Susan Wolf - Asymmetrical Freedom - Essay Example

Asymmetrical freedom-Wolf Wolf in his arguments s that for an individual to be morally responsible, he must meet two conditions: he must be a free agent, one whose actions are under personal control. This is for the reason that if his actions are not based on his decisions he does not deserve discredit or credit for doing whatever he does. Secondly, he must be an ethical agent, one to whom the moral claims relate, since his actions can be neither wrong nor right, and then there is no reason to credit or discredit him for. Wolf refers to the first condition as the condition of freedom, while the second one as the condition of value. According to Wolf, an agent’s actions are psychologically determined only on condition that his actions are determined by personal interests. By this, he means that his desires or values, and own interests are wholly determined by his environment or heredity. If people’s actions are determined, there is a high probability of the idea of psychological determinism being true. Considering what not being determined by his interests would mean for the actions of an agent, or for an agent to be capable of acting despite his interests, Wolf argues that the agent can act against everything that he cares about and what he believes in. For instance, if a son of an agent was in a burning building, yet the agent is standing and watching the building consumed by fire, then a person could think that such behavior ought not to be regarded as an action, but as spasms that are beyond the control of the agent. If it is an action, then they are so bizarre that an agent who did not bother to help may have been insane to have the ability to perform it. Wolf’s views suggest that if people require an agent to be psychologically undetermined, they cannot expect him to be an agent of good morals. This is on grounds that if people expect that his interests do not determine his actions, then probably they cannot be determined by his ethical or moral interests. However, if people expect that his interests should not be determined by something else, such actions cannot be determined by an agent’s moral interests. From Wolf’s arguments certain ideas come out clearly. When we think of an agent who performs his actions correctly, it seems that we think of an agent who is truly determined, and thus we tend to praise this agent. We believe that his actions are determined by the precise kinds of interests and that the right sort of reasons determines their interests. On the other hand, an agent who is not determined psychologically has no ability to carry out actions that are right. If his actions can never be suitably correct, then in doing right actions, he can never go wrong. One problem emerges from this situation, and that is that the undetermined agent seems to be free from moral reasons. Consequently, the satisfaction of the state of freedom tends to overpower the satisfaction of the state of value. Philosophers have got intuitions wrong, since there is an asymmetry in people’s intuitions concerning freedom that has been for a long time been overlooked. Consequently, it seems that the answer to the issue of free will can only be found in two options: either the verity that the action of an agent was determined will always be compatible with him being responsible for the action or the fact that the action of the agent was determined will often rule his responsibility out. Wolf suggests that the solution lies in the idea that both the incompatibilities and compatibilities are wrong. To be responsible beings, we need suitable combination of indetermination and determination. Susan Wolf’s views on the issue that being psychologically compelled or determined by good is compatible with the compelled agent being responsible for his action is plausible. This is due to the reason that an agent cannot be blameworthy in his morals if he is determined in the way he acts. In my view, determination is compatible with the responsibility of an agent to perform a good action, but is not compatible with his responsibility for a bad action. However, it is right to argue that the metaphysical conditions needed for the responsibility of an agent varies in accordance with the value of his action. The condition of freedom that the agent could have done otherwise seems to demand a conditional analysis. However, the condition should be one that distinguishes bad actions from good ones. This means that the condition must be basically value-laden. There is no better way of moving from Wolf’s conclusion about the moral status of nudging. This is due the reason that whether determinism is true or not, people display moral behavior in their daily reactive approaches towards the behavior of others especially when they express praise and blame for their actions and when they feel pride and guilt about their own actions. Moreover, to be accorded a status of a moral human is to be viewed as an appropriate person of a particular range of judgments and attitudes and as a legal participant in some practices. Some of the attitudes include shame and pride, resentment and gratitude, contempt and respect. The judgments include verdict that one is worthy of contempt or respect, and that one ought to be ashamed or proud. On the other hand, practices including blaming and praising, excusing, rewarding, forgiving, and punishing as per the rules put forward to make these practices. In addition to the expectation that an agent control his behavior, that is, he should have a potentially valuable will and the condition that he has control on the correct lines, there is also a requirement that his control be ultimate, meaning that his will should be determined by himself, and he should not instead, be determined by something external to itself. It is therefore unchangeable that the freedom needed for moral status is the freedom to be good. Such freedom will not be too little or too much to bring about nudging. Work cited Wolf, Susan. The Journal of Philosophy. Vol.77. No. 3. New York: Journal of philosophy.inc. 1980. Print. Read More