The Logical Nature of Scientific Realism - Essay Example

Philosophy Scientific Realism Scientific realism is one of the theories that have garnered a wide range of criticism on its credibility in explaining physical modeling in the experimental world. The semantic, metaphysical and epistemological aspects of scientific realism have all come under sharp focus in a wide range of literature. A large group of scholars has shown that there exists inaccuracy in scientific theories due to the existence of different approaches that often arrive at different models of the same problem. However, the proponents of this way of thought claim that scientific realism provides a cause effect relationship that helps to substantiate their way of reasoning, hence providing an efficient way of explaining physical phenomena. From a critical point of view, scientific modeling and existence of different experimental approaches provides cohesive formulas that can explain scientific phenomena. As a result, scientific theories have found their way in defining different situations that no other school of thoughts can explain. Therefore, the logical nature of scientific realism has made it more applicable in defining scientific phenomena in the contemporary world. The argument is that modeling and experimentation makes scientific realism a compelling approach despite the existence of false assumptions in development of scientific theories. Scientific realism is one of the traditional schools of thought that seek to explain the truth about complex phenomena of the world. The main tenet of scientific realism is that scientific theories, in a great way, provide factual and truthful information on the nature of the world. Notably, scientific theories have provided reliable explanation on complex phenomena from the way atoms behave to the way they the different elements of the world behave. Scientists have engaged in a wide range of activities including observation, experimentation and modeling to explain the nature of the world. History has defined the variation of theories and progressive scientific innovation. Recently, there has been an upsurge of criticism of the scientific approach as many authors’ expose different sides of the same coin (Boyd 54). While a number feel that these theories are reliable in explaining different situations, others view them as inferior and subject to manipulation. The opponents of these ideas state that scientific realism is subject to manipulation and that it fails to stand the test of time. The fact science leaves room for theoretical expansion has been exploited as a weakness of this idea of reasoning. Based on this, antirealists feel that scientific realism is flawed. Experimentation provides a substantial ground for scientific analysts to provide a compelling stand while explaining different situations. Evidently, scientific realists embed their work in experimentation of phenomena before developing any theories. Physical experiments help to observe certain variables, either dependent or independent and to show the way such variables affect a certain behavior. Hacking (155) state that experimentation is the strongest evidence that scientific theories are practical. While other theories use a logical approach in hypothesizing ideas, science uses physical manipulation to providence evidence for their conceptions. While developing any theory, it is reasonable to test the theory physically to ensure that the developed postulates are real and works in idealized situations. Therefore, experiments allow scientists to test their hypothesis and to reshape their own ideas and make more compelling claims. The outcomes of such experiments serve as a feedback mechanism to correct these theories. From this perspective, scientific realism convincingly provides tangible evidence to support its theories, which makes it the best way to explain complex situations. Secondly, in its semantic commitment, scientific realism relates the claims of its theories with the existence of its entities and the correct description of these entities within the framework of the theory. Therefore, we can judge scientific theories by their ability to extend their claims and predict certain phenomena from the models they provide. Weisberg (207) expresses the ability of scientific models to provide models that we can use to predict different situations. He referred to Mendeleev’s periodic table model that relied on scientific modeling to predict the properties of different elements. By developing a model based on the properties of different elements, he was able to come up with rows and columns in which any element could fit. For instance, using his model, he postulated the existence of elements such as eka-aluminium, eka-silicon, and eka-boron. Additionally, he was able to predict properties such as atomic weight and specific gravity for such elements while they did not exists. Many years later, it emerged that such elements existed and their physical properties minimally deviated from those that Mendeleev developed. This fact appeals to epistemological commitment of scientific realism that requires gives a reason to believe on the claims of a scientific theory. The fact that Mendeleev’s models still thrive and apply in the era of criticism suggests that scientific realism still maintains a compelling situation. On this ground, it is agreeable that scientific models provide a strong ground to believe on scientific realism. The proponents of scientific realism have shown important inadequacy in the recent criticism of scientific realism. Evidently, anti-realists have criticized scientific realism on the basic of developments that come up to prove certain scientific theories untruthful. For instance, there is evidence of change in scientific theories over time point out to the possible existence of inaccuracy of the former theories. For instance, the development of the modern periodic table emerged after the formation of different scientific models. Critics have used this position to illustrate the weakness of scientific theories and their inability to stand the test of time. However, Boyd (45) argues that the historical