Popper's Falsificationism versus Hempel's Confirmation Theory - Essay Example

Popper's Falsificationism versus Hempel's Confirmation Theory Both Hempel and Popper are concerned with the testability of scientific hypotheses, but they have different attitudes about the ways it is possible for evidence to bear on a hypothesis. This creates a disagreement between them on the logical difference between how positive evidence is supposed to function in confirmation and how negative evidence is supposed to function in disconfirmation or falsification. Following is a detailed discussion of these differences, in this critical analysis. According to Carl Hempel, deductive logic is a device for preserving truth (Bechtel 5). Therefore, positive evidence is used to confirm a hypothesis. On the other hand, Karl Popper objected that it was logically impossible to confirm or justify theories by using claims of science and observation. Hempel asserts that if the premises of a deductive argument are true, then the conclusion must also be true (Bechtel 5). Therefore, logical arguments should start from some foundation while, according to Popper, theoretical claims are known to have extended beyond the particular observations that were used to support them. According to Popper’s falsification theory, experience, more specifically, sensory experience is a foundation for arriving at a subsequent observation could always prove the best confirmed theory false (Bechtel 5). Hempel and others, who supported the confirmation theory, had a strategy of showing how claims of science might be justified by being derived from sentences that could be confirmed or invalidated by observation. On the other hand, Popper, argued in favor of an alternative in which scientists should strive to falsify hypotheses, in reference to the bold hypotheses that make strong claims about the world (Bechtel 5). Hempel claims that the logic of science, which is confirmation, has a method according to the proponents. This method involves a set of universally valid rules like those of formal logic. One can tell logically valid arguments simply by their form without attending to their content (Kincaid 22). Similar relations should hold for data and theory such that given data one can apply formal and universal rules of scientific inference and determine if the theory is confirmed. Logic of science must be universal. The scientific method must be formal, and should rest not on specific assumptions about the way the world is, but it must be sufficient. Therefore, given a set of premises rules of logic are sufficient to decide whether a conclusion follows and there is no need of other information (Kincaid 23). Always logic of science should allow us to do something similar, and that is to decide whether a hypothesis is confirmed given the data. Similarly, according to Hempel, a new law is looked by following a process, whereby a guess is made; consequences are computed about the guess to see what would be implied if this law that was guessed is right. Then, the result of computation is compared with nature to see if it works. Agreement will constitute good evidence only when it is known that there is not a more reasonable rival that predicts what ha already been observed. As much as confirmation is only one part of acceptance, and acceptance of a theory requires more than knowing whether a specific batch of data supports a particular hypothesis, multiple tests, the scope of the data, the logical and evidential ties with other hypotheses can be factored in order to make it practical (Kincaid 24). In shifting the emphasis entirely to falsification, Popper rejects the generally accepted aspect of science that experience, more specifically; sensory experience is a foundation for arriving at a subsequent observation because it could always prove the best confirmed theory false. He rejects the qualitative notion of evidence in confirmation. He argues that claims of the logic of science are generalizations from scientific practice. However, scientific practice is diverse in terms of time and fields. Therefore, finding universal rules will be difficulty (Kincaid 23). Popper is so concerned to reject the aspect that experience, more specifically, sensory experience, which is used as generally accepted empirical data, is a foundation for arriving at a subsequent observation because it can always prove the best confirmed theory false. Further still, he rejects the qualitative notion of confirmation because it seems relatively unimportant to him (Suppe 631). Empirical evidence should be used to disconfirm or falsify, and not to confirm. Popper claims that the logic of science is generalizations from scientific practice, and scientific practice is, however, diverse in terms of time and fields, making it hard to have a universal criterion. According to Popper’s Falsificationism, the methodology of science to works, whereby when a hypothesis is made, evidence is compiled to falsify the hypothesis. Scientists should seek to ensure that they gather sufficient evidence to falsify a proposed hypothesis rather than confirm it (Kincaid 24). Agreement will constitute good evidence only when it is known that there is not a more reasonable rival hypothesis that predicts what ha already been observed. Testing is supposed to provide for scientific progress and improvement in scientific theorizing on the view of Popper by using observations to falsify claims, even though positive evidence is denied its usual role. Since truthfulness of universal claims cannot be deduced from single observations, the falsity of universal claims can be used. Therefore, when