David Armstrongs Universals as Attributes from Universals - Term Paper Example

Paper Argument against David Armstrong’s ‘Universals as Attributes’ from “Universals: An Opinionated Introduction” David Armstrong’s Universals as Attributes hold a proposition that the universe exists and that once this postulate is accepted the proposition that they may have varying attributes at certain degrees. For instance, colors represent different attributes and order (Armstrong 105). Pautz theory examines the resemblance of substances in the universe according to their common properties or attributes. He came up with an analysis that two ordinary and first order substances can resemble exactly the same. As elements of particulars resemble closer with one another, identity becomes stronger; hence, two particulars become one and resemblance becomes an identity (109). In this paper, this argument is negated with the supposition that two different universes cannot be identical because they do not resemble completely as they have different elements. Armstrong’s Arguments Structural Universals Armstrong emphasizes in this idea that universals that resemble one another are complex universals and that they have common elements. These are also called structural universals. He further explains that they overlap due to common or identical parts. The more universals overlap, the more they resemble one another (120). Structural universals are considered to have parts according to Armstrong (122). These have non- metrological composition whereby it is possible that there are two can contain similar and simple elements. Hence, he redefines structural universals as having elements or constituents instead of parts. If this kind of universal has the appropriate parts, it they will overlap in a mereological manner. Chemical elements for instance overlap completely. Butane and isobutane can totally overlap because they have a similar element which is carbon (Pautz 110). Universals are Instantiated Aside from these, he also presented other arguments in his book regarding universals as attributes. He holds that all universals are instantiated, which means that any name can be substituted by variables. For instance, when a word has meaning, there is something within the actual world that corresponds to that particular meaning (Magalha?es 307). Plato and Socrates, two of the earliest and most notable philosophers of all time believe in the opposites. They believed that uninstantiated universals exist because objects need to correspond to a particular something or object in the world so that it is to be believed to have meaning. However, there are also things in the world that are considered to have meaning even though they do not actually exist (Pautz 110). Say, for example, the unicorn. It does not exist, but people are able to identify the properties of a unicorn even if it is just a myth. Therefore, they believe that uninstantiated universals like the word unicorn exist. This was obviously negated by Armstrong (120) insisting that the standards in this world are the only ones that have a property and meaning. A unicorn cannot have properties because it exists outside of the states of affairs (Pautz 109). Negative, disjunctive, and conjunctive properties Another argument is that negative universals do not exist because it is something that does not have any mass (m). Armstrong (122) also rejects disjunctive properties because they neither have the properties of mass (m) nor charge (c). However, he considers conjunctive properties as different from the other two properties. He argues that conjunctive properties have both charge (c) and mass (m) properties which are capable of having some things similar that can be factors to consider for identity. In addition, the fact that these properties have some things in common will give way to a great possibility of explaining how universals with conjunctive property can affect other universals (qtd. in Mulligan 30). States of affairs Since Armstrong (109) believes in the existence of properties and relations, he also believes that he is entitled to commit to state of affairs or simply regarded as facts. Since substances have their properties and that they exist having relation with another substance. Furthermore, he proves this using the principle of truth maker wherein he believes that there is something about universals that make them true or something about nature that makes facts and truths. This is considered as a metaphysical principle because it also believes that statements can be true only if they correspond to a condition, evidence, or visible feature of reality (Magalha?es 305). In addition, Armstrong claimed that universals exist only within the states of affairs and it will never be outside of it. Hence, he denies uninstantiated universals and bare particulars (110). Bare particulars Bare particulars are referred to as those particulars existing outside states of affairs, which Armstrong clearly negates. He said that any kind of particular that is outside of the states of affairs lack meaning because it does not have any property, nor does it have any relation to other things (qtd. in Bailey 33). Taking for example the unicorn, again; it is believed to have no properties and no relation among other things in the universe because it exists right outside the states of affairs. Thus, it is considered as a bare particular rejected by Armstrong. The Thin and the Thick Particular A thick particular refers to the state of affairs while a thin particular refers to a property that is apart from other properties but is not considered as bare particular. Although it is considered as apart from other properties, Armstrong insists that it is clothed in thin properties (127). These particulars are also examined whether or not they are within the periphery of the states of affairs. Armstrong firmly believes that they are within the states of affairs, although they have different levels of thickness. Universals as Ways In this section, Armstrong expressed that universals are ways. He elaborated that universals are just the way things in the world are. Thus, a property is a way that a particular thing has a relation with other things, which have ways of standing to one another. He confidently states that when things are considered as the way they are, they will stay in the borders with the things that will instantiate them and will relate them to other things with similar properties (130). Multiple Locations Since Armstrong claims that there is no such thing as bare particulars and rejects that uninstantiated universals exist, he is also entitled to prove that there are substances that exist in multiple spatial locations all at the same time (qtd in. Bailey 37). Arguments against Armstrong’s Claims Many studies have questioned the work of