The Central Problem of Philosophy of Religion - Essay Example

Problem of Evil In his article, Inwegan presents a well-written work characterized by ingenuous and insightful argumentation through a combination of elegant prose with philosophical rigor. The article offers many and diverse explanations and insights regarding the central problem of philosophy of religion. The study evaluates Inwagen’s fascinating views regarding free will on the global as well as local arguments from evil. Regarding the problem of evil, Inwagen argues that that there is no precise number of evil things that have to happen in order to secure particular compensating goods. Therefore, even the ideal moral judge like God has to draw arbitrary line even when deciding on the number of evil things he would allow; therefore, the vague line guarantees that some evils in the world are gratuitous (Sullivan 398-402). Inwagen’s strategy and enlightenments to the evil problem are very significant in enhancing people’s understanding, and rather than giving an entirely critical response, he offers contributions and then explains their significance. Inwagen condemns the normal taxonomy regarding the problem of evil and provides a substitute all of which are important (Łukasiewicz 448-450). The disadvantage that Inwagen points out includes analytic philosophers haste in categorizing the argument from evil into two, which involves the logical argument and evidential argument from evil. The logical problem from evil purports to indicate that the existence of both God and evil is logically impossible; nevertheless, defenders of evidential argument from evil grant that the existence of both God and evil to be possible (Van 8). However, Inwagen insists it is unlikely that God exists given the extent as well as the degree of evil observed; hence, he notes that logical as well as evidential distinction are only but relics of history. Furthermore, Inwagen points out historical differences that usually encourage theists to consider sufficient response concerning argument from evil (Shabo 107-110). Instead of the conventional classifications, Inwagen provides an alternative way of classifying all arguments from evil with their scope of evil that is given as evidence against God’s existence. Inwagen’s global argument from evil posits that if God existed, then the world would never have evil; however, the world has vast amount of evil, which points out that God never exists. On the other hand, Inwagen’s local argument from evil posits that if God were there, then the world would never have particular evil; however, the world does have certain evil, which points out that God does not exist. This approach is useful compared to logical/evidential distinction since global arguments as well as local arguments from evil desire distinct responses in place of the theist. Successful defense disregarding global argument will never voluntarily offer theist a successful defense against local argument from evil (Boyce and McBrayer 1-3). Another significant contribution of Inwagen is in his reaction to the argument from evil regards his ingenious use of vagueness as a means of arguing the existence of God to be compatible with existence of gratuitous evil. An evil is considered gratuitous once its occurrence is not essential in compensating good or essential in preventing something equally bad. Contemporary theistic responses to the argument from evil normally grant that if God exists, then there are no gratuitous evils; however, this challenges gratuitous evils that exist. The responses purport to either indicate that none of the evils in the real world are gratuitous or lack adequate reason for thinking that evils in the real world gratuitous. However, Inwagen response focuses on the premise that if God exists then there would never be gratuitous evils. Inwagen suggests that the vagueness in the world ensures that moral principle in question is false and in some cases arbitrary line has to be drawn by agents of perfect morals (Boyce and McBrayer 2-4). In spite of the significant contributions offered by Inwagen in his work, the works is never full proof from problems; for instance, the way he presents his debate ensures that the thesis is to some extent boring. Although, the argument from evil sounds exciting, Inwagen subsequently claims no philosophy in his conclusion. Inwagen in his article, he departs from the normal classification that distinguishes logical threat from evidential threat and replaces it with global argument from evil varies from local argument from evil. Inwagen’s global argument regarding evil begins from indisputable fact that there exists pointless evil in the world. This argument further asserts that with the vast amount of evil in the world, there should is no God which ends in atheistic conclusion. Various philosophers address this argument from evil through appeals to considerations of free will and Inwagen’s response hails from this tradition (Griffith 263). Inwagen offers defense to this argument that has to be distinguished from theodicy, where theodicy involves a narration of an individual in expressing the truth regarding the reason God allows huge amount of evil. Proponents of this defense do not actually have to believe that the story expresses the reality of the matter; but rather the proponents of the defense only have to tell a plausible and possible explaining the reason God allows the vast quantity of evil. Since the proposed defense is aimed at the free will defense, Inwagen considers that the proposition that God knows every truth is inconsistent with any proposition that creatures have free will and proposes the conventional concept of omniscience. The proposition is that rather than conceive a being to be omniscient, which only applies if it believes that every true proposition and believes no false one, an individual may be omniscient if fulfils two conditions which include that being’s belief being impossible to be mistaken and that the being has beliefs in every matter (Boyce and McBrayer 4-6). Inwagen’s arguments are subject to various substantive criticisms regarding his treatment of the problem of evil. For instance, his argument seems to have a planned stance against argument from evil, which appears to violate the criteria of sufficiency through which Inwegan faults other defenses on the argument. Inwagen maintains that adequate free will must take not only the story regarding God on bringing great good from evils in the world in order to outweigh the evils, but also includes the suggestion that God has been unable to bring about great good without the evident evils. He also faults various defenses against the argument for their failure to meet his standard; hence, Inwagen points that popular defense fails for this same reason. Various scholars