Gamal Abdel Nasser Triumphs and Failures during his Life and Rule - Essay Example

Gamal Abdel Nasser Triumphs and Failures during his Life and Rule This paper would discuss and evaluate the biography and achievements of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the founder of Modern Egypt. It would cover all his triumphs and failures during his life and rule. Introduction Modern Egypt always has been a difficult country to govern. Physical control has been a relatively simple task, for the Egyptians are by nature a submissive people. But positive plans for development continually have been defeated by Egyptian inertia and lack of public responsibility. True, in the past, "strong men" --such as Mohamed Ali, dictator of Egypt for over forty years, and Khedive Ismail--have imposed their will on Egypt. When they passed from the stage, however, their accomplishments were dissipated by the ineptness of their successors and by the apathy of Egypt's ruling classes. The nationalist revival during the period of British occupation revealed a public awareness among a segment of Cairo's population, but this seldom was transacted into positive achievements. Instead, the Egypt of 1952 was a stagnant country. Beset by political strife, successive national governments did little to foster the country's development. An archaic structure of land ownership, abysmal living conditions among the great majority of the population, an economy geared to benefit a privileged few, and political instability--this was the legacy after thirty years of independence (Frederick, 268). Political Career The existing political parties abdicated their right to govern. In their struggle with the King and their quest for power and office, they treaded ruthlessly on the welfare of their country. Egypt's political structure blocked progress, rooted as it was in the status quo. No parliament controlled by wealthy landowners and Cairo's privileged social elite would support sweeping reform programs to the detriment of the vested interests. Few groups were untainted by the corruption which permeated Cairo. Many ranking civil servants owed their positions to partisan politics; landowners gained protection from the Wafd; businessmen were dependent upon the government for favors; and high ranking military officers often owed their posts to the King's personal support. Only the middle-class military--the captains, majors, and colonels, and, perhaps, a few generals--had the moral credentials for a bona fide movement of reform. And, after the sordid manipulation of the Alexandria cotton market and the collapse of national government in 1952, only the military was prepared to take action in the name of the people. Humiliated in the 1948 Palestine War, the Egyptian army generally had done little to distinguish itself. In its ranks, however, was a cadre of sincere and talented, though inexperienced, officers, and it was they who toppled the government in 1952. Initially, a junta sought to establish a nonpartisan civilian government, but this body proved unwilling to initiate the reforms desired by the young officers. Thus, the job of governing fell to the Free Officers by default. Governing had not been their initial purpose, and they were ill prepared for the task; but they alone were in a position to raze the "old order." And the destruction of the "old order" was a prerequisite for the implementation of profound reforms (Frederick 269). Role in Modernizing Egypt Rapid development in Egypt required an authoritarian government, and it became increasingly obvious that the Revolutionary Command Council could not measure up to the task. Instead, a single leader, a man with dictatorial powers, was needed. Gamal Abdel Nasser became dictator of Egypt in April, 1954. His was a difficult task. The country had not rallied to the military movement. Moreover, there was no panacea for Egypt's problems, and his every move drew the sniping attacks of those without the responsibilities for government. To his credit, he approached his mission boldly. Easy as it was to be irresolute, he determined what was best for Egypt, then forcefully sought to impose his will on the country and his reluctant military colleagues. He alone assumed final responsibility for the success or failure of his policies. Unfortunately, his drive for internal development soon was tempered by external considerations. Nasser claimed the role of unifier of the entire Arab world. Moreover, he was embarrassed by Egypt's military inferiority vis--vis Israel. While economic and social development still progressed at a commendable pace, Nasser placed increasingly heavy emphasis on Egypt's foreign relations. Undoubtedly, Nasser realized that this would have a detrimental effect on Egypt's future internal development, for a massive military establishment would severely strain Egypt's limited resources (Joel, 139). In 1955, Egypt was passing through a transitional period. The government had provided handsome incentives to attract foreign investments; 40 million dollars of American technical assistance was forthcoming; the West was prepared to finance the foreign-exchange requirements of the mammoth High Dam scheme; internal development projects were gaining momentum. Egypt's internal programs required Nasser's personal and constant supervision--especially since few of Nasser's colleagues had the ability or authority to initiate the programs necessary for Egypt's sound development. Global Repute of Nasser and Egypt Instead, Nasser sought an international reputation: he became deeply involved in Arab world politics, and he embarked on an aggressive policy which alienated his Western friends. This campaign was not