UK Aviation Policy - Case Study Example

The RAF Greenham Common was never a viable option for an airport to serve London due to the staunch public opposition it encountered in 1983 regarding the commencement of its operation. It was the leadership of forty women who called themselves the "Women for Life on Earth," marched 120 miles from Cardiff to Greenham Common in protest of the deployed cruise missiles there. who started the campaign against the deployment of the cruise missiles. Several groups were vocal in its opposition against the missiles: Greenham Women's Peace Camp members, the Labour and Liberal parties, the British Parliament members and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. The British government had to yield to very negative public backlash from the people. It was impossible for the government, particularly the Margaret Thatcher Administration, to intervene and over rule the local authority since public clamour for its rejection were expressed consistently and constantly. Had it been operational, it would have played an important role in the defence against foreign pre-emptive strike. The case of Greenham Common brought about the importance of public consultation and perception about specific aspects of UK aviation policy. KEYWORDS: Peace, Deployment, Nuclear Missiles, British soil INTRODUCTION Air travel is of primordial importance to the United Kingdom's economy and prosperity. In the last 30 years there has been a five-fold growth in air travel. This vibrant air travel opened up opportunities: half of the population flies at least once a year, and many citizens have began flying far more often than that. The main challenge of UK aviation policy is to deal with the pressures caused by the increasing need to travel whilst at the same time retaining their commitment to protect the environment in which we live. The present UK aviation consists of a global policy framework that achieves stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would obviate dangerous man-made interference with the climate system. Aviation in the UK contributes an annual 14bn value added output to the UK economy, creating and sustaining 675,000 jobs, exporting 13bn per annum, and is directly responsible for transporting a third by value of our goods. (NATS and Trade Association in the UK, 2007). Aviation is a global industry. Many of its impacts demand global solutions. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) must identify the way forward and set the framework at an international level for national and local implementation. The ICAO must consider both the national and international impact of proposed policies. Moreover, it should lessen the adoption of unilateral measures which may result in adverse effects on the UK aviation industry and the national economy. Background of the Greenhouse Common The NATO's Nuclear Planning Group created a High Level Group (HLG) to determine NATO's requirements for handling threat from Soviet nuclear forces. The HLG started analyzing in December 1977 and decided to deploy cruise missiles in Britain. Cruise missiles were chosen as these were cheap, accurate and it could be fired from different platforms. The HLG's modernization plan was approved in 1979. (Sean, 2004). Then on June 17, 1980, British Defence Secretary, Francis Pym, announced in the House of Commons that 160 missiles were to be stationed at the United States Air Force standby base at RAF Greenham Common in Berkshire, and RAF Molesworth. (Parliamentary Debates of House of Commons, 1980). The first cruise missiles were delivered to the airport on November 14, 1983. (Sean, 2004) The NATO's December 1979 information that it had set-up a base for nuclear cruise missiles in a British airport generated instant and heavy public opposition. The anti-cruise missile movement had expanded to include mass demonstrations, peace camps at the bases, and multiple civil action by various organizations. Public opinion against the cruise missile deployment strengthened the anti-cruise missile movement and it acquired a majority view in Britain. (Sean, 2004). Several groups were vocal in its opposition against the missiles: Greenham Women's Peace Camp members, the Labour and Liberal parties, the British Parliament members and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. The location of the Greenham Women's Camp outside the site of U.S. nuclear weapons emphasized the physical presence of the nuclear weapons in the Berkshire countryside and the consequent control of the US military over those weapons. (Roseneil, 1995: 115). The women protestors joined hands to encircle the base, cut through its fences, and danced on its missile silos. More importantly, the Greenham Women's Peace Camp members raised serious issues raised regarding the security of the missiles. The capacity of members to cut through the perimeter fences and intrude on the base gave immediate credibility to security issues. Given the focal attention they drew from the mass media, the peace camp achieved a reworking of dominant social and spatial orderings, engaging the domestic construction of women and removing the shroud of secrecy pertaining to defense issues (Roseneil, 1997: 67). The Greenham Common also revoked prevailing assumptions of mass media culture which states that political debate should be settled in parliament, government offices, and television studios rather than at the actual storage place of the weapons. (Couldry, 1999: 339) Why, How and Who Campaigned for Its Return to "Common Land" In 1981, forty women who called themselves "Women for Life on Earth," marched 120 miles from Cardiff to Greenham Common in protest of the stationed cruise missiles there. Upon their arrival, they demanded a public debate on the issue with the representatives of the Ministry of Defence. The debate was denied and they instantly established a camp outside the U.S. Air Force Base." This event began the Greenham Women's Peace Camp that lasted for nineteen years. This fight drew national attention and support. In December 1982, 30,000 women gathered to join hands around the base in what was called the "Embrace the Base" event. Other disruptive tactics took place when 1,000 women "cut down four and a half miles of fence surrounding the air base." Before and after the deployment, members of the peace camp were a constant disruption to Greenham operations. (Cresswell, 1996: 150). Another group called Cruisewatch monitored cruise missile convoys