Provide an argument for the claim that (some) mental states are not identical to any brain state - Essay Example

Furthermore, it will discuss the relevant concepts in philosophy that will either affirm or negate these suppositions. In order to make this possible, the monist and dualist concepts are also discussed. Some mental states (beliefs) are not identical to any brain state The first argument being focused in this paper is the difference between mental and brain states. As mentioned earlier, these two are different concepts. Many people are confused and often use these two interchangeably. The mental state has a deeper context compared to that of the brain state.

This is so because it refers to the state of a person’s thoughts regarding pain or happiness, what a person believes in, and also ideas and aspirations. On the other hand, the brain state refers to the literal condition of the nervous system like a brain activity. According to Adam Sennet (chap. 5), some mental states, like beliefs, are not identical or similar to any brain state. This is because beliefs are not part of any physiological activities of the body particularly inside the brain.

the famous philosopher Descartes (qtd. in Carruthers 7) postulated that the mind is not spatial but has the ability to think, while the body is spatial but is unable to think; hence, the body is only capable of biological and physiological activities. . nd Y are very similar, then they should have the very same attributes, which is not true in the concept of the mind (beliefs) and the body (brain state). Hence, if X and Y have different attributes, they can never be considered as identical. The differences in the mental and brain states include the argument of certainty (Wright).

The mind can be certain about pain or desires but the brain cannot be certain about anything because it lacks a logical attribute. There is a great disparity between the mental state and the brain state as clearly stated by this Law. There are, however, some arguments by other philosophers like Carruthers that the Leibniz’ Law does not apply to mental states including beliefs, pains, and desires. He argues that if X and Y are not very similar substances, then X and Y must have the same intrinsic attributes or properties (Carruthers 8).

He believes that the mental state does not have a property of belief. Thus, he sticks to his argument that the two substances are very similar because they are one (Wright). The Monist Concept This concept does not hold the proposition that there are two kinds of substances. It holds that there is only one kind of substance and that the brain and the mind are just the same. There are, however, two separate views about this one substance. These are: materialism and idealism (Carruthers 6). Materialism is an idea that all that exists are material or physical, while idealism is an idea which states that all that exists are ultimately mental.

These are the two ideas in the Monist concept and there are philosophers who believe on either one or another but not both. The materialist does not believe that there is such a thing as the mental state and so they are similar or identical to absolutely nothing, because