H Frankfurt: The Concept of Person - Essay Example

Frankfurt Account Harry G. Frankfurt starts his essay, Freedom of the Will and Concept of the Person, by pointing out the two different forms that desire takes. We are introduced to first order desires, which are those desires that a person has to either do or not do a thing or the other and second order desires that encompass those desires that use self-evaluation. According to the article, a person whose desires can be placed under the second order and who simply desires to possess a certain desire or wants the desire to become his will has a desire that Frankfurt terms as second order volitions. Both human beings and other animals are able to have first order desires with their exclusivity not being limited to human beings. Human beings, however, can be said to possess second order desires with these desires, however, not being experienced by all people (Frankfurt 7). To my understanding, people who cannot use self-evaluation to validate their desire; therefore, deficient in second order desires, are referred to as wanton. According to Frankfurt, these second order desires are what distinguish a person from non-humans. Wantons or those without second order desires include small children, animals, and even adults who are not able to exhibit these desires. These non-persons are not bothered about will, and they do not have a care concerning where their life is going and how they could change it. In order to clarify the definition of a person, we can use the example of two child molesters. In this case, we can take the first child molester as having a first order desire to molest children given her affinity to do so, as well as having a second order desire that makes her desire to stop molesting children, although their urge may be uncontrollable. On the other hand, another child molester is in possession of desires in the first order that makes her molest children but is deficient in second order desires since she does not concern herself with what may happen if she is caught, which may lead to jail and embarrassment. For this child molester, who could care less concerning her will, her option of stopping the vile act and continuing the act are present in her mind, and none is more prevalent than the other is since she does not even attempt at evaluating her options. Therefore, she continues with what she does. Second order desires, to my understanding, then equate to a person being in possession of the will to carry out an action or not to carry out the action. If someone is not able to self-evaluate; therefore, not being in possession of desires of the second order, then they can be said to be deficient of will. In turn, they cannot claim to be persons according to Frankfurt, instead being considered as wantons (Frankfurt 6). While it is possible to understand where Frankfurt is headed with his argument, as well as where he is coming from, I disagree with the conclusion that a lack of will disqualifies someone from being considered a person. It is my belief that this someone still feels emotive, and exhibits feelings, even if they are vile characters like child molesters with no second thoughts about their actions and, therefore, to me at least, they are still persons. Early thought on the definition of a person held that, moral responsibility would be only applied to a person who commits a certain act if they had the chance to do something else. Throughout Frankfurt’s article, I found the inference to be that persons are not morally responsible for the acts they had committed when they had no chance to do something else. Frankfurt takes specific issues with this line of thought claiming, “our theoretical ability to do otherwise, he says, does not necessarily make it possible for us to do otherwise” (Frankfurt 10). The examples that Frankfurt assert to are important because they are suggestive of other ways that can be used to defend how determinism and moral responsibility can be compared, especially through the rejection of the argument’s initial premise. The article is clear that responsibility and determinism can be compared since the former does not have the freedom to choose another action as a pre-requisite. Frankfurt gives examples in his article, which normally involve agents whose responsibility for what they do is intuitive even as they are lacking, in freedom, to do something different. Mendelssohn is a member of a Westside gang who is likely to go to a street shootout with fellow members of the Blood gang. It is a fact that the only circumstance where Mendelssohn would defect to join the Crips or run away is, at the time; he considers that there is a chance the Blood gang will be defeated as they are so far from their street. If he considers this just prior to getting into the car, then he may withdraw. Mr. Ghost-face, the leader of the local Blood gang wants to ensure that Mendelssohn, his best shot goes along with them and, as such, sends a hit man to stay outside Mendelssohn grandmother’s house. If Mendelssohn chickens out, then he can make him aware of the hit man and force him to take the ride. As Ghost-face does not want Mendelssohn to know what he is up to, he plans to activate the hit if Mendelssohn quits before they are within range of the enemy gang. Mendelssohn, as it is, goes through with the shootout and is successful in hitting his target, giving Mr. Ghost-face no reason to call the hit man and blackmail Mendelssohn. In this case, while Mendelssohn is responsible for gunning down the rival gang member, he does not have the freedom to do otherwise, given that his boss had a contingency plan to make him do it anyway. If it is indeed true what Frankfurt suggests that Mendelssohn is responsible in a moral sense for gunning down a rival gang member and that he does not have the freedom to act otherwise, them moral responsibility does not require agents to possess the freedom to act in any other way. Therefore, even if there is truth in causal determinism, as well as if determinism ensures that freedom to another cause of action is removed, no reason exists to put into doubt that a person would still be responsible in a moral sense for what they do (Frankfurt 12). Frankfurt, therefore, suggests that the fallacy in considering the possibility that being coerced removes moral responsibility from an agent must be nullified. He contends that the agent only does what he does because he is coerced to do so, which leads him to reckon that a person cannot be held morally responsible for their actions if they acted out of lack of any other options. Amputees who undergo amputation by choice have the right to have their limbs, even if healthy, removed medically. These amputees will normally be driven to seek removal of a specific body part like the leg or arm, even when it is still healthy. This phenomenon is rare, and those who are motivated, by a yearning, to endure a needless amputation do so as they believe the part they want to rid themselves of is ugly, diseased, or because they feel that their image does not match their body and what they think of it. In extreme cases, they may find it sexually arousing to have it removed. It can be argued that those who want to get rid of a part of their body are suffering from a disease known as BIID, or body integrity identity disorder with others referring to it as amputee identity disorder. In my opinion, these kinds of amputation need to be considered as morally permissible since people who suffer from the disorder that is body integrity identity disorder are not globally irrational since they experience pain that they can only alleviate through getting an amputation. If these people cannot access surgery, they would try to amputate themselves, meaning they do not have second order desires. This means that they are persons. While it is morally permissible for the doctor to perform the amputation, it is also morally permissible for the wannabe amputee to get the amputation. This is because they do not have other options since theirs is a disorder. Work Cited Frankfurt, Harry. "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of Person." Journal of Philosophy (1971): 5-20. 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