Freedom of Assembly in Hong Kong - Essay Example

?Freedom of Assembly in Hong Kong Introduction Hong Kong’s Public Ordinance Part III provides the primary framework for restrictions on freedom of assembly. The Public Ordinance Part III also sets out the primary framework for the controlling conduct at a public gathering and for the exercise of that control authority. With Hong Kong’s return to China in 1997 however, these provisions have been loosely applied and have been characterized as largely inconsistent with Hong Kong’s Basic Law and the freedom of assembly provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).1 HKSAR v Yeung May Wan [2005] attempts to put some consistency into Hong Kong’s national and international obligations relative to freedom of assembly by defining the use of the term necessity as it appears in the Public Ordinance Part III.2 This research study examines the restrictions on the right to freedom of assembly in Hong Kong with particular emphasis on the ruling in Leung Kwok Hung and its importance to the rationale for restricting freedom of assembly. A comparative analysis is conducted with reference to Hong Kong’s case law and international jurisprudence relative to freedom of assembly. This study is therefore divided into two main parts. The first part of the paper will examine Hong Kong’s freedom of assembly regime and the second part of the paper will examine the international jurisprudence on freedom of assembly. I. Hong Kong’s Freedom of Assembly Law A. Overview The Sino-UK Joint Declaration of 1984 which provided for the transfer of Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) contained an undertaking to maintain the pre-existing fundamental human rights including freedom of assembly.3 China implemented the Basic Law 1997 which reflected its undertaking under the Joint Declaration of 1984 to maintain a one country, two system framework with respect to its sovereignty over Hong Kong. This meant that Hong Kong could continue to adhere to the laws in place at the time of the handover.4 Shortly after the handover of Hong Kong however, China reneged on some of its key guarantees under the Joint Declaration and among its broken promises, announced that there would be restrictions on a number of freedoms including freedom of assembly.5 With the handover of Hong Kong in 1997, Hong Kong became a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China.6 The SAR government amended and repealed parts of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (BORO) 1997, the Public Order Ordinance and the Societies Ordinance, laws that were previously introduced by the British government prior to the handover to China, in 1992 and 1995. The amended law provides that demonstrations comprised of at least 30 persons must first obtain police approval. Secondly the Public Order Ordinance and the Societies Ordinance stipulate that associations are required to register under the approval of the SAR government in order to obtain legal status. Moreover, national security is the broad basis upon which the police may refuse to permit an association or a demonstration.7 B. Current Law on Freedom of Assembly Essentially, the Basic Law 1997 as promulgated on behalf of the SAR retains for Hong Kong, the fundamental freedoms and rights existing in Hong Kong at the time of the handover to China. As a result the Basic Law and BORO provide the primary methods by which the executive and the legislature exercise their respective authorities. Likewise the two instruments also guarantee Hong Kong residents civil rights protection such as the freedom of association, of assemble, of procession, free speech, free press and freedom of demonstration.8 Freedom of Assembly is provided for in Article 17 of BORO and is characterized as Freedom of Peaceful Assembly. Article 17 provides that: The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.9 Freedom of assembly in Hong Kong is therefore not an absolute right. The right to peaceably assemble is subject to law and restrictions that may be necessary in a democratic society and in the interest of public safety, public order, national security and public health and morals as well as for the protection of other human rights. In other words the decision to permit peaceful assembly can be exercised by reference to a broad discretion. However, that discretion must be exercised by reference to some standard. Essentially what is necessary in a democratic society or is in the interest of public health, morals and so on, must have some sort of standard by which to measure whether or not a peaceful assembly should be permitted. Some guidance can be had from the fact that BORO was implemented so as to incorporate the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1996.10 In fact, Article 17 of BORO is a replication of Article 21 of the ICCPR. In the preamble to the ICCPR it is clear that all rights contained in the instrument are to be promoted and observed.11 In this regard the right to freedom of assembly is first and foremost an inalienable right and any restrictions must be exercised sparingly and only where necessary. Nevertheless, the courts of Hong Kong have been loyal to the legislators and as