The Essential Characteristics of Loving - Assignment Example

The Essential Characteristics of Loving The writings of the philosophers that are analyzed in this paper have at least one thing in common. They all are aimed to criticize the present society if not to change it. Thus, the definitions of love for Beauvoir, Freud, Goldman, and Morgan are shaped by the attitude of these authors to the questions of family, as well as individual and social benefit. All these writers are not satisfied with the state of affairs; they believe that love is not merely an ideal or a construct, but a working behavioral model. Consequently, they do not idealize it but rather assess the state of erotic relationships as such in (their) present condition and make the remarks about potential changes. Sigmund Freud is troubled by the level of neurosis in his contemporaries. Though he emphasizes his neutrality as a physician (“On the Universal Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love” 6), the very nature of his text is performative: they are too rich in anecdotes, interesting cases, and witty quotes to be called totally neutral. According to Freud, present society is on the third level of restriction of sexuality: it controls even those sexual activities that are intended for procreation only (“Civilized’ Sexual Morality and Modern Nervousness” 6). This is dangerous, because in this situation: (1) individual libidinal characteristics (that often differ from the societal demands) are ignored and (2) every man and woman is being torn apart by 2 contradictory yet inescapable desires. One of them is the need of appreciation from fellow human beings, which is impossible when the sexual behavior of an individual is considered inappropriate. Another one is an instinct that Freud associates with love. In “Civilized’ Sexual Morality and Modern Nervousness”, the founder of psychoanalysis describes sexual instinct as almost a living creature that is innate in every human. It is a subject to development, and the problems in the way of this development lead to different types of neuroses (in the article, Freud distinguishes between neurasthenia and psychoneurosis (4). This “animal inside us” is incomparably greedy and cruel: it is “probably more strongly developed in man than in most of the higher animals; it is certainly more constant, since it has almost entirely overcome the periodicity belonging to it in animals” (“Civilized’ Sexual Morality and Modern Nervousness” 5). Freud does not recommend tolerating abstinence, as it suppresses the dangerous sexual instinct. In such cases, the latter is either ‘sublimated’ or resulting in neuroses. However, marriage does not offer any attractive alternatives, as it limits the sexual satisfaction of the couple to the pre-conception intercourses (“Civilized’ Sexual Morality and Modern Nervousness” 8). Following this logic, marriage is a severe stress, especially for women, so that neurotic girls cannot make good party (according to Freud) and are succumbed to the abstinence-related neuroses (“Civilized’ Sexual Morality and Modern Nervousness” 8). In the paper “On the Universal Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love”, Freud develops this theory of sexual instinct. As a physician, he approaches love technically, mainly as a working instrument of the explanation of neuroses: “The highest phase of development of which object-libido is capable is seen in the state of being in love, when the subject seems to give up his own personality in favor of an object-cathexis” (Freud, “On Narcissism” 76). From this quotation, it follows that sexual instinct is always object-directed, and it finds its objects either in the people surrounding an individual or an individual him/herself. The state of balanced, so to speak, “healthy” love is achieved when the two ‘currents’ of this instinct successfully meet each other. The first one, the affectionate current, is connected with the ‘primary object-choice’ in childhood; it grows out of the warm feelings to the family on the basis of the self-preservative needs fulfillment (Freud, “On the Universal Tendency…” 2). The reader should not be deceived by Freud’s euphemistic wording: this is not a pure child’s bond to its parents but the first sign of a sexual desire. The second current, the sensual one, is not misleading an individual any more: it is responsible for the sexual desire to those objects that can satisfy it, unlike the parents (Freud, On the Universal Tendency…” 2). It is interesting that Freud implicitly shares the view criticized by Beauvoir that “spiritual” attitude in love comes after the sexual affection, “in the course of time”: his “sensual current” in marriage precedes the formation of “affection” (Freud, On the Universal Tendency…” 2). That is, to love R, P must reach the stage of balance of his or her affection to some relative (the one resembling R) and the sensual feeling to R; this is actually the