Zartmans Concept of Ripeness - Book Report/Review Example

Zartman's Concept of Ripeness Zartman's Concept of Ripeness The theory of ripeness in mediation is based on one basic principle: when both parties have reached an impasse in achieving their goals, they both become more willing to compromise and end the feud. William Zartman believes that this theoretical ripeness for positive mediation is the major factor in both small scale and international negotiation, and should be fully taken into consideration by anyone who wants any number of parties to reach an agreement or resolve a conflict (Zartman 2003). Within a contemporary context, the concept of ripeness has been cited constantly as international groups try to dissuade potentially violent groups from engaging in warfare or political provocation. The theory does ring true on a basic level however it still needs work before it can be considered a completely comprehensive school of thought (Zartman 1989). Although William Zartman is the first to put this ripeness theory into print in his series of negotiation books, the basic notion has been mentioned by others before him. Notably, Henry Kissinger, the United States' Secretary of State from 1973 to 1976 pointed out that "stalemate is the most propitious condition for settlement" (Zartman 2000). Kissinger was the American official who oversaw the end of a warring era between Egypt and Israel during his time in office, and it was his role as a mediator that helped to bring about the signing of a peace treaty just a few years later (Deiwiks 2005). Perhaps more remarkably, Henry Kissinger was the 1973 recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize for his role in ending the Vietnam War, a military engagement still considered an incredible failure by many Americans and international citizens. For his part in the resolution, Kissinger confronted many factors in the confrontation between North and South Vietnam. A controversial man himself, Kissinger did actually fail to make the Paris Peace treaty work for North and South Vietnam, however is esteemed for negotiations that eventually helped to stop the war. Was the failure due to 'unripeness'; both parties in an unready state for negotiation The Vietnam War occurred during the time of the Cold War, an extended feud between Western democracies and Eastern communist countries who were both trying to prove their superiority in ideology. No guns were ever fired in this time, which is why the period is referred to as the 'Cold' war; however the tensions present between such nations as the United States and the Soviet Union meant that an outburst between these nations' allies was bound to become a proxy war. A proxy war, as described by Narender Sehgal (2001) is an armed conflict that arises almost secondary to the real point: The United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in conflict without actively pursuing an enemy, so the involvement of a Soviet ally in warfare gave the U.S. the chance to step in and fight the Soviets, to a certain extent. Many Americans felt that the involvement of their country in the Vietnam War was unjustified; however despite massive protests at home America continued to support South Vietnam and to fight the North Vietnamese communists who had both the Soviet Union and China on their side. What Henry Kissinger faced was a seemingly endless war that couldn't be won easily. He had to gauge the best way to end the war and salvage the dignity of his nation, and to do that he had to have an overall understanding of every aspect involved in the conflict. For one thing, he had to take into consideration the fact that it was indeed a proxy war, and big egos were present on either side. Apart from that were the localized issues at work in both the North and South Vietnamese. How did they both envision the end of the war Was there any hope of a middle ground or did one side simply have to overpower the other Kissinger did understand the principle of ripeness in positive mediation (as much as one can without the itemized term having yet been written) yet he also knew that as a man in his position he couldn't simply wait for that moment to come on its own. He said of the United States, "No country has been more reluctant to engage itself abroad even while undertaking alliances and commitments of unprecedented reach and scope" (Kissinger 1994, p.1). While his government was incredibly willing to send military forces into Vietnam, Kissinger found that mediation on any front was quite demanding on him. The American government would not yield until it felt that an agreement of some sort had been reached, yet few people were actively seeking to alleviate the confrontation. Kissinger found himself dealing with two super egos in the form of his own government and the Soviet Union, as well as the fragmented North and South Vietnam and their own differing ideologies that went farther back than mere communism or democracy. The ripeness that Zartman refers to would surely have come eventually, but the key was to shorten that length of time and help all parties involved to feel ready to resolve the issue sooner rather than later. Henry Kissinger pushed for peace talks that did actually fail