such have not hesitated to uphold any restrictions on freedom of assembly imposed by the legislature.12 Essentially, Hong Kong courts have required that restrictions on any right contained in BORO must have a rational connection to at least one “legitimate societal aim”.13 This is known as the “rationality requirement”.14 The Public Order Ordinance 1997 provides some guidance to both the courts and the commissioner of police with respect to the rationality requirement as it not only describes those situations in which the police may prevent or disperse an assembly, demonstration or procession, but also describes what amounts to unlawful assembly. By virtue of Section 18(3) of the Public Order Ordinance an unlawful assembly occurs: When three or more persons, assembled together, conduct themselves in a disorderly, intimidating, insulting or provocative manner intended or likely to cause any person reasonably to fear that the persons so assembled will commit a breach of the peace, or will by such conduct provoke other persons to commit a breach of the peace…15 Limitations or restrictions on freedom of assembly are therefore open to interpretation and can lead to varying results. The gathering or meeting is only required to be perceived as likely to cause a breach of the peace in order to be deemed unlawful. Although there must be something in the way of the conduct of those assembled that gives rise to this perception, that conduct can be intimidating, insulting or provocative. However, insulting, provocative or intimidating conduct does not always give rise to a breach of the peace. Moreover a breach of the peace can mean almost anything including excessive, but harmless noise. Ultimately, the restrictions presented by the text of the Public Order Ordinance arguably intend that civil liberties associated with freedom of assembly are sparsely and carefully exercised. As a result, freedom of assembly is hardly a liberty in this context when one has to tread carefully in exercising that right. The emphasis throughout the Public Order Ordinance appears to be on avoiding disturbing the peace and since virtually anything might disturb the peace, police officers have a very wide discretion with respect to dispersing assemblies or prohibiting assemblies. In any event, the Court took into account this vaguely qualified right to freedom of assembly as delineated under Article 17 of BORO in Leung Kwok Hung. The court essentially held that upon a construction of Article 17, the operative word was “necessary”.16 The court held that any restriction on the freedom of assembly or any right contained in BORO must be contained in some law and the method of restriction must be only that which is necessary to meet a legitimate goal.17 In this regard, the restrictions are prescribed by the Public Order Ordinance and are such that they are designed to prevent a breach of the peace or to intervene when there is an actual breach of the peace. Aside from the attending problems associated with what amounts to a breach of the peace, ascertaining when it is necessary to prevent a breach of the peace can be problematic. Leung Kwok Hung can be taken as a valuable source of guidance as it sets out the parameters for proportionality. Obviously this means that the conduct that gives rise to a breach of the peace or the fear that there will be a breach of the peace must be proportionate to the restrictions. A mere apprehension of fear based on what might be provocative or insulting conduct is not proportionate to an intervention which ultimately ends with criminal consequences. Any person participating in such an assembly is likewise guilty of a criminal offence.18 It is difficult to imagine that the ruling in Leung Kwok Hung intended that this kind of restriction is proportionate, as participant is merely guilty by association and this is not proportionate to the legitimate aims of the restrictions. The aim here is conceivably to discourage participation in an assembly, rather than to ensure that the peace is not disturbed. Nevertheless the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal in the case of Leung Kwok Hung ruled that the police restriction authority contained in the Public Order Ordinance was vague from a constitutional perspective and did not satisfy the ICCPR’s requirement that those restrictions are to be prescribed by law.19 Even so, Fu et ales argue that the Court of Final Appeal was decidedly “conservative” since it did not disagree with the requirement for notification and seemed to tolerate the fact that sever criminal sanctions were permitted even in cases where the assembly, procession or demonstration was peacefully conducted.20 Justice Bokhary’s dissenting judgment however was less conservative. Justice Bokhary stated that the authority to restrict an assembly beforehand was unconstitutional and this included the resulting criminal sanctions permitted by law. Ultimately however, the Court of Final Appeal stated the freedom of assembly is a fundamental civil right so that the police are required to use the authority so that in the event restrictions are applied, they should only be measures that are necessary for meeting the statute’s legitimate