without some provocation or justification--for, at times, Great Britain, the United States, as well as several Arab governments had not behaved with consummate wisdom or tact. But this was no reason for Gamal Abdel Nasser to abandon the statesmanship which he had employed to Egypt's great advantage during the Revolution's first thirty months. The Nasser of 1955 was essentially the same man who had engineered a coup three years before. He was exceedingly ambitious for himself and for Egypt; he worked far harder than did his colleagues; and he was content to live an austere life free of the extravagant luxury often associated with military dictators. His greatest attribute was his extraordinary skill as a tactician. Perhaps it was too much to expect such a man to content himself with the difficult and often monotonous task of internal development: this taxed his administrative abilities while providing little scope for those skills which he had used to such advantage in besting Mustapha Nahas, Mohammed Naguib, the Moslem Brethren, and the British in Suez. The same energy which had been devoted to internal reform subsequently was directed outward onto the international scene. Nasser's successes were undeniable. He became the symbol of Arab nationalism to the Arab masses. His program of "positive neutrality" gained a degree of respectability through his association with Nehru and Tito. Confident of Soviet support, he mounted a vigorous attack against British and French interests throughout the Arab world. But these successes benefited Egypt little. Nasser, as the self-styled champion of Arab nationalism, heightened the pitch of his anti-Western attacks, derided his opponents in the Arab world as "stooges of imperialism," and scored notable victories. But, as he had discovered earlier in Egypt, destroying was easier than building. Nasser deemed the High Dam the cornerstone of Egypt's economic development. Thus, it was a severe blow to Egypt when the West withdrew its offer to finance the Dam. John Foster Dulles made this move in retaliation for Nasser's aggressive tactics. The Egyptian President, even if he could justify his actions in terms of "sovereignty" and "dignity," could not blink the fact that his foreign adventures have postponed the construction of the High Dam, essential to Egypt's future well-being, by at least two years. Egypt benefited from the Anglo-French attack on Suez. She obtained unquestioned control over the Canal, from which she should net an amount in excess of 10 per cent of her annual national budget. Moreover, as an aftermath to the attack on Port Said and Egypt's military defeat in Sinai, foreign control over Egyptian banks and insurance companies have almost been eliminated. As "compensation" for the Anglo-French-American blockade of Egyptian assets, Nasser was awarded a Soviet industrial credit for 62 million pounds. This was small compensation, however, for the economic losses implicit in his estrangement from the West (Joel 140). The year 1957 was a critical one for Egypt. She weathered the West's diplomatic isolation, initiated an industrial development program, and convened a National Assembly. Ironically, however, Gamal Abdel Nasser, the hero of the Arab masses, was becoming less popular at home. The internal-development program, sharply curtailed during the Suez crisis of 1956, certainly gave Egyptians little cause for rejoicing. The National Assembly, symbolic of the "new Egypt," proved uncomfortably embarrassing to the regime. President Nasser, anxious to end the period of political transition (originally proclaimed in 1953), had opened the carefully screened Parliament amid great fanfare. But when some members displayed startling independence, the government felt obliged to end the entire parliamentary experiment abruptly. Without question, the Revolution of 1952 was on the decline, and the military was reluctant to relinquish its authority. Instead, the "transitional period" was extended indefinitely. Nasser as a Tactful Politician In 1958, Nasser again sought victories abroad. He triumphantly incorporated Syria into the United Arab Republic, but the regime, already hard-pressed to manage Egypt's domestic affairs, was ill equipped to shoulder the economic burdens of Syria. In the wake of the Syrian merger came the Iraqi revolution, which some called Nasser's greatest victory to date. With the demise of Nuri es Said, however, "Nasserism" seemed to lose its momentum. Because many of the Arab countries already had overthrown the "treacherous old order," there remained few scapegoats on which Egypt could vent her ire. Moreover, Nasser and his tired co-revolutionaries lacked an operational program for economic and social development which they could pass on to other nationalist leaders. Nasser did not play his cards well. In 1954, when Egypt represented a liberal force in the Arab world, Nasser could well have afforded to be charitable to his Arab neighbors. His control over the religious and secular center of learning for the Arab Middle East gave him a tremendous advantage which he could have used wisely. Instead, he embarked upon a destructive policy, ostensibly to make the dream of a single Arab nation a reality. In this, however, he has failed. Egypt's difficulties in Syria --her "northern province"--have brought the sudden realization to many Arab leaders that Nasser had little to offer to the "newly liberated" Arab nations. These failures seem to have had a sobering effect on Nasser. At least for the present, he appears to realize that the once irresistible force of "Nasserism" has lost its momentum. He is making a serious attempt to develop a more constructive policy toward the