when they are deployed on exercise so as to make public its movement and render it useless. (Byrne, 1988). The Cruisewatch volunteers were recruited at both the national and local levels. In 1980, CND has 2,000 members. Due to the cruise missile issue, the CND had reached a membership base of 85,000 in 1993. (Byrne, 1988). At an October 26, 1980 rally in Trafalgar Square, the CND had 80,000 participants. The annual CND rally had been moved from Trafalgar Square to Hyde Park to accommodate 250,000 participants in 1981 and 400,000 participants in 1982. Public opinion was consistent in its opposition towards the deployment of cruise missiles. For example, a Marplan poll conducted in September 1980, showed that 43 percent of the UK was opposed to U.S. cruise missiles being stationed there. By November of the same year, the opposition had catapulted to 53 percent. (Freedman, 1999). A national poll conducted for the Sunday Times, in January 1983, revealed that 54 percent were against allowing cruise missiles to be based in Britain. (Kettle, The Sunday Times, 1983). Britain's political parties were involved in the cruise missile concern. Labour, which maintains strong connections to CND, was affected by this wave of sentiment. The party rejected the deployment of U.S. cruise missiles in Britain. Labour leader, Michael Foot stated that there will be no cruise missiles on British soil. In 1981, the Liberal party demanded a campaign against NATO's deployment of cruise missiles and in 1984 it heeded calls for the immediate withdrawal of cruise missiles. The opposition to cruise missiles within Britain's political parties grew in response to that of the public. British Minister of Parliament Ronald Boyes noted that the women have brought to the Ministers' attention that missiles or missile heads cannot be protected all the time and may possible end up in the hands of our enemies or terrorists. Even Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher later admitted that the ultimate control of cruise missiles was the most tricky issue. The issue heightened concern over the possibility of the U.S. sacrificing Britain for its own interests. MP Stan Newens stated in the House of Commons that the United States has made it clear that it is prepared to put the United States' interests before those of Britain where it suits it, so how on earth can the deployment of American owned and controlled cruise missiles in this country be justified" The citizens perceived that Britain had become expendable to the U.S. The perceived lack of control of the British government officials over the cruise missiles helped foster opposition. In Parliament, the Secretary for Defence was faced with a battery of questions on whether he was aware that a key concern of the British people is the point of who really is in charge of the cruise missiles. (Cresswell, 1996). The refusal of dual-key set-up became the turning point in galvanizing opposition to cruise missiles. Member of Parliament Dr. David Owen, leader of Britain's Social Democratic Party, stated in the House of Commons in March 1983 that all opinion polls demonstrate that if there were to be a dual key, the people would be ready to accept. (Owen, Parliamentary Debate, 1983). The level of mistrust of American defence policy by British citizens even increased. A Mori poll conducted for the Sunday Times in October 1983, showed that 73 percent of the US public believed that "if the American government wanted to fire the missiles and the British government objected ... America would fire them anyway." (Duke, 1987). The Role it could have played in UK airport strategy Had the British public approved the deployment of cruise missiles to the Greenham Common, the airport's possible full utilization would have played a strategic defence role in UK airport strategy. Public support for cruise missile deployment would have ensured the approval of the Parliament and the Prime Minister. Greenham Common airport would have preserved the capability of Britain to respond immediately to a nuclear attack from the Soviet Union. The airport could have been put to use as a working military airbase. The airport would have developed ancillary defense industries in the area of stockpiling, monitoring and services sector. Conclusion Although the establishment of the UK aviation policy is largely the provenance and expertise of government policymakers, citizens have an increasing role in the implementation of such a policy. The emerging quality and distribution of communication and travel technologies has made it easier for domestic populations to react and organize to aviation policy. Realizing that the multiple factors of nuclear threat, control, mistrust, and protest actions become avenues for peaceful resistance, UK citizens should use these factors to encourage and motivate domestic reactions for the improvement of UK aviation policy. REFERENCES Atkins, Sean. 2004. Unwanted Allies: What Influences Negative Domestic Reactions to Deploying Forces into Allied States. Air Power History. Volume: 51. Issue: 4.Page Number: 40. Byrne, Paul. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. London: Routledge, 1988, p. 55. Couldry, Nick. 1999. "Disrupting the Media Frame at Greenham Common. A New Chapter in the History of Mediations" Media, Culture and Society 21: 337-358. Cresswell, Tim. 1996. In Place/Out of Place: Geography, Ideology and Transgression. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Duke, Simon. 1987. U. S. Defense Bases in the United Kingdom : A Matter for Joint Decision. USA: Better World. Freedman, Lawrence. 1999. The Politics of British Defence, 1979-98. New York: St. Martin's Press. Kettle, Martin. "British Thumbs Down to Cruise." The Sunday Times. 23 January 1983: 1. Meyer, Sarah. Women's Encampment Handbook. Summer 1983. From the archives of Sarah Meyer, Commonweal Collection, University of Bradford. Owen, David. PD. House of Commons. March 1, 1983: 121. Parliamentary Debates (hereafter PD), June 17, 1980. House of Commons: 1342. Rose, Nikolas. 1999. Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Roseneil, Sasha 1999 "Postmodern Ferninist Politics: The Art of the (Ira)Possible" European Journal of Women's Studies 6,2:161-182. UK Department of Aviation. A strategy towards sustainable development of UK aviation. UK: Trade Associations of UK and National Air Traffic Control. Walters, William. 2006. No Border: Games with(out) Frontiers. Social Justice. Volume: 33. Issue: 1. Read More