Mind is not Identical to the Body - Essay Example

? An Exposition and Evaluation of Descartes’ Arguments for the Claim that the Mind is not Identical to the Body Inhis Sixth Meditation, Descartes presents two arguments for the claim that the mind is not identical to the body. One is the argument based on a clear distinction between mind and body, and the other is based on the mind’s indivisibility and the mind’s divisibility. Both of these arguments are plausible but several objections to them can be thought of. The first of these two arguments is the argument that can be fittingly called an argument from distinction. According to Descartes: “It is true that I may have (or to anticipate, that I certainly have) a body that is very closely joined to me. But nevertheless, on the one hand, I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in so far as I am simply a thinking, non-extended thing; and on the other hand I have a distinct idea of body, in so far as this is simply an extended, non-thinking thing. And accordingly, it is certain that I am really distinct from my body, and can exist without it.” (54) From the argument above, Descartes is trying to say that he has a “clear and distinct” idea of himself and at the same time, he has a “clear and distinct” idea of body. He therefore concludes that his having a clear and distinct idea of himself serves as enough proof that the mind exists, and that his having a clear and distinct idea of body directly implies that his body exists separately from the mind, and is therefore different from it. It is also interesting to note that his clear and distinct idea of himself is “simply a thinking, non-extended thing” and how he perceives the body is “simply an extended, non-thinking thing.” This therefore brings us to the idea that Descartes’ argument of separation of the mind from the body, or of the body from the mind, is simply based on the matter of extension and capacity to think. Descartes therefore, in making the distinction between mind and body, does not consider the other qualities of the mind except its capacity to think and its not being extended, and he also therefore does not take into consideration the other qualities of the body except its lack of capacity to think and its being extended. Therefore, by simply emphasizing the non-extendedness and thinking capacity of the mind, and by equally emphasizing the extendedness and thinking incapacity of the body, Descartes now sees the distinction between the body and the mind. There might, however, be some objections regarding this. First, Descartes may have failed to take into account that by emphasizing the distinction between the mind and the body, it does not follow that one can say that the mind is not identical to the body. The fact that one can be perceived distinctly from the other cannot therefore guarantee that one is not identical to the other. Of course, Descartes may be correct at this, but still there is a possibility that he may be perceiving only the different qualities of just “One Thing.” It therefore could be possible that this “One Thing” may simply have the attributes of thinking and non-extension at times, and those of non-thinking and extension at other times. Descartes then may have made a mistake by equating such distinct qualities as qualities of two distinct objects (body and mind), when in fact they can simply be distinct qualities of one object. Second, Descartes’ clear and distinct perception of the mind and the body cannot guarantee that mind and body are different from each other because it is possible that Descartes’ perception may be subjective or impaired. Descartes was only human and, human as he was, he may not have been that accurate in perceiving such a “clear and distinct” mind and a “clear and distinct” body. How sure is Descartes in the whole of the Meditations that what he is actually perceiving is the mind or the body, and how sure is he that the mind remains thinking and non-extended, and that the body remains non-thinking and extended? If Descartes’ claim that the body cannot think is true, then the mind is the one doing all the thinking, which means that it is therefore now unfair for the body to have the mind judge it as merely extended and non-thinking, when perhaps the body could possibly think but this thinking is simply not perceived by Descartes or mistaken as done by the mind. Furthermore, Descartes can never be sure that whenever he thinks, it is still the mind and not the body that is doing the thinking. Thoughts cease at a certain moment, and how sure is Descartes that the one that did the thinking an hour ago is the same as the one that is doing the thinking now? After all, even non-identical objects can have identical qualities. A third objection to the claim of Descartes on the distinction between mind and body is that how exactly is perception possible between a mind and a body, which Descartes himself considers to be totally non-identical? What then gives Descartes even the right to use his mind to make conclusions about the body? If mind and body are non-identical, then how can it be possible for perception to occur from the mind to the body? One may simply argue that the mind is the one thinking and can therefore think about the body. However, can we also conversely say that the body has extensions or sense perceptions that cannot be perceived by the mind because they are qualities of the body? If the mind can think of these extensions of the body, then perhaps it is only the mind that exists and that the body actually does not, and so there is no distinction between them. One last objection to Descartes’ argument on the distinction between body and mind is that the idea of having different qualities – the mind being non-extended and thinking, and the body being extended and non-thinking – seems enough to lead him to the conclusion that body and mind are non-identical. Simply because two different and even opposing qualities are exhibited or are perceived does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that there must be two different and separate objects that manifest such qualities. There could simply be “One Thing” but only perceived by Descartes at two different perspectives, and what he perceives as the mind may only be one perspective of this “One Thing,” and that the body may simply be another perspective of this “One Thing.” Perhaps, it is like Descartes saw a man once when he was facing him, and another time when his back was turned, and that Descartes may have thought that he saw two different men for one of them had a “clear and distinct” face, while the other one had a “clear and distinct” back. What Descartes did not realize was that this was the same man that he was observing and what he did not see was when this man whose front he saw TURNED AROUND and showed his back. Only then could Descartes conclude that it was actually the same man he was perceiving all along. This analogy of “turning around” may, however, not work with the body and the mind, or may do but may be imperceptible. The second argument that Descartes presents for the claim that the mind is not identical to the body goes like this: “The body is by its very nature always divisible, while the mind is utterly indivisible. For