Reformed Epistemology Insulates Religious Faith from Scientific Scrutiny - Essay Example

Reformed Epistemology Insulates Religious Faith from Scientific Scrutiny “I am going to assume--uncontroversially among most philosophers but controversially among reformed epistemologists--that “reformed epistemology” is nothing more than an effort to insulate religious faith from ordinary standards of reasons and evidence in common sense and the sciences, and thus religious belief is a culpable form of unwarranted belief given those ordinary epistemic standards. “ Religion is a unique aspect of the human experience. It has the ability to unite us as nations or believers, to separate us from one another, to invoke passionate hatred, as well as passionate devotion. Apart from race, religion is a key identifier for the individual in today’s world. It speaks to one’s political beliefs, one’s heritage and history, and it helps people define themselves in terms of cultural groups. We form traditions, we develop a relationship with God, and we follow certain doctrines which dictate to us how to treat other human beings. Religion also attempts to answer life’s existential questions in comforting, understandable ways. But does this all mean that religion is so mysterious in its nature that it must never be questioned, and that its doctrines take precedence over the laws by which we choose to be governed? This is the territory Leiter explores in his paper - at least, he explores it to the extent that religion brushes up against secular laws. It is an interesting point of view. We all know people whose religious affiliations have exempted them, from time to time, from duties or obligations that, had they not claimed a particular religious affiliation, they would have been expected to fulfill. And we, for the most part, in the name of freedom of religion, tolerate these exemptions. But why? Why are religious individuals accorded this toleration? And if we cannot answer this question, should we continue, in fact, to tolerate their exemptions, even in the face of no reasonable evidence? Any person who has taken an American history class or studied for his or her citizenship exam is well-acquainted with the Amendment concerning freedom of religion – but perhaps it is now time to re-evaluate the concept. Leiter would have us believe that the re-evaluation is long overdue. He even goes so far as to delineate a difference between toleration and respect. (Incidentally, this writer finds it ironic that the mere publication of Leiter’s work would not be possible without the toleration he seeks to eliminate, but that is a topic for another paper.) So is Leiter justified in his premise? This paper will explore his logic, analyze some of his examples and draw a conclusion as to whether or not he has successfully made his case with regard to tolerating religion. In order to properly examine the above premise regarding “reformed epistemology”, it is necessary first to define a few terms. Epistemology, according to Webster’s dictionary is “a branch of philosophy that investigates the origin, nature, methods and limits of human knowledge.” The word “culpable” as it is used in this context appears to mean deserving blame or disapproval. Leiter’s primary objection to religion is that it does not hold up well at all under scientific scrutiny. Its evidence is scanty, its proofs non-existent, and there is no scientific explanation proving the existence of any sort of deity who could be the supposed source for religion’s categorical requirements and commandments. That said, Leiter believes that religious faith has been accorded a protection of sorts from the laws which apply to our society in all other aspects, and that he cannot find any compelling evidence for religion to deserve that kind of exception. This paper will show that, in fact, he has a valid point regarding the fact that religion should not be tolerated. He cites as his example the Canadian Supreme Court case, Multani, “[which affirms] the right of a Sikh child to carry his ceremonial knife, the kirpan, in school, in accordance with his religion.” (49) This is a particularly apt example of the epistemic protection to which Leiter objects. The object in question, the kirpan, is not allowed on airplanes or in courtrooms because it is considered a weapon. Why, then, argues Leiter, should it be acceptable to bring said weapon to school, where weapons of all kinds are expressly prohibited? Leiter says, in fact, that it should not be acceptable, and that the reason this case was upheld was because “the Court nonetheless held that the student in question could carry the most dangerous kind of kirpan as long as ‘his personal and subjective belief in the religious significance of the kirpan is sincere’ (¶37), including his ‘sincere’ belief that wearing a plastic or wooden kirpan will not suffice--since adherents of a religion ‘may adhere to the dogma and practices of that religion to varying degrees of rigour’” (¶39), apparently free from scrutiny by the state.’ ” (50) So, because of the child’s “sincerity” he should be accorded the right to bring a weapon to school? Why should anyone be allowed to carry to school an object that clearly qualifies as a weapon? The case was upheld in part because there was no precedent of a kirpan being used as a weapon. The problem is that the object could absolutely be used as a weapon if its bearer so chose to use it – but allowing him to have the object on his person was done in the name of religious freedom. It makes sense to use this case as the jumping-off point for a debate about why religion should not be tolerated. On the face of it, this particular instance of religious tolerance is sanctioning a child bringing an object to school which is, in fact, a weapon. Where do we draw the line with regard to religious tolerance, if not in this case? Leiter presents some powerful arguments which help to illuminate his theory that religion should not be tolerated. Categorical commands and insulation from evidence are two terms Leiter uses to build his case against religion. Leiter explains that categoricity (meaning without exceptions; absolute) and insulation from evidence (meaning scientific, provable evidence) ought to render religion ineligible for protection; that it should not be tolerated, any more than any other idea or concept which cannot be supported by facts and evidence. This is a powerful statement, considering how many millions of people participate in organized religion. He does find one redeeming quality about religion – that it provides consolation in the face of existential dilemmas – but then he immediately refutes it with this: “Could the utility-maximizing effect of religious belief’s existential consolation function be realized by beliefs (or other practices) that did not incorporate the potentially harmful attributes of categoricity and insulation form evidence? The answer to the latter question must surely be ‘yes.’ ” (38) So, Leiter is saying that the one redeeming quality he is willing to afford religion, its ability to console us in terms of life’s big questions, is not worth according religion special treatment under the law, because the answers to those existential questions can be gotten by other means. He returns to his premise: that “religion qua religion” should not be tolerated. In fact, he equates it to intelligent design and other concepts which have no concrete scientific backing, particularly with the Blackburn example: “Religious belief is (epistemically) culpable false belief, i.e., it is unwarranted and one ought to know it is unwarranted. This is probably the real concern for Blackburn, and it certainly distinguishes the case of religious belief from some of our other false beliefs, such as those involving our children or ourselves. (Blackburn’s host may falsely believe his children are intelligent and attractive, but he is hardly epistemically blameworthy for so believing!) Why should culpably false beliefs elicit respect, rather than indulgence or toleration? That is surely the point of Blackburn’s scenarios such as being asked to “respect” those who believe the Hale-Bopp comet is a recycling facility for dead Californians. These beliefs are false, and ridiculously so, and no one in their right mind should accept them.” (61) Some people may say it is a stretch of logic to compare religious beliefs to those who believe Comet Hale-Bop is a recycling facility for the dead, but according to Leiter, both are equally impossible to prove epistemically, which qualifies them both as culpably false beliefs and therefore, neither merits tolerating. Philosopher Alex Byrne, though, makes a very interesting point about religion: [I]t is fair to say that the arguments [for God’s existence] have left the philosophical community underwhelmed. The classic contemporary work is J.L. Mackie’s The Miracle of Theism, whose ironic title summarizes Mackie’s conclusion: the persistence of belief in God is a kind of miracle because it is so unsupported by reasons and evidence.1 (63) How does Leiter account for the fact that so many millions of people take comfort in religious beliefs? He doesn’t concern himself with this, except to say that these people should not be allowed to enjoy special exceptions under the law – that one’s religious convictions should not be tolerated to the extent that one is excluded from following the laws to which everyone else must adhere. When he puts it that way, particularly in light of the Siekh student bringing the ceremonial knife to school, religious tolerance does take on an aspect of absurdity which merits further consideration. We excuse and tolerate so much behavior in the name of religious freedom. Perhaps Leiter is right – it is time to draw the line somewhere. The existence of God is not scientifically provable – therefore, the actions and beliefs which people take because of their belief in God should not be accorded special privileges, nor should they be considered above the law. Religion is also the source of many egregious beliefs which have spawned countless acts of violence, prevented numerous scientific discoveries from taking place (through the opposition to stem cell research, for example) and given credence to such tenuous theories as the theory of Intelligent Design, and the idea that it should be taught in schools alongside, or in lieu of, evolution. Perhaps it is time to take more than a cursory look at our constitutionally protected religious freedoms, and examine exactly what it is those amendments are protecting. After all, many hate crimes are committed in the name of religion, from gay persecution to anti-abortion rallies where doctors who perform the procedure are murdered. Continues Leiter: “And it is now difficult to see how any of the preceding considerations would support the conclusion that religious matters of conscience warrant esteem or reverence. Only if there were a positive correlation between beliefs that were culpably without epistemic warrant and valuable outcomes would it seem that we should think them proper objects of Appraisal Respect. But the evidence on this score is, as we have already had occasion to note, mixed.” (66) What the issue comes down to, then, is how the law must deal with what Leiter calls a “claim of conscience”: “A claim of conscience is, after all, a claim about what one must do, no matter what--not as a matter of crass self-interest, but because it is a kind of moral imperative central to one’s integrity as a person, to the meaning of one’s life.” (74) Leiter is elegantly leading us toward his ultimate argument, which is, once we start making exceptions in these cases, where does it end? Conscientious objectors to war can refuse to enlist, but then anyone can merely claim to be a conscientious objector and get out of military service, which puts an extra burden on those who do serve in the military. Animal rights activists who happen to be imprisoned can refuse certain work detail which involves what they consider to be cruelty to animals. Again, where does it end? According to Leiter, we should all be subject to the same laws and rules. Making exceptions for religion appears to unnecessarily complicate the issue. I agree with Leiter: legal exceptions for religion should not be tolerated, because adherence to a particular religion does not appear to warrant exemption from the laws and rules everyone else is expected to follow. His argument is rational and well-supported. It may, in fact, be time for us to reconsider our policies with regard to tolerating religion. Read More