a theory is brought forward, it is analyzed by use of observation to ascertain whether it can be falsified (Tedre 54). Once the claim has been falsified, a theory cannot be said to be true, but it can be said that it is the best theory that is currently available, since it has not been successfully falsified. For instance, in program testing, it is acknowledged that testing can only prove the existence of bugs and not the absence of them (Tedre 54). Popper's notion of corroboration is that justification exists for only those theories that best withstood the best effort of falsification. Therefore, those theories for which there could be no sufficient evidence to falsify them are held as the best theory currently. This is because the efforts to falsify have not been successful yet. Also, Popper was in favor that scientists should strive to falsify hypotheses, in reference to the bold hypotheses that make strong claims about the world. This notion differs from confirmation in that, with confirmation, empirical evidence is gathered to confirm a theory or hold it true. Even with this attempt to accommodate positive evidence in some way, Popper's account faces some challenges. Falsification is as problematic as the logic of confirmation. This is because any falsification is dependent on a number of assumptions. These assumptions and not the hypothesis being tested can be wrong or problematic (Bechtel 5). Falsification also faces a challenge of believe bias because peoples’ beliefs influence the conclusions they endorse about a theory. Only where conclusions are unbelievable do people such for models that may falsify them, given that one single compatible model will suffice for most people (Schaeken, Vandierendonck and d'Ydewalle 90). Therefore, Falsification requires that a particular hypothesis or theory should be logically inconsistent with some potential data (Kincaid 24). It also fails to distinguish science from pseudoscience. Finally, hypotheses by themselves are generally either consistent or inconsistent with the evidence, and something that might be called “a theory of the test” must be brought in to make the hypothesis conflict or concur with the data (Kincaid 25). These challenges are fatal, but in defense, of Popper, one can say that claims of the logic of science are generalizations from scientific practice, and scientific practice is, however, diverse in terms of time and fields. Therefore, finding universal rules for confirmation will be difficulty (Kincaid 23). Also, the rules that describe science must be abstract from detail, and are unlikely to be sufficient because of the information that they ignore. The holistic nature of testing makes sufficient rules unlikely. Therefore, universal rules are unlikely to be sufficient or formal. Formality, sufficiency and universality, which are proposed b confirmation, cannot be satisfied jointly. Finally, an account that ignores an empirical details and domain-specific assumptions becomes abstract, and consequently, becomes more simplified, thus it can only do less work by itself in evaluating specific pieces of science. (Kincaid 23) Falsification as an account of science is insufficient and full of bias because always rival hypotheses that fit the data can be constructed (Kincaid 24). Therefore, it is difficulty to fail to falsify a theory no matter how true it might seem. Furthermore, according to falsification, agreement of hypothesis and observation is only convincing evidence, if all rivals are inadequate, something that is very rare in most cases of real-life situations. Popper’s falsification is about collecting enough evidence to disconfirm. Therefore, competing hypotheses need not be known to know that the evidence rejects the hypothesis at hand, which is inapplicable in real life. All competing hypotheses must be taken into consideration before falsifying a theory. According to Popper, falsification separates science from pseudoscience. The essence of scientific testing is the attempt at falsification, and good science is that which has survived attempts at falsification. Therefore, f falsification requires that a particular hypothesis or theory should be logically inconsistent with some potential data (Kincaid 24). However, falsification fails to distinguish science from pseudoscience. It should also be noted that hypotheses by themselves, are generally either consistent or inconsistent with the evidence. Something that might be called a “theory of the test” must be brought in order to make the hypothesis conflict or concur with the data (Kincaid 25). This reverts to the confirmation theory elements, which falsification is strictly against. Falsification cannot be considered an account of science because it conflicts itself, whereby, disconfirmation has to originate from a “theory of the test," which is the assumption supported byte confirmation theory. Works Cited Bechtel, William. Mental Mechanisms: Philosophical Perspectives on Cognitive Neuroscience. Abingdon: Taylor and Francis Press, 2012: 3-6. Print. Kincaid, Harold. Philosophical Foundations of the Social Sciences: Analyzing Controversies in Social Research. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996: 22-26. Print. Schaeken, Walter, et al. The Mental Models Theory of Reasoning: Refinements and Extensions. New Jersy : Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Press, 2007: 88-93. Print. Suppe, Frederick. The Structure of Scientific Theories. Champaign : University of Illinois Press, 1979: 628-631. Print. Tedre, Matti. The Development of Computer Science. Joensuu: Joensuu University Library Press, 2006: 53-56. Print. Read More