Armstrong because of the lack of evidences and adequate explanation for his claims. His arguments presented in this paper are weak, unreliable, and arguable. These are the following arguments stitched from different studies as well as the personal negations of this paper’s writer. Structural Universals Armstrong believed that structural universals have constituents composed of similar elements that overlap completely, which make them exactly similar or identical (109). This is not entirely true. It is true that different structural universals can overlap just like the chemical elements exemplified in the previous section of this paper. Hence, A and B can overlap completely but it does not necessarily follow that A and B are exactly identical (Pautz 110). Two particulars having some similar elements or constituents can combine, but there is no evident proof that they are identical because they may have different functions and may relate to other things differently. Universals are Instantiated In this section, Armstrong reiterated that there are no such things as uninstantiated universals. This notion was based on the position of Aristotle wherein it was believed that a certain particular’s properties are considered as universals or the so-called universalia in rebus. First, he argued based on an assumption that when a word has a general meaning, there is always a particular thing in this world that will represent that meaning (Magalha?es 305). However, his assumption was not fully justified and explained. He also thinks that it is merely a prejudice to think that some uninstantiated universals do exist in contrast to the belief of Plato and Socrates. Armstrong’s argument is weak and unsupported. Myths and beliefs are believed to exist in the world even if there happens to be nothing that appears to be a representation of these universals. They are not supposed to be found in the actual world with space and time; hence, the phrase Platonic Heaven was coined in order to represent a world where uninstantiated universals exist. Since there are particulars considered as forms having no space, time, or physical properties like virtues and justice that cannot be instantiated, it is agreeable that uninstantiated universals exist (Magalha?es 305). Negative, disjunctive, and conjunctive properties Armstrong stuck to his idea that there are no negative and disjunctive properties -- only conjunctive properties (qtd. in Bailey 37). He further believes in the existence of physics like space, time, mass, charge, and the like as properties of particulars. Negative properties do not have any of these properties; hence, he does not consider these properties to be part of the universe. Similarly, disjunctive properties are believed to have none of these properties as well, so he rejects them. Conjunctive properties, on the other hand, are considered to have the physical properties of mass and charge, which is why this is the only property that he considers (Armstrong 125). However, this claim is also very weak. The same argument presented by Plato and Socrates will negate this. There are negative and disjunctive properties carried by the forms which have no physical elements because they exist in the Platonic heaven. There is a separate world or realm of intangible forms (Pautz 109). States of Affairs Armstrong only considers particulars that belong within the perimeter of the so called state of affairs or the truth maker. He insists that particulars and universals that are outside the realm of states of affairs are considered as meaningless to the extent that they are regarded as non existing (190). This is not agreeable because it is not necessary to line states of affairs with standard physical properties, particulars, and relations for the reason that the world simply cannot keep up with the standards of things because there is no such thing as perfect in this world, like things that cannot be instantiated. Bare particulars Armstrong never believed in bare particulars because he believes it is in the outside realm of the states of affairs. He further believes that it has no particulars and no properties that will make it relate to other things existing in the universe (qtd. in Bailey 33). This argument is similarly weak with other arguments he had. He cannot even provide a clear and firm argument about it in this section. This part of the argument still falls on the Platonic heaven concept wherein there are other forms in this world that do not fall to the physical and standard properties of the so called states of affairs. The Thin and the Thick Particular Armstrong’s argument that the thick particular strictly belongs to the area of states of affairs is rather believable. However, when he stated that the thin particulars are apart from its properties but is still considered being within the periphery of the states of affairs is quite confusing. He did not clearly state why this is so. Instead, he only reasoned that the thin particulars are clothed with properties but are very thin. This argument is rather confusing and absolutely not substantial (125). Universals as Ways Believing that things are the way things are in this world is not a very strong argumentation. There are different ways things are intended to be, and the intangible things like beliefs, desires, and virtues also have their own ways in this world even if they do not have properties that can be instantiated. Multiple Locations Since he rejected the existence of uninstantiated universal, Armstrong now faces a difficulty in explaining how things exist simultaneously in a multiple location or space. Also, his naturalism instinct to explain this part makes it more difficult because the question about where these multiple locations are will eventually follow. Conclusion Armstrong has so many claims that are easily negated because of the past studies set out by early philosophers who have established their names in the field and have influenced many scholars of different times. Negating their claims is a brave thing to do, though. However, one needs to be firm and consistent in his claims in order for his claims to be undoubtable and unquestionable. Works Cited Armstrong, David Malet. A Theory of Universals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1978. Print. Bailey, Andrew M. “No bare particulars.” Philosophy Studies 158.1 (2012): 31–41. Print. Magalha?es, Erna?ni. “Armstrong on the Spatio-temporality of Universals.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84.2 (2006): 301 – 308. Print. Mulligan, Kevin. ed. Language, Truth, and Ontology. Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992. Print. Pautz, Adam. “An Argument Against Armstrong’s Analysis of the Resemblance of Universals.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75.1 (1997): 109-111. Print. Read More