT had been the idea of “truth shall keep you free” (Wheelon, 73). However, even in the days of DDR, the organization faced ethical dilemmas inside it, which could have destroyed its survival prospects. Even during the early 1960s ethical dilemmas started to surface with the conception of ELINT or Electronic intelligence. ELINT was a pervasive synchronization project involving satellite and radar systems. The main aim of ELINT was to gather information of Soviet war preparations beyond the horizon. In other words, the Americans needed to find out the position and strength of different radar systems of the Soviet Union inside their territory thousands of kilometers away from the key US military establishments. The project was approved and aggravated by liberal democrat Herbert Scoville, who was the head of DDR at that time. Also, morally inspired professionals like Wheelon had joined it. But soon American strategy was switched from defensive to offensive (for example, Richelson describes toxicology and drugs research in the chapter Unexpected Missions, see page nos. 9-11). According to Richelson, “Scoville was committed to nuclear disarmament and devoted some of his time to chairing an integrity committee on the issue.” (61) Consequently, Scoville got involved in serious contradictions with the contemporary DCI McCone. Finally in 1963, Scoville had to resign. More moral setbacks were yet to come. CIA consistently collaborated with Itek. This private firm helped OSI and DDR in creating the spy satellites and related ELINT devices (Lewis, 58, 121-134). But about the same time as DS&T became fully functional, Itek parted its way from the organization. According to the contemporary officials of Itek, CIA was fostering an immoral environment by taking its espionage activities too far without any regard for privacy, fairness or ethics (Richelson 120-122). In this way, DS&T evolved as an organization that went through a number of ethical dilemmas from time to time. But still the DS&T managed to survive. CIA’s technical expertise and sense of nationalism have been so great that it could combat even the fiercest of its enemies unethically but effectively. This is how the organization has become a ruthless opponent to the enemies of America. And critics like Yeadon and Hawkins have gone to the extent of alleging that the DS&T and its predecessors have used even “Nazi research from the concentration camps” (397). Whereabouts of the ‘Wizards’ If the reader wants to know that where do the scientist and engineers of DS&T operate, then Richelson has a straight forward answer to give. These scientists and engineers, who can be compared with modern wizards of science and technology, operate in Langley, the headquarters of DS&T. A simple as that! However, this is can be an interesting analogy that is not a true fact. Scientists and engineers of DS&T are capable of providing their “technical services” in all seasons and almost across all countries in the world, thanks to CIA’s extensive spy networks and enthusiastic but secretive agents (Clarridge 320-321). For example, sophisticated reconnaissance techniques developed by DS&T helped USA to destroy Iraqi air forces and radar systems during Operation Desert Shield, which took place in the early 1990s (Richelson, 245-248). American success in combating Iraq (which had the largest military strength in the Middle East at that time) has been largely attributed to DS&T’s early warning and battle-space analysis methods. Making Timely Decisions When did the organization fail and when did it succeed? This is a truly difficult question to answer since most of the archives regarding DS&T are classified even today. However, American military success all through the Post Cold War era cannot be explained without DS&T’s contributions taken into consideration. Per se, the bureaucracy of the organization did not come in the way of national interest even when it was neglected, devalued, or criticized. For example, the US Government was able to establish its federally funded National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) in 1996, thanks to the flexible of mindset of CIA bureaucracy as a whole (Richelson 270-273). Although NIMA will take away both funds and responsibilities from DS&T’s allotments, the department has shown enough maturity in supporting the US Government’s call for decentralization and diversification in the right time. This kind of other timely decisions like calling off the experiments on mind control have helped the DS&T bureaucracy to find a respectable place in CIA hierarchy. Conclusion The main strength of Richelson’s book is that it is highly authentic, carefully edited, and based on facts. Furthermore, most of these facts can be crosschecked with the help of Federal archives. However, the author does not pay sufficient attention to the controversies related to mind control. Also, instances of intelligence failure like the bombing of US military base in Lebanon have been discussed in too short of reality. Therefore, the book is more suitable for finding out CIA’s official rhetoric. However, an authentic evaluation of CIA’s patriotism and expertise has been done without partiality. Works Cited Clarridge, Duane R. A Spy for All Seasons: My Life in the CIA. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997. Print Goodall, James and Jay Miller. Lockheed’s SR-71 ‘Blackbird’ Family: A-12, F-12, M-21, D-21, SR-71. Hinckley: Midland Publishing, 2002. Print. Lewis, Jonathan E. Spy Capitalism: Itek and CIA. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008. Print. Richelson, Jeffrey T. The Wizards of Langley: Inside the CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology. Boulder: Westview Press, 2002. Print. Wheelon, Albert D. “And the Truth Shall Keep You Free: Recollections by the First Deputy Director of Science and Technology,” Studies in Intelligence 39:1 (1995), 73-78. Yeadon, Glen and John Hawkins. The Nazi Hydra in America: Suppressed History of a Century. Calif: Progressive Press, 2008. Print. Read More