superficially, however the fact that he did engage with the North Vietnamese repeatedly and made it clear that his government did want a clear resolution helped to see the end of the war. In 1976, after ignoring the peace treaty set out for them, North Korea had advanced far into the South and this action actually lead to the reunification of Vietnam as a whole. Pushed for an end to the violence, a resolution was eventually reached after the deaths of 1 300 000 Vietnamese. The ripeness concept can also be applied to the recent fighting between Israel and Lebanon, known as the Second Lebanon War by the former and the July War by the latter. William Zartman has described his ripeness theory as an "analytical tool" and said that concerning its use he is "most interested in the conceptual understanding of the negotiation process and the conflict management process" (Zartman 2003). When put into the Israeli-Lebanon context it becomes clear that ripeness for debate and resolution is not so clear cut, however as Zartman says, the ideology does provide a good basis from which to analyse the situation. The conflict began on July 12, 2006 when the Hezbollah guerrilla force from Lebanon fired rockets at Israeli military units and took two Israeli soldiers hostage, killing three more. This sparked Israeli defensive military action and many more lives were lost in both countries before the United Nations initiated the cease fire on the 14th of August. Superficially speaking, this conflict seems quite unorthodox, however it must be taken into consideration that this was not an isolated incident. The conflict came about as the result of years of tension between the two nations, and unrest based on border conflicts, repeated invasions and individual attacks (Lea 2002). The two nations have not been comfortingly situated next to one another and the people in both countries have grown up within a culture of fear and violence against one another. "At present, the Lebanese are beginning to recover from fifteen years of civil war and are attempting to rebuild their country, but they are also forced to tread water, so to speak, while awaiting the 'peace process' to yield agreements among their neighbors that would make a normal national life possible" (Winslow 1996) The conflict between these people and their Israeli neighbours is not one that can be easily solved, as any diplomat will tell you. It is also a situation that does not adhere easily to the theory of ripeness, in that the warring bodies themselves are not clear on what exactly they want to achieve. The complete dissolution of the Israeli state, as stated by Hezbollah militants to be the ultimate solution, is not an option that any diplomat or mediating body would accept. The problem with using the ripeness theory in this context is that for a ripe state for mediation to occur, feuding parties must have precise goals in mind. Once they understand that the full measure of these goals is not an option, they will be willing to take a step back and open the table to discussions. This is how mediation can begin and work effectively. When it comes to the July and August conflict between Lebanon and Israel, no clear objectives were defined and therefore the state of ripeness Zartman discussed is not possible. What is possible, using the ripeness theory, is simply the construction of a platform from which to interpret the situation. Zartman says, "It is the government's job to be responsive to the grievances of its people; it is the insurgents' purpose to draw attention to their grievances and gain redress (1995, p.77)". When you use the ripeness concept in this context, you are able to recognize the fact that violence is carried out to make a point and consider what point the Lebanese, the Israelis, the North and South Vietnamese are trying to make. This perspective makes it simpler to understand the conflict, and to understand the length of time it may extend for. While Zartman's theory is not perfect, he himself admits that it is merely a tool for the diplomat. References Beyond Intractability 2003, William Zartman interviewed by Julian Portilla, University of Colorado, October 26 2006, http://www.beyondintractability.org/audio/william_zartman/nid=2489. Deiwiks, C 2004, A Formal Model of International Mediation: Application and Prospects, Masters thesis, Osnabruck University, Osnabruck. Kissinger, H 1994, Diplomacy, Simon & Schuster, New York. Lea, D (ed) 2002, A Survey of Arab-Israeli Relations 1947-2001, Europa, London. Narender S 2001, Converted Kashmir, Kashmir Information Network, Utpal Publications, 2001, http://www.kashmir-information.com/ConvertedKashmir/index.html. Winslow, C 1996, War and Politics in a Fragmented Society, Routledge, New York. Zartman, W 1989, Ripe for Resolution, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Zartman, W 1995, Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars, Brookings Institution, Washington DC. Zartman, W 2000, International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War, National Academies Press, Washington DC. Zartman, W 2003, Ripeness, Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder, October 27 2006, http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/ripeness/. Read More