Strengths and Weaknesses of Zartmans concept of Ripeness - Book Report/Review Example

Running head: DISCUSSION OF THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF ZARTMANS CONCEPTS OF RIPENESS Zartmans Concepts of Ripeness Strengthsand Weaknesses of Zartmans concept of Ripeness This is a theory that focuses on the idea of readiness to end a ranging conflict. Zartman observed that in order to come up with a solution on conflicts between two parties the parties must first identify a ripe moment. In such a case negotiation is bound to succeed. he defines negotiations as a process of combining conflicting positions into a common position under a decision rule of unanimity, a phenomenon in which the outcome is determined by the process. (William, 1982) This essay to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the concept looking at the methodology of explaining the idea of ripeness it also assesses how this theory can successfully reach lead to an amicable solution. The idea of ripening is a very big challenge in ensuring that diplomacy is practised, this is merely because the theory of ripeness indicates that ripeness is a very subjective discernment resulting from intentioned indicators and persuasion. For ripening to be achieved the warring parties must understand and accept that the impending conflict is hurting both of them and the only way to come out of it is through mutual negotiations or the use of a mediator and in case of the presence of subjective elements then persuasion can be applied to clearly bring out the notion of both pain and the stalemate. They need to comprehend the idea that dedication to end the stale mate must come from both parties with full utilisation of an opportunity to end the vice. The other party should be willing to join in the search o of solution that exist in principle and need to be negotiated. A trusted third party should be involved as a mediator who give the conflicting parties a good shake-up through injecting fresh ideas ,ensure that he keeps the fresh ideas flexible by coming up with basic principles , should ensure reliability in the negotiations by structuring a negotiation mechanism in order to reach a mutual agreement He should also identify the parties to be involved in negotiations, issues to be resolved separating them with those that can not be resolved, come up with practicable alternatives by establishing bridges between the two parties by clarifying involved costs with impending risks in seeking harmony and assuring immeasurable support to the peace negotiation efforts which in turn will ensure that each party reciprocates by showing commitment to the same. working toward the achievement of this goals is tantamount to creating a ripe moment even when the conflict is not perceived as ripe. (William, 1982) Weakness of the concept The theory is not self-fulfilling and self implementing thus having a great weakness such that the involved parties will never be sure that the other is going to cooperate this is because decisions are made at the same time but one of the parties may fail to give out its response. the parties can never be sure that the other is going to cooperate, mainly because of two reasons: for in stance when the Israel signed an agreement with the PLO the Palestinians were doubting whether Israel was going to cooperate and this made PLO chairman Yasser Arafat write an official letter to the Israel prime minister who responded and made it clear that his government recognised Palestine Liberation Organisation as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people (Gavron,1980).At times decision may be made at the same moment but one of the sides may fail to respond. This makes the parties to have contradicting enticement as to either cooperate or not to. Ripeness is only a condition, necessary but not sufficient for the initiation of negotiations. It must be seized, either directly by the parties or, if not, through the persuasion of a mediator. Thus, it is not identical to its results, which are not part of its definition. It is therefore not tautological, although some scholars have claimed such, arguing that it cannot be measured except by the success of negotiations, after which one can observe that "the time was ripe." Not all ripe moments are seized and turned into negotiations, hence the importance of specifying the meaning and evidence of ripeness so as to indicate when conflicting or third parties can fruitfully initiate negotiations. Finding a ripe moment requires research and intelligence studies to identify the objective and subjective elements. As observed by smith (1987), during the Cuban missile crisis Cuba leaders became convinced that the US was planning a military attack on them this was after learning that Cuba had missile bases that could launch a nuclear attack on them. This made president Kennedy to order a naval blockade to stop further shipment of arms demanding that the Soviet Union remove all missile and missile bases from the island. They embarked on a negotiation which yielded fruit and the timing was ripe .The Soviet Union agreed to remove weapons after the US pledged not to attack Cuba. The United States government made through research and intelligence studies which later brought to an end the Cuban missile attack. William (1982) further observes that subjective expressions of pain, impasse, and inability to bear the cost of further escalation, related to objective evidence of stalemate, data on numbers and nature of casualties and material costs, and/or other such indicators of a mutually hurting stalemate, along with expressions of a sense of a Way Out, can be researched on a regular basis in a conflict to establish whether hurting stalemate by the parties, and to a sense by authoritative spokespersons for each side that the other is ready to seek a solution to the conflict, or, to the contrary, whether it has reinforced the conclusion that any mediation is bound to fail because one or both parties believes in the possibility or necessity of escalating out of the current impasse to achieve a decisive military victory. Actions of a mediator are delicate and at times dangerous, since they threaten the neutrality and hence the usefulness of the mediator, the mediator may favour one side thereby interfering with the whole peace negotiations efforts but on occasion they may be deemed necessary. Again one side maybe weaker or stronger than the other which may affect negotiations To gather empirical ideas on the theory there must be mediator who will among other things provide an answer to the question whether the idea of ripeness is a fruitful notion in the discussion of third-party intervention. The theory has been openly dismissed by social scientists because of their highly objective nature. Strengths of the concept of Ripeness To achieve the concept Parties do not necessarily have to identify a specific solution to their problems what is required is the willingness to share hence arrives at solution. For example, the Palestine Liberation Organisation founded by the Arab league was started with an aim of destroying the state of Israel a