An Evaluation of Feminist Arguments - Essay Example

? An Evaluation of Feminist Arguments against the Present System of Science of Introduction Feminist arguments againstthe present system of science focus on a science not habitually or consistently considerate to women’s interests. Most feminists share the same opinion that in western culture gender is a very important aspect determining social norms, laws, human relationships, and individual behaviour. The second-wave of feminism examined how male-centred, male-dominated societies marginalised and disenfranchised women, both to identify and abolish gender inequalities (Lederman & Bartsch, 2001). The movement also argued that science, besides perpetuating inequalities between sexes, is excessively focused on rational positivism, specifically on matters of objectivity, exactness, and certainty that seemed in conflict with feminism’s political ideals (Potter, 2006), and specifically with the development of a feminist science that focuses on women’s interests. Feminist Critiques of Science Feminist discourses are stuffed with cases of gender inequalities, especially in the field of science. Since the 1960s, feminist critique of science have shifted from discourses that explained the likelihood of reforming the existing system of science to demands for a total reconstruction of the core bedrock of culture and science (Wyer, 2009). Radical feminism argues that the politics, ethics, metaphysics, and epistemologies of the prevailing system of science are male-biased and interdependent; that in spite of the profoundly embedded Western cultural faith in the inherent objectivity or liberalism of science, science nowadays caters mostly to reactionary or backward social inclinations; and that science’s methods of creating and explaining meanings, its approaches to the process of research problem identification and experimental designs, its instruments and applications, and its social structure are not just androcentric but also culturally intimidating, rigidly hierarchical, and racially prejudiced (Outhwaite & Turner, 2007). As explained by Mayberry (2001), in their explorations of how the formation of gender identity, the gender-based differentiation of labour, and gender representation have shaped the historical development and principles of science, feminist scholars have questioned and debunked the social and intellectual system at their core. Feminists have commonly viewed practitioners of science as conspiring, unknowingly or intentionally, in the creation and perpetuation of cultural and social stereotypes about the two sexes. A good example is sociobiology, the field that associated animal behaviour with human behavioural patterns. Sociobiologists generally believe that the environment has a negligible contribution to human development. They have attributed the greatest role to the genes. A well-known sociobiologist, E.O. Wilson argued that, “It pays males to be aggressive, hasty, fickle, and undiscriminating. In theory it is more profitable for females to be coy, to hold back until they can identify males with the best genes... Human beings obey this biological principle faithfully” (Wyer, 2008, 188). Because of such male-biased statements, feminists have fervently condemned the efforts of sociobiologists to validate and reinforce inequalities between the human sexes. Sociobiology promotes the idea that females are selective and favour monogamous relationships because these traits guarantee the reproduction of their genes. On the other hand, males are naturally promiscuous and prefer polygamous relationships to guarantee the transmission of their genes (Wyer, 2008, 188). Hilary Rose and Nancy Hartsock support and explained the value of a feminist standpoint perspective, and the importance of developing a form of science that gives consideration to women and women’s worldview and knowledge. These feminist arguments against science blended with an array of other perspectives against positivism, or rigid objectivity and certainty, as the epistemological foundation of the social sciences (Oakley, 2005, 42). The outcome is two conflicting methodological frameworks—qualitative and quantitative-- that disagree, instead of collaborate. The ‘qualitative’ method suggests that genuine social sciences take part only in spontaneous, contextual forms of knowledge acquisition or analysis, able to value diverse subjectivities; whilst the ‘quantitative’ method focuses on issues of certainty, objectivity, reliability, and validity. Feminists generally support the qualitative framework and criticise the quantitative method. Feminism criticises the concept of foundationalism—the exactness, absoluteness, and omnipresence of the scientific method (Oakley, 2005, 42-43). Certainly, the very concept of knowledge is an issue for feminism. Current feminist epistemology believes that knowledge is constantly “provisional, open-ended and relational” (Oakley, 2005, 42). Underlying the conflict between the methodological frameworks is a complicated history which introduced the idea that “methodology is itself gendered” (Holland & Ramazanoglu, 2002, 165); specifically, the polarity of the quantitative and qualitative methodologies and their corresponding emphases on men and women is the issue to be resolved. This male-biased foundations of knowledge provoked feminists to criticise the present system of science: the quantification and identification of science as the major adversaries. Knowledge about human beings based entirely on findings about men goes against definite principles of theory and method. Research methodologies that only involve men studying or questioning only men about human behavioural patterns are destined to misrepresent facts. Beliefs that the reproductive capacity of women generally work in a dysfunctional or undeveloped ways do not have any bases in biological knowledge (Ruse, 1984). Feminists who regard bad science as the only problem promote the principle of impartiality and value-free objectivity for science (Duran, 1998); they believe that there is a