For instance, these proponents have argued that for a fetus with Down syndrome, it is permissible to carry out abortion. Down syndrome (DS) is a health condition in which superfluous genetic material leads to delays in the mental and physical development. This paper holds that it is morally permissible to abort a fetus with Down syndrome due to various reasons. Apparently, aborting this fetus will save it future pain and suffering once born. In addition, the fetus lacks capacity for making its own decision and does not have the capacity to desire for the continuation of its existence. Moreover, the fetus lacks more developed person-like features and it lacks fully developed rights to life (Warren, 2004).
Moral issues surrounding abortion. The issue of terminal conditions and abortion accrues from the idea of active euthanasia. Marquis (1989) indicates that the overall issue of killing a person who is terminally ill to save him or her from pain is sometimes not justifiable. This accrues from the premise that death is more painful that all other forms of physical pain. On the other hand, he claims that it is not generally wrong to kill the person who would die anyway. Under this premise, it is then not morally wrong to abort or terminate a fetus suffering from a terminal condition such as Down syndrome. This raises the proposition that aborting might be illegal but considering the moral responsibility concerning terminal conditions, it becomes morally justifiable.
He adds that the parents of these children undergoes through hard financial strains while trying to provide adequate treatment to them. It is under this notion that it becomes morally permissible to abort a fetus that will probably bring about these problems once born. This premise asserts that it is not morally wrong to terminate a life that would otherwise go through pain and bring strain. He adds that there is a difference between terminally ill adult individuals and a fetus with a severe condition. This is in the sense that the adult individual can make a decision for himself or herself while the fetus does tot have the capacity to make its own decision. This therefore supports the claim that it is vital to make the decision on behalf of the fetus, thus becoming morally acceptable to abort it. On the other hand, Marquis (1989) indicates that some opponents of this issue would claim that it is not right to kill a terminally ill person due to his or her future value. Under this premise, the opponents would argue that this should be the same in the case of a fetus with Down syndrome. However, this assertion fails in the sense that a fetus is not fully ripe to realize its value in the future. Though there might be some innate value in the baby, there is no justification that it would add value in the future. This premise rests entirely in the public opinion but not in the reality of the issue. Another strong view in proposing the issue of aborting a 16 week- fetus with Down syndrome rests in the incompleteness of the person-like feature of the fetus. It is very evident that even though opponents of abortion argue that the fetus is a human being, it lacks unquestionable features to make it person-like. For instance, Warren (2004)