The methodology of scientific research programmes - Coursework Example

The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes A critical look at the Lakatos’ account of the scientific method shows that the Lakato’s account ofthe scientific method is an improvement of both Karl Popper’s and Kuhn’s Philosophies of science. For better understanding of how Lakato’s account of the scientific method is an improvement of Popper’s and Kuhn’s philosophies of science it is instructive to briefly look at Popper’s and Kuhn’s accounts of the scientific method.According to Karl Popper, science grows and proceeds through conjectures and refutations.

For Popper, every scientific theory or hypotheses must be falsifiable. The main weakness of Popper’s account of scientific method is that it is not historically accurate. This is because a look at the history of science shows that science grows through the development or the improvement of the existing scientific theories, rather than through the refutations of the existing scientific theories.According to Thomas Kuhn, on the other hand, science does not grow through linear accumulation of knowledge.

For Kuhn, science grows through major revolutions; according to Kuhn, a revolution occurs in science when an old paradigm is replaced by a new paradigm. Kuhn held that revolutions in science are precipitated by anomalies in the existing paradigms; for Kuhn, therefore, revolutions or paradigm shifts in science occurs to correct or to overcome the anomalies in the existing paradigm. The main weakness of Kuhn’s account of scientific method is that, just like Popper’s account of scientific method, Kuhn’s account of scientific method is also not historically accurate.

This is because a look at the history of science shows that science grows in other ways, other than through revolutions; for this reason, therefore, Kuhn offered only one mode of growth of science.In his account of scientific method, Lakatos taught that the appropriate unit of appraisal of scienfific method is not an individual theory, as Popper and taught, but a sequence of related theories, i.e. a scientific research programme. The Lakatos’ research programme has a hardcore, the protective belt, negative heuristic, and the positive heuristic.

For Lakatos, the hardcore is the theoretical hypothesis that forms the basis upon which the research programme is developed; Lakatos’ hardcore is comparable to Kuhn’s paradigm. Protective belt, on the other hand, refers to the auxiliary hypotheses which are adjusted so as to save the research programme from refutation. Negative heuristic for Lakatos stipulates the assumptions underlying a research programme. Positive heuristic for Lakatos refers to the research policy or the set of guidelines for ordering research priorities.

According to Lakatos, therefore, in face of experimental difficulties, the hardcore of a research programme is not abandoned in face of experimental difficulties; according to Lakatos, in face of experimental difficulties, the protective belt of a research programme is adjusted, but the hardcore of a research programme remains intact. A critical look at the Lakatos’ account of the scientific method shows that Lakatos’ account of the scientific method is an improvement of Karl Popper’s and Kuhn’s accounts of scientific method.

Lakatos improved Popper’s account of scientific method by arguing that science does not grow through refuting the existing scientific theories, but rather, through adjusting the safety belt of the existing scientific theory; this fact, therefore, shows that Lakatos’ account of scientific method overcomes the main weakness in Popper’s account of scientific method. On the other hand, Lakatos improved Kuhn’s account of scientific method by giving a more holistic model of the growth of science; this is because, while Kuhn’s account of the growth of scientific method offers only one mode of growth of science, Lakatos’ account of scientific method offers a broad model of growth of science that is not based only on scientific revolutions, as Kuhn had argued.

For this reason, therefore, Lakatos’ account of scientific method is an improvement of Popper’s and Kuhn’s philosophies of science.