In part, the Critique of Pure Reason assesses the claims of rationalism and metaphysics regarding the capacity of the mind to probe into the nature of reality without the support of the senses (Adorno 41). The main features in Kant’s Critique to Pure Reason are the relationship between a priori knowledge and analytic knowledge on the one hand, and a posteriori knowledge and synthetic knowledge on the other hand (Adorno 50). Kant contends that analytic knowledge is distinguished by the fact that the concept in the predicate is necessarily contained in the concept in the subject. Synthetic judgments are distinguished by the fact that the concepts in the predicate have information that is lacking in the concept in the subject.
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant assigns the qualities of a priori and synthetic judgments to all mathematical truth and scientific principles (Adorno 63). In his philosophy, such truths have a universal element and their truth-values are not dependent on sense experiences. The a priori and synthetic elements of the human mind, according to Kant, makes it possible for the mind to discern knowledge but does not imply the express capacity for the mind to discern the mysteries of the universe as understood within the claims of metaphysics. The perceiving mind, according to Kant, processes information acquired and interprets it in accordance with time and space. It is within the same element of the perceiving mind that Kant explains the capacity of the human subject to make sense of the laws of causality. The critique introduces the role of intuitions and the faculties of sensibility and understanding as some of the key determinants of knowledge. Time and space, according to this line of though, become only intuitions generated by the faculty of sensibility. The faculty of understanding, on the other hand, generates scientific concepts. Knowledge from sense experience occurs after the processing and organizing of the experience in line with the intuitions of time and space. The faculty of understanding, according to Kant, organizes the events we experience in order for them to make sense. Finally, Kant argues that it is not entirely impossible to know the nature of ‘noumena,’ which he compares to “things-in-themselves.” The challenge of metaphysics, according to the philosopher, is that it attempts to unravel realities of things that go beyond the limits of knowledge (Adorno 70). In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant argues that practical reason is capable in guiding the attainment of knowledge more effectively and reliably than in the desire-based practical reasoning (Adorno 33). The critique proposes the fostering and cultivation of pure practical reasoning. This second Critique departs significantly from the position adopted by the Critique of Pure Reason, whose conclusion affirmed the fact that metaphysical subjects such as knowledge on the existence of God are ultimately unknowable. The Critique of Practical Reason confronts the challenges of pure reason because of the difficulty in probing into noumenal truths. In essence, the effort is linked to the aspect of “the highest good,” (Freydberg 101). Kant argues that the pursuit of the highest good will necessarily lead to the pursuit of the metaphysical truths. Kant’s arguments in “Religion within the limits of reason alone,” seeks to re-establish an alternative framework of assessing the authenticity and truths of religion outside the conventional systems as established by conventions and religious dogma. Kant sought to establish the place of faith, in this critique, by pointing out certain weaknesses in the existing arguments of reason, which were based on