only possible way of maintaining P’s health. What is most pessimistic about Freud’s view of sexuality is the impossibility of complete satisfaction of sexual instinct (Freud, “On the Universal Tendency…” 5-6). The final object of an individual’s sexual choice almost never equals the original (family members); thus, sexual instinct requires sublimation, of which most members of the society, especially women, are merely incapable (Freud, “Civilized’ Sexual Morality and Modern Nervousness” 8). However, the same pessimistic claim has a silver lining: Freud seems to imply that there should be no moral prescriptions in the questions of survival such as the question of healthy sex (at least this is so for Freud). This way, he claims sexual affection free of moral opinions imposed upon it by the society. In a sense, women and man, homosexuals and heterosexuals become equal to him, as they are all victims of a pitiless, monstrous sexual instinct entailed by civilized condition. Simone de Beauvoir’s concern was precisely gender equality. Her attitude to love is evaluative: as an Existentialist, Beauvoir associates true love with transcendence, with the spiritual desires “higher” than just physiological needs. Thus, love is not a ‘service’ rendered to men in marriage (Beauvoir 420); it is not an animal urge: “When sexuality is no more to be redeemed by the individual, but God or society is supposed to justify it, then the relation of the two partners is no more than an animal relation” (Beauvoir 428). Moreover, it is not a consequence of calculation, so it cannot be gradually developed in spite of a woman’s need (Beauvoir 426); accordingly, sexual satisfaction for Beauvoir is not the matter of technique (427). Free will has a priority in this philosopher’s system of values: love is defined as a voluntary action of mutual support, with all the subjectivity that is entailed in the notion of free will; without it, physical passion is painful and incomplete (Beauvoir 431). In Beauvoir’s version, P is independent from R in economic matters and in judgment; P decides (on the basis of his or her feelings and on the careful considerations of pros and cons) to share a big part of their lives (the primary consideration will be transcendent tasks, and they are viewed separately from the sexual activities). Consequently, physical love should be free, uncontrolled by the institutions, it should not be treated “neither as an end in itself nor as a mere means to an end” (Beauvoir 434). Beauvoir explains in detail how painful objectifying dialectic affects both men and women: for instance, men are put under pressure of bread winning and maintaining prestige (Beauvoir 421); a girl experiences drastic rupture with her previous identity when in marriage (Beauvoir 446). Individual rights, individualism itself are crucial for Beauvoir: she criticizes Hegel on the ground that he refused to assign to women any individual characteristics but rather saw each of them as a part of biologically defined entity (contrary to men) (Beauvoir 423-424). K. P. Morgan offers an insightful analysis of Beauvoir’s theory of love with an alternative ethical assessment of the construct of ‘Romantic Love’. The analysis of the oppositions of Existentialist thinking such as Spirit/life maintenance, immanence / transcendence, and life situation of men / women allows for the claim that Beauvoir shows “a Platonic preference for the permanent, the trans-personal, and the self-transcending” (Morgan 125). In other words, Beauvoir believes that both partners of the couple (unconditionally defined as heterosexual) (Morgan 118) must be independent subjects, and this for her means that they can create “entities whose permanence often outlasts perishable domain of biological life”, even when such entities make nature subordinate, like in the case with fishing (Morgan 121). From this subtle criticism Morgan proceeds to the point in which she agrees with Beauvoir, namely, the dismissal of ‘Romantic love’. The latter is defined through the framework of Existentialism as caused by 3 main reasons: 1) ‘bad faith’, that is, natural inclination to avoid the burden of existential responsibility; 2) social and economic status of women; and 3) ‘romantic ideology’ (Morgan 125). ‘Romantic ideology’ also has 3 characteristics: loving one man gives a woman her existential value; it confirms her ‘womanliness’; and, last but not least, it requires an unconditional servitude, “person-specific altruism” (Morgan 119). It is a ground for a harmful relationship in which a “P” woman faces 4 paradoxes: firstly, she eliminates her transcendental condition by her excessive commitment to her lover (“R”); secondly, by struggling for the control upon him, she loses either the justification of herself (“P”) as human or the justification him (“R”) as a free, strong person; then, lying and jealousy further her feeling of transcendent incompetence of herself (“P”) or of her lover (“R”) (Morgan 136). Therefore, Morgan concludes, even in an imaginary situation when love servitude is voluntary, it is immoral from both moral eclectic and consequentional viewpoints (141-145). “The capacity of choice” is the one that is to be maintained by each human being (Morgan 140). P should always leave the right to choose how to behave with R when they are in love. Emma Goldman is also critical about Beauvoir’s approach. In general, her view does not contradict Beauvoir’s: true love for her is the socially guaranteed ability “to give of one's self boundlessly, in order to find one's self richer, deeper, better” (Goldman). She calls for combat with “internal tyrants” of women, namely, the social restriction (meaning also the morals that suppress instincts) and expresses dissatisfaction about the slavish nature of working condition of emancipated women. But, unlike Beauvoir, for Goldman, love should not take into account bad outcomes of passionate devotion: “If love does not know how to give and take without restrictions, it is not love, but a transaction that never fails to lay stress on a plus and a minus.” (Goldman). Thus, it is not an informed consent; it is more like a passionate devotion of the generation of grandmothers admired by Goldman. If P loves R, P tries to understand R and gives her (him) self to the partner with all possible passion, non-restricted by any social institutions. This is a strange claim for a Feminist and an Anarchist; however, it is not as conservative as it may seem, as this claim is supported with the criticism of unbearable toil. In the environment where men share Goldman’s values, this claim may really be the support of “vital things” (Goldman): it will attract men’s attention to the need of emotional support for their female partners. Though Goldman puts such an emphasis on sharing moral and material goods, she is also an individualist in a sense. She calls for ‘understanding’ each other, not ‘forgiving’; her argument that ‘forgiving’ implies guilt is acceptable, but ‘understanding’ is no alternative, as P is hardly able to comprehend the ultimate ‘otherness’ of R. Thus, all the thinkers whose views are presented in this paper hold rather individualistic views of the feeling which has traditionally been associated with intermediacy between individuals. Freud’s account of love is different from all Feminists’ notions of love considered above: the psychoanalytic sees love as a trap into which people are born, while the Feminist tradition is concerned with the choices and perspectives that love can open. All the philosophers are critical towards the social restrictions of sexual drives, especially that of women; all the authors (even Freud) do not limit love to sexual drives. To love R, P should be a strong, aware individual; the fact that P possesses healthy personality ensures that P’s physical relationship with R is of humane, spiritual nature. What is implied in this view is that a neurotic or an unhappy P is unable of healthy relationship with any R. As one of the characters of the biopic When Nietzsche Wept put it, “I should be I before I became we”. In reality, Ps and Rs could help each other a lot if they did not require individual perfection in relationships but rather directed their common efforts to such perfection. In this respect, I feel closer to the views of Beauvoir and Goldman than to Freud’s worldview. Socialization in the form of love or friendship should not separate ‘poorly performing’ individuals from those who are opened to communication. Mutual attraction (justified by Beauvoir), courage at the face of P’s emotions offered by Goldman, Freud’s liberation of sexuality, and P’s dignity advocated by Morgan seem to be the key characteristics of loving. Works Cited Beauvoir, Simone de. “The Married Woman”. The Second Sex. Transl. and ed. H. M. Parshley. London: Jonathan Cape, 1956. Print. 415-466. Freud, Sigmund. ‘Civilized’ Sexual Morality and Modern Nervousness. Trans. E. B. Herfurd and E. Colburne Mayne. E-Book. Chrysoma Associated Ltd. 2000-2004. Retrieved Nov., 5, 2012 from www.lightoftheimagination.com . Freud, Sigmund. “On Narcissism: An Introduction”. Complete Works. Ed. J. Strachey. Vol. 14. London: Vintage, 1975. 73-102. Print. Freud, Sigmund. “On the Universal Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love”. Complete Works. Ed. J. Strachey. Vol. 11. London: Vintage, 1975. 177-190. Web. New College of Florida. Retrieved Nov., 5, 2012 from . Goldman, Emma. “The Tragedy of Woman’s Emancipation”. Anarchism and Other Essays. New York: Mother Earth Publishing Association, 1917. 219-232. Web. Women’s History. 2012. Retrieved Nov., 5, 2012 from . Morgan, Kathryn Pauly.”Romantic Love, Altruism, and Self Respect: An Analysis of Simone de Beauvoir”. Hypatia 1.1 (1986): 117-48. Print. When Nietzsche Wept. Dir. Pinchas Perry. Perf. Ben Cross, Armand Assante, and Joanna Pacula. First Look International, 2007. Film. Read More