progress of science is not a sign of weakness is scientific realism but a confirmation of the ability of science to accommodate mature approximations in guiding the public to the truth. Science offers flexibility and leaves room for maturity of ideas that provides the opportunity for provision of truthful ideas. Unlike the constructivist theories that seem to adopt a more rigid framework in their claims, the scientific theories provide an opportunity for advancement of theory. Notably, modern theories build on traditional theories and new theories do not nullify the claims of former theories. Therefore, the criticism presents inadequate claims in defining the changes in scientific theories as a weakness in scientific realism. From another perspective, the convergence of scientific theories has provided a substantial ground for the opposition of any form anti-realism. Convergence refers to a situation when different scientific theories come to an agreement and provide the same claims. For instance, the theory of electrons as mobile entities of an atom is confirmed in various scientific theories. For instance, bonding theory shows that electrons are responsible for the formation of electron covalence bonds. This confirms that electrons are free to move along the metallic structure and that they spin around the nucleus. This convergence shows that scientific theories are based on fact and that their claims are truthful (Hacking 71). When two unrelated experiments lead to the same claim, it becomes a grounded course to believe in such theories. From this perspective, scientific models have stood the test of time and they remain unidirectional in their claims. On this basis, scientific realism retains a compelling position more than any alternative school of thought. Over the history of scientific realism, the role of observation has become a point of sharp focus. Scientists discover a wide range of facts by mere observation rather than logical deduction. While antirealists use deductive psychology to develop theories regarding phenomena, they lack the necessary ingredients to create trust and inspire logic in their claims (Boyd 48). These schools of thought provide basic postulates that are merely opinionated and are subjective in their nature. However, observation appears to be the best logic of arriving to conclusions in scientific realism. For instance, scientists observe the behavior of particles and provide theories on the way they observe this behavior. Such observations are factual and are not subjective. Therefore, theories developed out of such observation are universal and appear the same way to any person. Observation provides a basis for consistent development of theories and the statement of substantial theories. Theorists play the role of arguing to explain observed phenomena. At the end, and more crucial, is that attempt of different authors to explain such phenomena always end in a concession. This consistency in scientific theoretical deductions has provided a good ground to term this realism as reasonable. A counter argument has emerged on the role that modeling plays in the creation of scientific realism. The opponents of the scientific way of thought argue that scientists use assumptions to suit their scientific models and to bring about the ideas that they hold within themselves. Therefore, the cite manipulation in scientific realism and hence perceive this as a less compelling situation (Weisberg 12). However, this remains a contentious issues and one that may be evaluated from the basic understanding of assumptions. On this end, it is crucial to show the value of assumptions and the way they influence modeling. First it is crucial to note that scientific modeling involves the formation of complex mathematical equations to solve real life problems. Some of the mathematical models are difficult to solve without the development of assumptions that simplify these models. Secondly, scientists are keen to justify the use of assumption within their models, which makes it possible to follow the direction of these models. Since these justifications follow a scientific approach, it is clear that these models achieve the necessary objectivity. Therefore, downplaying the role of assumptions within scientific models would be a disfavor in the explanation of difficult scientific phenomena. From this perspective, it is clear that the evolution of antirealism is in many ways inadequate. In conclusion, scientific realism is unique and still holds a compelling position on the truth about the world. Evidently, the use of experiments and models provides a substantial ground for processing decisions. It helps scientists to substantiate their claims and predict possible behavior of the world. Apart from this, the fact that scientific theories converge on similar issues supports its credibility. Furthermore, alternative idealistic theories provide a less compelling approach in defining world phenomena. The idea that scientists manipulate their models by making favorable assumptions is inadequate. Evidently, assumptions are the basis for simplification and scientists justify every assumption with science. Therefore, scientists use this approach to support their work rather than to mislead the public. In addition, observation of phenomena makes it possible for scientists to take a consistent journey in developing their claims. Lastly, scientific claims leave an opportunity for development of ideals by recognizing that times paves way for more mature scientific arguments. Concisely, scientific realism is still the best approach in revealing the truth about the world. Works Cited Boyd, Richard N. "On the current status of the issue of scientific realism." Methodology, Epistemology, and Philosophy of Science. Springer Netherlands, 1983. 45-90. Hacking, Ian. "Experimentation and scientific realism." Philosophical Topics anc Southwestern (The) Journal of Philosophy Norman, Okla. 13.1 (1982): 71-87. Van Fraassen, Bas C. "To save the phenomena." The Journal of Philosophy (1996): 623-632. Weisberg, Michael. "Who is a Modeler?." The British journal for the philosophy of science 58.2 (2007): 207-233. Read More