Varieties of Judgment in the Critique of Pure Reason - Assignment Example

Varieties of Judgment in the Critique of Pure Reason Immanuel Kant, in the Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysic, presents for the first time one of the central themes contained in The Critique of Pure Reason, carefully drawing crucial distinctions about the judgments that humans actually make. One of the initial distinctions made about judgment is the separation of a posteriori judgments from a priori judgments, of which the former is grounded on experience and is uncertain and limited in how they can be applied to particular cases (Kant & Hatfield 21). A priori judgments, on the other hand, are only based on reason and apply universally because they are not dependent on sensory experience. However, in The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant makes another distinction between synthetic and analytic judgments. In this case, the predicates of analytical judgments are contained wholly in the subject and, because they add nothing to how the subject is conceived, they are deducible from the non-contradiction principle and are purely explicative (Kant 33). On the other hand, the predicates of synthetic judgment are completely separate from their subjects and their relation must be proved by a real connection that is external to the specific concept. As a result, while synthetic judgments are informative, they must be justified by referring to external or outside principles. On this theme, Kant begins by supposing that both Hume and Leibniz had not properly differentiated between the two distinct forms of judgment and that, in fact, they had made only one distinction, which was the difference between uninformative truths on the basis of pure reason and factual matters on the basis of sensory experience (Kant 37). Kant argues that the two distinctions were not wholly coextensive; also stating that all four combinations that are logically possible should be taken into consideration. The first combination, analytic a posteriori judgments, is not logical because one does not need to use experience in order to support an assertion that is purely explicative. Secondly, synthetic a posteriori judgments would be considered as generally uncontroversial facts that humans come to know of because of their sensory experience (Kant & Hatfield 45). Thirdly, analytic a priori judgments are those that are necessarily true because they include all straightforward definitions and merely logical truths. Finally, synthetic a priori judgments can be considered as the most crucial case from Kant’s arguments, specifically because they can only provide necessarily true new information. It is this latter combination of synthetic a priori judgments that Kant believes not only to be possible, but also as the source of significant parts of knowledge. From his argument, it is also clear that Kant supposes geometry and arithmetic to be made up of synthetic a priori judgments, while also eluding to his belief that natural science is dependent on synthetic a priori judgments to predict and explain events (Kant 34). However, probably the most pertinent question in Kant’s The Critique of Pure Reason how synthetic a priori judgments are possible in the first place. Kant, as a result, seeks to use the example of mathematics, holding that some truths of mathematics, such as that the sum of a triangle’s interior angles is a straight line and that 3+2=5 are synthetic judgments. In this case, these mathematical truths are synthetic judgments because, for example, the triangle concept does not contain the sum of a triangle’s angles, although these truths are accepted a priori because they apply with universal and strict necessity without being derived from experience of the objects itself (Kant 35). Comprehension of mathematics in this manner enables humans to rise above the empiricist vs. rationalist controversy about the nature of time and space. Whereas Isaac Newton insisted on the absolute nature of time and space, rather than being a set of temporal and spatial relations, Leibniz argued that time and space is a product of the human mind and not intrinsic features (Cassirer 55). Kant, on the other hand, seems to be accepting that both thinkers were correct, in that time and space were absolute, as well as being derived from the human mind. Mathematical truths, as a result of being synthetic a priori judgments, are both necessary and informative. This provides the first instance of Kant’s transcendental argument that is based on the fact that humans possess a particular sort of knowledge, which concludes that all presuppositions of this knowledge that are of a logical nature should be satisfied. However, it can be argued that achieving certainty in such a manner comes at a costly price. This is because, although mathematics is derived from one’s sensible intuition and one can be completely sure that it applies to all that is perceived, one cannot have assurance that it is related to the current state of things except how one perceives them (Cassirer 35). Kant also holds that synthetic a priori judgment in natural science, as in mathematics, provides required foundations that form human knowledge. Laws of nature, even the most general, are not justifiable through experience just as is the case with mathematical truths, but they must all apply universally to it (Kant 34). As such, Hume’s demonstration those unjustifiable beliefs are the basis on which matters of fact rest, as well as that causes and effects have a necessary connection, would be entirely correct. However, Kant offers an approach that is more constructive and provides a transcendental argument based on the fact that humans possess natural world knowledge. One of the necessary conditions required for human perception is the application of the concepts of time and space in the form of sensible intuition. However, scientific knowledge also requires that how humans experience the world should be perceivable and thinkable (Kant 35) and, as such, Kant argues that intelligibility of experience should satisfy at least two main conditions. The first condition is that, in principle, it should be possible to organize and arrange the chaos resulting from numerous sensory images, particularly through tracing connections that interlink them or hold among them, which Kant referred to as the sensory manifold’s synthetic unity (Cassirer 42). The second condition holds that, in principle, it should possible for one subject to organize the chaos through the discovery of the perceived images and their connections, which Kant refers to as the transcendental unity of apperception. Experiential knowledge, therefore, is only thinkable if what is known has some regularity and if there is a knower who can represent this regularity. Because humans actually possess world knowledge as they experience it, it is critical that the two conditions are obtained. According to Kant, the most fundamental convictions that humans have concerning the natural world are derivatives of several concepts, including quantity, quality, relation, and modality. Thus, the most general natural science principles are synthetic a priori judgments concerning what humans could experience where the four concepts are crucial connectives, rather than simple empirical generalizations from previous experiences (Cassirer 42). Works Cited Cassirer, Heinz. Kants First Critique: An Appraisal of the Permanent Significance of Kants Critique of Pure Reason. Routledge, 2014. Internet resource. Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Paris: PUF, Presses Universitaires de France, 2013. Print. Kant, Immanuel &Hatfield, Gary. Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward As Science: With Selections from the Critique of Pure Reason. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Print. Read More