aim. Moreover, the commissioner of police must provide his/her reasons for the imposition of restrictions and cannot categorically impose restrictions. In fact in giving his/her reasons the commissioner of police must ensure that the reason is detailed enough to reveal the proportionality aspect influencing the decision.21 The Court of Final Appeal reviewed judgments from comparative jurisdictions relative to the right to freedom of assembly. Some of the judgments outside of the Hong Kong were judgments from the European Court of Human Rights, Canada and the UK. Referring to these external judgments the Court of Final Appeal concluded that the right to freedom of assembly ensures that there is a positive covenant on the government to facilitate lawful assemblies. Justice Bokhary went further in his dissenting judgment to remind that a report by the UN Human Rights Committee was dissatisfied with the constitutionality of the Public Order Ordinance.22 Kuah-Pearce and Guiheux argue that the Leung Kwok Hung case is a “classic illustration” of the extent to which the “law can be used to define and limit the physical space” that “social movements utilised for protests and demonstrations” and the extent to which “an independent and activist judiciary can contribute to protecting such space” by emphasising the constitutional premise of the right of free assembly.23 In this regard it is necessary to look at the relationship between the Basic Law, BORO and the ICCPR, which together form the constitutional principal of fundamental human rights and freedoms. The Court of Final Appeal explained this connection in Gurung Kesh Bahadar v Director of Immigration (2001). According to the Court of Final Appeal, Article 39 (2) of the Basic Law protects “the rights and freedoms of Hong Kong residents.”24 Article 39(2) makes it unambiguously clear that any restrictions on fundamental freedoms and rights are required to be specifically “prescribed by law”.25 In the event the restrictions are found to be prescribed by the law: The restrictions shall not contravene provisions of the ICCPR as applied to Hong Kong, that is, as incorporated by the Bill. Thus, in the context of rights recognized by the ICCPR as applied to Hong Kong, (whether or not such rights are also enshrined in the Basic Law), article 39(2) spells out the two requirements which any purported restriction must satisfy.26 By virtue of the ICCPR, contracting states are at liberty to place restrictions on a number of rights contained in the text of the instrument. As we have already seen, freedom of assembly is one of those rights that can be the subject of restrictions. However, those restrictions are required to be prescribed by law and must be demonstrated as entirely necessary in a democratic society for national security, public safety, public order, the protection of the public’s health and morals and for the protection of the rights and freedoms of other residents.27 The Court of Final Appeal however informs in the Leung Kwok Hung case that a vague or very broad law imposing restrictions will not be sufficient to satisfy the requirement that the restrictions must be prescribed by law. In other words the broad and rather vague police authority to prevent and intervene in assemblies could not reach the level of necessity and prescription as anticipated by the ICCPR. It would therefore appear that based on the Court of Appeal’s ruling in the Leung Kwok Hung case, the authority of the police to restrict the right to freedom of assembly in the interests of national security must be exercised appropriately. There must be a clear case of a breach of the peace or a threatened breach of the peace. Some guidance can be gleaned from the application of international standards for safeguarding the right to freedom of assembly. II. International Jurisprudence on the Right to Freedom of Assembly Jacobsen explains that any restrictions on the grounds of national security, public order, public safety, public health or morals or for the protection of the rights of others, must not only be founded on law, but must be sufficiently clear so that persons will understand the criteria for peaceful assemblies. In other words restrictions on freedom of assembly must comply with the “principle of proportionality, legal certainty and foreseeability”.28 Jacobsen goes on to explain: The law must avoid vagueness or ambiguity, such that the authorities do not give the impression of being subjective in their regulation of the rights to freedom of association and assembly.29 The police authority to intervene and disperse a crowd is decidedly vague in the Public Order Ordinance. However, the requirement of prior notification at international law has been held to be proportionate to the legitimate aims of a restrictive statute or policy. For instance the European Court of Human Rights held that the right to freedom of assembly under the European Convention on Human Rights 1953 was not contravened by the requirement of prior notice.30 The European Court of Human Rights held that prior notice was necessary so that police could make arrangements to ensure that the public order was not disrupted.31 The right to freedom of assembly at international law does