standpoint from which the relationship of the social and natural world can emerge in their correct viewpoint. In the traditional theory, the ‘knower’ is constantly an individual, not a gender or social group. Moreover, this individual is conceptual, without any specific historical social characteristic. The individuals behind the outcomes of scientific inquiry should have been socially unknown; the fact that the author is a man or a woman should not influence the ‘reliability’ or ‘strength’ of the outcomes of inquiry (Harding, 1991). According to Potter (2006), scientific method should be effective in eradicating any social prejudice that could pass through from the researcher’s social condition into research methodologies, theories, hypotheses, data collection, and analysis of the findings of the study. Feminist empiricism claims that chauvinism and sex discrimination are social prejudices that can be remedied by more rigid compliance to the current methodological principles of scientific method; efforts towards social freedom “make it possible for people to see the world in an enlarged perspective because they remove the covers and blinders that obscure knowledge and observation” (Harding, 1999, 63). Feminism creates not just the prospect for this expanded perspective but a greater number of female scientists. On the other hand, the feminist standpoint supports the idea that the superior status of men in society leads to biased and bad knowledge, whilst the suppressed and marginalised status of women creates the likelihood of more inclusive and appropriate knowledge. Feminism builds the theory and driving force for research and political movement that can revolutionise the point of view of women into a ‘standpoint’, defined as a “morally and scientifically preferable grounding for our interpretations and explanations of nature and social life” (Outhwaite & Turner, 2007, 550). These feminist arguments against the current system of the natural and social science are based on the general attributes of the experiences and perspectives of women as interpreted and viewed from the point of view of feminism. Meanwhile, feminist postmodernism calls for regarding as an effective foundation for research the fragmented identities contemporary life produces. It calls for unity in resistances to the threatening and destabilising narrative of the naturalised, quantified, distinctively ‘human’ and to the misrepresentation and abuse committed for the sake of this narrative (Creager, Lunbeck, & Schiebinger, 2001). From this point of view, feminist arguments are less misrepresented and more credible only as much as they are based on a unity between these contemporary fragmented identities. Nevertheless, several feminists advise that the arguments against science can result in cultural relativism, within which objectivity is at the mercy of individual subjectivity. Some feminists argue that to prevent this outcome, objectivity has to be reconceptualised instead of discarded completely. Scientists have to be aware that objectivity is influenced by their personal biases and motives, cultural background, and individual characteristics (Oakley, 2005). Tuana and Morgen (2001) argue that this form of recognition or awareness would help scientists gain a conscious appreciation of the nature and uses of science, hence contributing to the effort to resolve the relationship between masculinity, superiority, and objectivity. The feminist arguments against the present system of science have led to several favourable changes for women. Women’s body or physical condition is receiving more consideration now as scientists are persuaded to take into account female and male bodies rather than grounding their studies solely in male bodies. Female bodies have received negligible and excessive attention at the same time (Ashfield, 2012). Pathologies most investigated in women are diseases that only affect women; other diseases that affect both men and women have been inadequately investigated in women (Hager, 1997). Scientists have traditionally embraced the erroneous idea that information gathered for men is naturally representative of women. Moreover, feminist arguments against bad science give explanation for why women involved in the natural sciences are opposed to the idea that they must one way or another be conducting science as ‘females’ rather than as the objective, value-free, unbiased observers or ‘knower’ that they were taught to be (Koertge, 1980). Feminism builds the opportunity for a greater number of women to be scientists by criticising the direct and indirect impediments that prevent women from acquiring the opportunities in the field of science that are widely accessible to their male counterparts. Conclusions The different feminist arguments against the present system of science, particularly the feminist epistemologies, namely, feminist standpoint, feminist empiricism, and feminist postmodernism demonstrate how male-dominated science makes women mere scientific objects and unfit for the scientific endeavour. Feminists have regarded their arguments against science a powerful movement towards radical changes. Most feminists do not envision a world without science; instead they want scientific inquiry and method to be reconstructed to serve all genders. References Ashfield, J.A. (2012). Towards an Integrated Perspective on Gender, Masculinity, and Manhood. New Male Studies: An International Journal, 1(1), pp. 19-30. Creager, A., Lunbeck, E., & Schiebinger, L. (2001). Feminism in Twentieth Century Science, Technology, and Medicine. London: University of Chicago Press. Duran, J. (1998). Philosophies of science/feminist theories. New York: Westview Press. Hager, L. (1997). Women in Human Evolution. London: Routledge. Harding, S. (1991). Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?: Thinking from Women’s Lives. New York: Cornell University Press. Holland, J. & Ramazanoglu, C. (2002). Feminist Methodology: Challenges and Choices. London: SAGE. Koertge, N. (1980). 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