The urgent question is whether the existing doctrine may assist in adopting the constitution, which would be entrenched against the future amendments and would effectively limit the executive and legislative power in Britain. In this connection it should be mentioned, that despite the fact, that the doctrine is supposed to be the basic principle of the British constitutionalism, it has been recently admitted, that the doctrine becomes more and more inappropriate and unacceptable in the constitutional context, changing because of the British membership in the European Union, higher accents at the human rights and the transition of the legislative rights to the regional legislatures. Despite the absence of the fixed constitutional frames in the written form, which would limit the British Parliament' activity, it has long been admitted that it is impossible to take any political measures for limiting legislative or executive powers. However, it is essential to note, that the British Parliament is now more limited in its rights not on the judicial, but on the political reasons, and the sphere in which it is not able to implement its unlimited powers is increasing.
'When Dicey published The Law of the Constitution in 1885 he defined parliamentary sovereignty as meaning that,
'Parliament has, under the English constitution, the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and further that no person or body is recognised by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.' (Elliott, 2002)
Simultaneously, it is essential to note, that any constitution without future amendments can hardly be adopted in the light of the existing Doctrine. The possible proof for such assumption may lie in the explanation as for the role of courts in the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty, which shows that the courts are not able to protect the absurd laws from being adopted, if the process of passing it through the both houses of Parliament has been transparent and legal. 'It has therefore been established that Dicey's doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is, in theory, true. Parliament, it seems, can make or unmake any law it wishes and no person or body can set aside or override such legislation. However, whether this is actually true in practice remains to be seen.' On the other hand, it is also notable, that when the judges find enough competence and ability to interpret the Parliamentary statutes and acts, it hardly serves for the benefit of the society, as the laws and acts are usually written in such ambiguous wording as to adopt its interpretation to the specific situation; though taking into account the