not confer upon those arranging and participating in an assembly the right to freely choose the time or place of a gathering.32 It therefore follows that prior permission as prescribed by the Public Order Ordinance does not contravene international standards for restricting the right to freedom of assembly. However, those restrictions must be proportionate to the legitimate aims of the legislative provision.33 In most cases account will be taken of the kind of assembly, the message it intends to deliver and the effectiveness of delivering the message to a targeted audience. Account will also be taken of whether or not there is a more appropriate place for the assembly.34 All indications are therefore that international standards relative to the right to freedom of assembly will not be restricted without good reason. Therefore in exercising the authority contained in the Public Order Ordinance, the police commissioner may not prevent an assembly at a specific place and at a specific time unless there are reasons associated with the limited grounds for restriction to do so. Necessity and proportionality was indeed a concern of the court of Final Appeal in the Leung Kwok Hung. Moreover, the Court of Final Appeal in the Leung Kwok Hung case emphasised that decisions taken by the commissioner of police relative to the authority over assemblies must be reasoned and detailed as well as demonstrative of proportionality. This requirement is consistent with international standards. For instance it was held in Plattform Arzte Fur Das Leben (1987) that a place and time for an assembly cannot be denied merely because it would be inconvenient to others.35 Clearly, restrictions on the right to freedom of assembly cannot be said to be prescribed by law if those restrictions are applied loosely without regard to the fact that freedom of assembly is a fundamental and perhaps inalienable human right. At international law restrictions relative to the authority to disperse an assembly must also be proportionate to the legitimate aims of the relevant law. Assemblies can be dispersed in cases where there is actual public disorder at the assembly relative to the resources of the police. However, arrests should only be made in circumstances where the law itself is contravened so that public order is compromised. However, the police action is required to be proportionate.36 In other words, the authority conferred upon the police under the Public Order Ordinance must not be interpreted to permit police to disperse an assembly unless there is an actual breach of the law. Although the Ordinance speaks to a breach of the peace or an anticipated breach of the peace, these characterizations are vague and can give rise to a dispersal for virtually any reason. Too broad a power does not have the appearance of being prescribed by law. Instead it gives rise to powers that can contain any assembly whether lawful or not. The question at international law is always what amounts to a lawful justification for the police to intervene where there is public disorder or criminal conduct. In such cases the police ought to have some authoritative discretion.37 However, that discretion cannot be properly and fairly exercised if it is as broad and as vague as it is in the Public Order Ordinance. As it stands, police may intervene if a single person fears that the peace will be disturbed. There are any number of persons who may perceive that a breach of the peace will be disturbed in virtually any public setting. Moreover, the restriction on insulting and provocative conduct is far too broad and vague with no definition of what might amount to insulting and/or provocative conduct for the police to exercise fair and consistent discretion with respect to intervening in a public assembly. At international law, it has been held that authorities may take action calculated to prevent public disorder where a sit-in was organised on a public road.38 In another case it was held that preventing an assembly that set up a tent in public traffic was a proportionate restriction.39 Similarly the use of excessive noises in a public place was also held to be a proportionate preventative restriction on the right to freedom of assembly.40 Ultimately freedom of assembly is not an isolated human right at international law. It is closely associated with other fundamental and inalienable rights such as freedom of expression and freedom of association. In fact, the European Court of Human Rights stated in United Communist Party v Turkey (1998) that: The protection of opinions and the freedom to express them is one of the objectives of the freedoms of assembly an association…41 It was also held in Sidropoulos v Greece (1998) 27 EHRR 633 that freedom of assembly is closely tied to freedom of religion and freedom to express one’s belief. To this end, freedom of assembly together with freedom of association, are “fundamental rights in a democratic society” and as such the both are among the “foundations” of a democratic society.42 Conclusion The main question at this juncture however, is whether or not Hong Kong is a democracy and if the requirement that restrictions on freedom of assembly are necessary in a democratic society