fight that continued until the ripe moment came when negotiations yielded some fruits. This was in 1993 when PLO chairman Yasser Arafat and the then Israel prime minister Yitzak Rabin secretly negotiated Oslo accords to end the conflict between Israel and Palestine, this was signed in 20th august the same year subsequently a ceremony was conducted at Washington. The accord granted the Palestinian right for self governance on Gaza strip and Jericho city where Israel responded by recognising PLO as the legitimate representative o the Palestinian people. (Reich, 1985) The concept must only have a sense that a negotiated solution is possible and that the other party shares that sense and the willingness to search for a solution too. Without a sense of a Way Out, the push associated with the mutually hurting stalemate would leave the parties with nowhere to go. Spokespersons often indicate whether they do or do not feel that a deal can be made with the other side. They think concessions will be reciprocated, not just banked particularly when there is a change in that judgment. Although ripeness theory cannot predict when a given situation will become ripe, it can identify the elements necessary for productive negotiations to begin. It is of great value to policymakers seeking to know when and how to begin a peace process. Ripeness is the key to many successful cases of negotiation, opening the way for discussions that led to an agreement in Paris Peace Accords of 1973 where President Nixon announced the suspension of offensive action against North Vietnam by citing the achieved progress in peace negotiations this was followed by the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Vietnam. The Paris Peace Accords were signed on January 27, 1973, officially ending direct U.S. involvement in the Vietnam conflict. The signing of the Accords was ripe and it led to the winning of 1973 Nobel Peace Prize for U.S. National Security Adviser and lead negotiator Henry Kissinger and North Vietnamese Politburo member and lead negotiator Le Duc Tho. (Taylor, 1983) The first U.S. prisoners of war were released by North Vietnam on February 11, 1973, and all U.S. soldiers were ordered to leave by March 29. Soldiers returning from the Vietnam War were generally not treated as heroes, and were sometimes even condemned for their participation in the war. The peace agreement, in the meantime, did not last. As an inducement for South Vietnamese government to sign the Peace Accords, President Nixon had promised that the United States would provide financial and limited military support so that the south could continue to defend itself. . With the United States no longer heavily involved in Vietnam, both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. no longer saw the war as significant to their relations. The balance of power shifted decisively in North Vietnam's favour, and the north subsequently launched a major military offensive against the south. (Pikie, 1978) A greater understanding of the indicators of ripeness could lead to its more frequent recognition among disputing parties, and more successfully seized negotiation opportunities. Individuals should make separate, interactive decisions; and negotiation analysis considers how groups of reasonably bright individuals should and could make joint, collaborative decisions. The other element critical to persuasion is the perception of a way out, necessarily that the other party is willing to join in the search for a negotiated solution and that such a solution does exist in principle. The perception of a way out need not identify a specific agreement, but rather merely the belief that an agreement can be found. It is as much a perception of the other party's willingness to bargain as it is of a bargaining range. In its absence, a third party or internal faction is needed to encourage that perception, but also to encourage thinking about possible solutions. Third parties may also need to be involved much more directly, serving as a go-between to carry each party's perception of a possible agreement to the other. If there is no objective indicator to which to refer, ripening may involve an even more active engagement of the mediator, altering that role from communication and formulation to manipulation. As the mediator may increase the size of the stakes, attracting the parties to share in a pot that otherwise would have been too small. To increase the size of the pot during the Oslo talks between Israel and Palestine through United States aid is an example of the first type of manipulation, to enlarge the stakes in a successful outcome. Or the mediator may limit the actions of the parties in conflict, thereby providing objective elements for the stalemate. United States was the mediating body and it acted as a manipulator to bring about a stalemate. (Gavron, 1980) To gather empirical ideas on the theory there must be mediator who will among other things provide an answer to the question whether the idea of ripeness is a fruitful notion in the discussion of third-party intervention. The parties' perception of a mutually hurting stalemate is a necessary condition for the opening of negotiations to end a conflict. Once all sides realize they cannot win with further escalation, and the state at that moment is unacceptably damaging, the conflict is said to be "ripe" for resolution. A case seen in the Cuban missile attacks where the Soviet Union accepted to remove destructive weapons from Cuba after realizing that the state at that moment was conducive for negotiations (Suchlicki, 1986).However, the absence of ripeness does not mean we should walk away and do nothing. Too often, the absence of ripeness is cited as an excuse for total disengagement. However, that is when efforts are needed more than ever to move the conflict to the point where it is susceptible to mediation or negotiation. If a conflict is not ripe, it can be ripened, and if an interested party cannot ripen it, it can position itself for later involvement. Indeed, if ripeness is not present, its components can serve as a target that helps identify obstacles and suggests ways of handling them and managing the problem until resolution becomes possible. Even when a conflict is ripe for negotiation, practitioners need to employ all their skills and apply all the concepts of negotiation and mediation to take advantage of that necessary but insufficient condition in order to turn it into a successful peacemaking process (Thomas, 1984) References Cobban, H. (1985) The Palestine liberation organisation. Cambridge Gavron, D. (1980) Walking through Israel, Houghton Pikie, D. (1978) History of Vietnamese communism, Hoover institution. Reich, B. (1985) Land of Tradition and Conflict. West view press Said, E. (1980): The question of Palestine, Random house. Smith, W. (1987) Closest of Enemies. Norton Suchlicki, J. (1986) Cuba from Columbus to Castro. 2nd edition, Pergamon Taylor, K. (1983): The birth of Vietnam. University of California Thomas, H. (1984) Cuban revolution, West view William, Z. (1982) The Practical Negotiator, Yale University press, New Haven. Read More