when I consider the mind, or myself in so far as I am merely a thinking thing, I am unable to distinguish any parts within myself; I understand myself to be something quite single and complete. Although the whole mind seems to be united to the whole body, I recognize that if a foot or arm or any other part of the body is cut off, nothing has thereby been taken away from the mind.” (59) Descartes further adds: “…there is no corporeal or extended thing that I can think of which in my thought I cannot easily divide into parts; and this very fact makes me understand that it is divisible. This one argument would show me that the mind is completely different from the body.” (59). The above statements of Descartes somehow comprise his argument on divisibility and indivisibility. Descartes is therefore simply telling us that the mind is indivisible and that the body is divisible, and he therefore concludes that the mind is different from the body. Based on the first part of the argument, Descartes explains that the nature of the body is that it is divisible, and the nature of the mind is that it is indivisible. Descartes has made the conclusion about the nature of the mind and that of the body simply because he cannot identify the parts of the mind, and that he can perceptibly identify the parts of the body. He also explains that the body is divisible because he can imagine parts of it being taken away from it, while the mind is indivisible because no part can be taken away from it. Furthermore, based on the second part of the argument, the fact that Descartes himself simply cannot imagine a corporeal body which cannot be divided into parts, then he therefore concludes that all bodies are divisible and therefore are distinctly different from the mind. This argument, however, also lends itself to several objections. First, just like in the objection to the argument on distinction, Descartes may simply be perceiving one thing with basically two very distinct qualities of divisibility and indivisibility. One aspect of this thing, which Descartes perceives as the body, may simply be its divisible part or aspect; and the other, or another, aspect of this thing, which Descartes perceives as the mind, may simply be the indivisible part. Of course, Descartes may be right at his conclusions, but he cannot discount this possibility. Two different perspectives of one thing is still simply not equivalent to two different things. Moreover, it could also be that at one time, the mind-aspect of this “One Thing” is at work and what is perceived is therefore indivisible, but if it is the “body-aspect” of this “One Thing” is at work, then what Descartes can perceive is merely its divisible aspect. However, this is a possibility which can be confirmed only through a dissection of the mind and the body, and may not be completely or accurately perceived by the human mind. Second, for Descartes to say that “the body is by its very nature always divisible, while the mind is utterly indivisible” and then presents his own account of how he arrived at this conclusion through his mere perceptions somehow tells us that Descartes simply made conclusions out of mere empirical evidence. Just because he was able to perceive the mind as indivisible does not guarantee that it does not have parts and can never be divisible at any time. A fitting analogy would be just because I was not able to see a spider on the chair before I sat on it does not make the spider unreal. In short, our perceptions are faulty and cannot be made as a basis for the truth of the things around us. Similarly, just because Descartes perceives the body as divisible and just because “there is no corporeal or extended thing that [he] can think of which in [his] thought [he] cannot easily divide into parts,” does not mean at all that the body is therefore divisible and that its nature is divisibility. Descartes may simply not have seen the indivisible aspect of the body, or maybe this aspect is merely imperceptible. In a similar way, Descartes may also simply not have seen the divisible aspect of the mind, or maybe this aspect is merely also imperceptible to him, or at least to him. Third, Descartes’ idea of divisibility and indivisibility may be purely physical and may not take into account mental divisibility. According to Descartes, “Although the whole mind seems to be united to the whole body, I recognize that if a foot or arm or any other part of the body is cut off, nothing has thereby been taken away from the mind.” The separation of the foot from the body is physical but nevertheless it is just merely imagined by Descartes so, if I could only imagine the mind as something with parts and each part is being taken away, then it could also be possible that the mind actually has parts. If the basis of Descartes’ arguments is merely imagination, then he can subject the mind to the same method in the same way that he does to the body. Fourth, in claiming that the mind is different from the body by virtue of physical indivisibility and divisibility, then Descartes may not have considered that physical indivisibility of the body may even have its own limits. If the atom can be continually divided forever, then Descartes may be right – at least in the physical sense. However, if there is a limitation to the physical divisibility of the atom (although there could be no limit to its mental divisibility), then Descartes may be wrong in assuming that the nature of the body is its divisibility. If splitting the atom has therefore reached a point where it cannot be done anymore, then the atom, which is obviously body not mind, is now considered to be mind, because it is now indivisible. Descartes should therefore have clearly emphasized whether his criterion in this argument is physical indivisibility or mental indivisibility. Nevertheless, if Descartes chooses to argue from the standpoint of physical divisibility and indivisibility, his argument fails because although the mind may be physically indivisible, the body may reach the point of physical indivisibility. On the other hand, if Descartes chooses to argue from the standpoint of mental divisibility and indivisibility, his argument still fails because both body and mind can be mentally imagined as having parts that can also be imagined as mentally divisible. Descartes, therefore cannot really actually argue that the nature of the body is its divisibility and that the nature of the mind is its indivisibility. The arguments of Descartes in terms of a clear distinction between a body and a mind, and the one concerning divisibility and indivisibility, may both be plausible but both also lend themselves to a number of objections. The whole point of the objections is that no one can possibly say at which point the objectivity of Descartes’ mind ceases and at which point its subjectivity sets it. Moreover, even if Descartes’ mind perceived mind and body with 100% objectivity, it does not necessarily mean that all observations have been carried out in perfection. In short, the mind may be objective but it may still not be complete or accurate. Top of Form Bottom of Form Works Cited Descartes, Rene. Meditations on the First Philosophy. Ed. Robert Paul Wolff. New York: Penguin Books Ltd., 1969. Print. Read More