maintain that the motive God allows evil in the planet is because a lack of evil would not persuade anyone to appreciate the goodness in things that are good. Moreover, aside from the fact that the appreciation defense falls short of plausibly accounting for the magnitude and the extent of evil within the world; hence, Inwagen argues that this defense has various fault in a different manner (Łukasiewicz 450-453). Regardless of whether the world in which nightmares are actually worth it because they would render people better off, Inwagen notes that it appears that the world where horrible things happen only in nightmares would be better off compared to a world where horrible things occur in reality. Therefore, in his defense, Inwagen proposes that god allows several evils within the planet is to endow individuals with particular form of knowledge that is essential for individuals to gain for them to gain spiritual good (Boyce and McBrayer 5-8). Inwagen suggest that the reason God permits pervasive evil in the planet is because humans by their free choice have become estranged from God and that God’s desire is to return to humanity to himself. Moreover, restoring humanity to himself, God demands cooperation from human beings and for humans to cooperate with God, the humans have to be aware of the need of being rescued. However, to understand what that really means, Inwagen claims that people have to understand what it means to be far from God and to Inwagen this means living in a planet characterized by horrors. A main criticism on Inwagen’s defense involves his over dependence on moral skepticism and his response to the argument offers a defense a story true for all, which shows how evils in the world are plausible considering the existence of God. In his defense, Inwagen offers two stages that include post-lapse evil, which is the evil that occurs because moral agents are initiated by the separation from God this is return accounted for through free will defense. The other stage is the pre-lapse evil, which includes evil that occur prior to initiation of moral agents that result in the separation from God, which can be accounted for by the massive irregularities in defense (Boyce and McBrayer 8 and 9). Therefore, I find Inwagen’s call to for inclination to moral skepticism regarding the pre-lapse defense unconvincing. Inwagen makes up the pre-lapse defense of various claims in which he argues that every claim is true; hence, philosophers have to endorse or rather be agnostics regarding the claims. These claims include the proposition that in every world God had the ability to set levels with patterns that are equivalent in moral terms to those in the real world. Another claim involves the suggestion that significant intrinsic or extrinsic good relies on the presence of advanced creature and the good being of sufficient magnitude in order to outweigh suffering prevailing on the earth. Moreover, Inwagen offer another claim that by being hugely irregular signifies defect within the world and the defect be in proportion to the pattern of moral suffering to those on real world. The last claim in the pre-lapse defense is that the world being the cosmos was created by God; therefore, by considering that the claim in his story to be true it would in dictate that various forms of evil in the world are consistent with God’s existence (Sullivan 402- 403). The components of defense is objectionable if an individual has prior reason for believing that actual suffering of beats to be a grave defect in the world compared to what massive indiscretion would be. Inwegan’s most common approach he employs in addressing the local argument from evil is the premise that considers the assumption of identifiable and pointless evils and offer an explanation that on the reason God may allow some contingent pointless evils. Inwagen expands his free will defence shows that God has to permit a certain amount of evil in order to implement his creation plan; however, it is unclear if the free will defence entails the actual amount of evils required in realizing God’s plan (Boyce and McBrayer 3 and 4). Even Inwagen, goes ahead to show that if the quantity of evil required by the expanded free will defense remains indeterminate, then even God is prone to a form of practical problem; therefore, God may deem it necessary to allow point less evils. Within the problem or evil, Inwagen develops a theist burden in a rather different though in a thorough view remains compatible with early approaches of probability (Sullivan 398). Inwagen’s proposition that a morally right creator in a world that does not have pointless evil, the omnipotent creator would create a world that corresponds in its goodness to his world. However, Inwages argues that when faced by practical problem, a moral agent is never obliged to destroy all pointless evil. Inwagen indicates that there are many pointless evils because the expanded free will defense is true and that even God faced a practical problem. Moreover, Inwagen’ s response to the local argument can be considered by a theodicist, an individual who believes that God allows evil because the individual can insist that the actual world incorporates a range of worlds that meet God’s plan of redemption and that some evils are; nevertheless, gratuitous. Hence, the presence of pointless evil never provides evidence against God’s existence who is a morally perfect creator. Up until, the knowledge on how to regard the understanding of indeterminacy has been cagey and the lack of convincing theory regarding indeterminacy makes it impossible for philosophers to believe that God is prone to practical problems. One big concern within Inwagen’s argument is that in his case he insists that the case is connected to everyday life; however, it would be better to elaborate the how a source of belief connects to everyday life. Works cited Boyce, Kenny and McBrayer, Justin. Van Inwagen on the Problem of Evil: the Good, the Bad and the Ugly. n.d. Web. Nov. 15, 2013 < http://www.baylor.edu/content/services/document.php/41162.pdf > Griffith, Meghan. "Does Free Will Remain A Mystery? A Response To Van Inwagen." Philosophical Studies 124.3 (2005): 261-269.. Łukasiewicz, Dariusz. "The Problem Of Evil." Forum Philosophicum: International Journal For Philosophy 12.2 (2007): 447-454.. Shabo, Seth. "Why Free Will Remains A Mystery." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92.1 (2011): 105-125.. Sullivan, Meghan. Peter Van Inwagen’s Defence. n.d. Web. Nov. 15, 2013. < https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=ZGVmYXVsdGRvbWFpbnxzdWxsaXZhbm1lZ2hhbnxneDo2ZWEyMGE4N2ViYjUzMDBh> Van, Inwagen P. The Problem of Evil: The Gifford Lectures Delivered in the University of St. Andrews in 2003. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. Print. Read More