are relevant to Hong Kong. Although this legal requirement is a part of the legal landscape applicable to Hong Kong, there are some concerns arising out of the handover to the PRC. For instance Article 43 of the Basic Law 1997 provides that the Chief Executive in Hong Kong’s SAR is accountable to “the Central People’s Government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in accordance with the provisions of this Law.”43 Moreover the Chief Executive is either elected or selected “through consultation held locally” and appointed by the Central People’s Government.”44 With the PRC having a direct hand in the accountability and the selection of the Chief Executive, democracy appears to be compromised. Additionally, there are two sources of authority relative to the Chief Executive: local and the central government.45 Although the PRC undertook to ensure that Hong Kong retained its capitalist regime by virtue of the Joint Declaration of 1984, its involvement in the selection and control of the Chief Executive illustrates that the PRC has not lived up to its commitments with consequences for the democratic institutions in Hong Kong. Although the court in Gurung Kesh Bahadar v Director of Immigration explained the relationship between the Basic Law, BORO and the ICCPR, there is a more significant legislative relationship impacting the right to freedom of assembly in Hong Kong. This other legislative relationship is the relationship between the Basic Law and the Constitution of the PRC. Ultimately, any decisions relative to the constitution and any other laws are decided by authorities in the PRC and this threatens the independence of the judiciary in Hong Kong.46 It is clear that the Basic Law was intended to segregate the legal system of Hong Kong from that of the PRC. However, the two systems often overlap. As Russell and O’Brien explain: It is at these points that the independence and effectiveness of the judiciary come under strain, because the Hong Kong judicial system is subordinate to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.47 Be that as it may, the judiciary sitting in the Court of Final Appeal took a stand with respect to the right to freedom of assembly in Leung Kwok Hung. However, while the Court of Final Appeal took a stand it was not as critical as it could have been of the restrictions imposed by the Public Order Ordinance. As we have seen, the lone dissenter, Bokhary was more prepared to criticise the restrictions on freedom of assembly. In the final analysis, freedom of assembly in Hong Kong is subject to be construed and applied pursuant to its obligations under the ICCPR. However, Hong Kong, although a SAR and part of a one country, two system relationship with the PRC, the operative word is country in that Hong Kong is a part of China. In this regard, the authorities in Hong Kong may unfortunately be persuaded to view freedom of assembly from the perspective of the PRC. In this regard, what is necessary in a democratic society is not expected to gain greater currency in Hong Kong, at least not in practice. Bibliography Primary Sources Ciraklar v Turkey, [1995] 80 DR 46 Application 19601/92. (Accessed online on13 February 2011 at: http://www.qub.ac.uk/schools/SchoolofLaw/Research/HumanRightsCentre/Resources/EHRIS/EHRISHumanRightsMaterialsonTurkey/InternationalCaseLaw/icasefilestore/Filetoupload,72951,en.htm). G. v The Federal Republic of Germany [1989] cited in A. Jacobsen, Human Rights Monitoring: A Field Mission Manual, (BRILL 1st Edition, 2008) 326. (Accessed from Google books online on February 15, 2011 at: http://books.google.com/books?id=3gSH3gj97pEC&pg=PA317&dq=ICCPR+freedom+of+assembly+cases&hl=en&ei=kpFcTaqmBs-5tgfnlqzuCw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0CEMQ6AEwBA#v=onepage&q=ICCPR%20freedom%20of%20assembly%20cases&f=false). Gurung Kesh Bahadar v Director of Immigration [2001] FACV No. 17 of 2001. (Accessed online on 14 February 2011 at: http://law.hku.hk/clsourcebook/conlawcase/bahadurCFA.htm). Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance 1997 (Accessed 12 February 2011 at: http://www.hklii.org/hk/legis/en/ord/cur/383.txt). International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1996 (Accessed 12 February 2011 at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm#art17). Joint Declaration 1984 (Accessed 12 February 2011 at: Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau, the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administration Region online at: http://www.cmab.gov.hk/en/issues/jd3c.htm#right). 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Public Order Ordinance 1997 (Accessed online on 11 February 2011 at: http://www.hklii.org/hk/legis/en/ord/cur/245.txt) Sidropoulos v Greece [1998] 27 EHRR 633. (Accessed online of 15 February 2011 at: http://books.google.com/books?id=GhUzB4I1YmEC&pg=PA7&dq=ICCPR+freedom+of+assembly+cases&hl=en&ei=kpFcTaqmBs-5tgfnlqzuCw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4&ved=0CD4Q6AEwAw#v=onepage&q&f=false). United Communist Party v Turkey [1998] 26 EHRR 121(Accessed online on 14 February 2011 at: http://books.google.com/books?id=GhUzB4I1YmEC&pg=PA7&dq=ICCPR+freedom+of+assembly+cases&hl=en&ei=kpFcTaqmBs-5tgfnlqzuCw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4&ved=0CD4Q6AEwAw#v=onepage&q&f=false). Secondary Sources Brabyn, J. ‘The Fundamental Freedom of Assembly and Part III of the Public Ordinance’ (2002) 32(1) Hong Kong Law Journal, 271-312. (Accessed on 10 February 2011 at HKU’s Online Database located at: http://hub.hku.hk/handle/10722/74695). Buchman, A. ‘The Misapplication of Leung Kwok in Hong Kong: Authorizing the Rationality Requirement for textually Absolute Rights.’ (2010) 19(3) Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal , 565-586 (Accessed online 11 February 2011 at: http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/515/19PacRimL%26PolyJ565%282010%29.pdf?sequence=3 ). Chan, M. The Challenge of Hong Kong’s Reintegration with China. (Hong Kong University Press, 1st Edition, 1997) (Accessed from Google Books online on 12 February 2011, at: http://books.google.com/books?id=lEBCxR-4dqYC&pg=PA99&dq=china+announces+restrictions+on+Hong+kong,+freedom+of+assembly&hl=en&ei=zq1aTbv2G8Oftweb8K2yCw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2&ved=0CCwQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q&f=false). Chan, M. and So, A. Crisis and Transformation in China’s Hong Kong. (M.E. Sharp, 1st Edition 2002). (Accessed from Google books online on 13 February 2011 at: http://books.google.com/books?id=1c19oPKUB6MC&pg=PA326&dq=China%27s+restriction+on+hong+kong%27s+freedom+of+assembly&hl=en&ei=IihbTbKHL8altweunLTbCw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=book-thumbnail&resnum=5&ved=0CEYQ6wEwBA#v=onepage&q&f=false). Fu, H.; Harris, L. and Young, S. Interpreting Hong Kong’s Basis Law: The Struggle for Coherence. (Palgrave MacMillan, 1st Edition 2007) (Accessed from Google books online on 13 February 2011 at: http://books.google.com/books?id=F4ZEPJIw4nEC&pg=PA37&dq=freedom+of+assembly+in+hong+kong+and+Leung+Kwok+Hung&hl=en&ei=bnJcTfy8HMK_tgfT_N2DDA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CCcQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=freedom%20of%20assembly%20in%20hong%20kong%20and%20Leung%20Kwok%20Hung&f=false). Fu, F.; Petersen, C. and Young, S. National Security and Fundamental Freedoms. (Hong Kong University Press 1st Edition 2005). (Accessed from Google books online on 13 February 2011 at: http://books.google.com/books?id=nWymRTzz1ncC&pg=PA315&dq=freedom+of+assembly+in+hong+kong+Part+III+of+the+Public+Order+Ordinance&hl=en&ei=2T1bTa3lMMWWtwea9KWMDA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CCcQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=freedom%20of%20assembly%20in%20hong%20kong%20Part%20III%20of%20the%20Public%20Order%20Ordinance&f=false). Jacobsen, A. Human Rights Monitoring: A Field Mission Manual. (BRILL 1st Edition, 2008). (Accessed from Google books online on February 15, 2011 at: http://books.google.com/books?id=3gSH3gj97pEC&pg=PA317&dq=ICCPR+freedom+of+assembly+cases&hl=en&ei=kpFcTaqmBs-5tgfnlqzuCw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0CEMQ6AEwBA#v=onepage&q=ICCPR%20freedom%20of%20assembly%20cases&f=false). Kuah-Pearce, K. and Guiheux, G. Social Movements in China and Hong Kong: the Expansion of Protest Space. (Amsterdam University Press, 1st Edition, 2009). (Accessed from Google books online on 13 February 2011 at: http://books.google.com/books?id=3rHQ6LPY22UC&pg=PA86&dq=freedom+of+assembly+in+hong+kong+and+Leung+Kwok+Hung&hl=en&ei=bnJcTfy8HMK_tgfT_N2DDA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2&ved=0CC4Q6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=freedom%20of%20assembly%20in%20hong%20kong%20and%20Leung%20Kwok%20Hung&f=false). Russell, P. and O’Brien, D. Judicial Independence in the Age of Democracy. (University of Virginia Press, 1st Edition 2001). (Accessed from Google books online on 15 February 2011 at: http://books.google.com/books?id=MADgmKdYMBsC&pg=PA208&dq=independence+of+hong+kong%27s+judiciary&hl=en&ei=daxcTe2cFIO0lQeC5OiGCg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CC0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=independence%20of%20hong%20kong%27s%20judiciary&f=false). Wacks, R.‘One Country, Two Grundnormen? The Basic Law and the Basic Norm’. cited in R. Wacks (Ed) Hong Kong, China and 1997: Essays in Legal Theory. (Hong Kong University Press, 2nd Edition, 1998). (Accessed from Google Books online on 13 February 2011 at: http://books.google.com/books?id=ile6ZgyxhO4C&pg=PA168&dq=The+Basis+law+1997&hl=en&ei=ujNbTf4Gx863B8_uxPoL&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CDMQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=The%20Basis%20law%201997&f=false). Wang, T. and Liang, H. ‘Economic Integration Between Hong Kong SAR and Mainland China.’ Cited in E. Prasad and J. Chan-Lau (Eds) Hong Kong SAR: Meeting the Challenges of Integration with the Mainland. (International Monetary Fund, 1st Edition, 2004). (Accessed from Google Books online 12 February 2011, at: http://books.google.com/books?id=csG4ctp6vzgC&pg=PA1979&dq=Hong+kong+became+SAR+of+china+in+1997&hl=en&ei=kCpbTd7OG82TtwfPlqnJCw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CDwQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=Hong%20kong%20became%20SAR%20of%20china%20in%201997&f=false). Read More