Arab world. Nasser still has strong appeal among the Arab masses, but he is discredited with most Arab governments. It will be a difficult task for him to gain the confidence of the very men whom he sought to undermine not so long ago. But if he is sincerely concerned with the welfare of the Arab world, he must do just that. He still is the most competent leader in the Arab world, the man who best can provide cohesion to the Arab drive for political and economic maturity. His ultimate success will depend on the extent to which he will subordinate his personal ambition for the well-being of his Arab "brothers." Positive neutrality has been the guideline of Nasser's foreign policy since 1955. His desire to maintain Egypt's independence of action is undeniable--and, in this context, his adherence to neutrality is far more sincere than most Western observers are wont to believe. But his aggressive anti-Western posture for much of the past four years has compelled even such a convinced Asian neutralist as Nehru to dissociate himself from Nasser's "neutralist philosophy." "Neutralism" for Nasser is not a philosophy but a blanket of morality in which he has sought to shroud his aggressive tactics. Nor has he executed "neutralist" tactics with outstanding skill. By alienating the West, he has estranged the Soviet bloc's rival bidder for Egypt's favor and thus had undercut his country's value on the auction block of neutrality. There has been evidence of late that Nasser is trying to redress this mistake. After his clash with Nikita Khrushchev over Iraq, he seems anxious to restore the balance to Egypt's policy which proved so profitable in 1955. President Nasser is no Communist, nor is he anxious to further Communist aims in the Arab and African worlds. But in his desire to extend Egypt's hegemony over the Afro-Arab world, he has, in the past, accepted massive Communist-bloc support. He may do so again. Cold War Scenario Moreover, although Egypt's flirtations with the Communist bloc have brought the cold war into the Arab heartland, Nasser has not become a tool of the Soviets. Indeed, Communist economic penetration in Egypt could be curbed if the West were willing to underwrite the bulk of Egypt's cotton exports. "Nasser is skilled in the game of political survival; he has also been extremely lucky. He has played the cards of positive neutrality for high stakes and, to date, bluff and courage have kept him in the game. But Egypt has benefited little from Nasser's international adventures. Much has been undertaken in the name of lofty principles, yet Egypt has paid a high price for Nasser's tactical successes" (Dar el Maaref 19). Originally, internal reform and development was the Revolution's raison d'tre. Ultimately, it is by the achievements in these fields that Nasser will be judged. Egypt is a poor country--poor in physical as well as human resources. At the time of the Revolution, the new regime faced substantial balance of payments deficits, a much-reduced General Reserve Fund, and a crisis in cotton marketing. Industry provided a nominal proportion of the national income and only six million feddans under cultivation were available to produce sustenance for twenty-one million people. During Gamal Abdel Nasser's presidency in Egypt, which ran through the early 50's to the late 60's, the Cold War had both the Soviet Union and the United States gathering countries to form blocs with which they attempted to outdo each other's world influence. Egypt experienced Western rule as a British protectorate, and in 1919, a rebellion against the British was the first sign of Egyptian unrest with the European domination (Milner). Nasser found the Soviet Union and its policies to be attractive due the "presence of a common enemy and its influence"(Aburish, 275). The financing for the Aswan high dam, the nationalization of the Suez Canal, and the Six-Day War of 1967 pushed Nasser away from Western unity and into the influence of the Soviet Union. Egypt Domestic Economic Development Today, seven years later, Egypt has made substantial progress. Gross examples of waste are in evidence--the results of bad planning, inefficient implementation, and inexperienced management. By Western standards, the results are not outstanding. But one must gauge the military's achievements against the accomplishments of previous civilian governments. For example, the Aswan hydro-electric plant, under consideration for many years, is under construction; an iron and steel company, expensive by Western yardsticks, has been constructed; and roads have been built, railway equipment replaced, the High Dam project undertaken and numerous educational and social programs initiated (Joel 155). Progress has not met original expectations. But this failure is not peculiar to Egypt: planning in underdeveloped countries invariably is overly ambitious. The shortcomings of specific programs have been obvious. And, perhaps, Egypt's long-range planning is ill-conceived. Moreover, Egypt still has not attained an adequate level of economic and social development. This, however, does not detract from the significant progress made by the military regime. Nasser can claim less success in internal politics. His elimination of domestic opposition was a masterpiece of political legerdemain. One by one, the opposition first was isolated, then destroyed. His hesitant efforts to build a new political structure suggest, however, that the military period of "transition" may continue indefinitely. Nasser has shown concern over his regime's lack of permanence. His government, as distinct from Nasser as an individual, has no "mandate from the people." His sudden death would result in chaos, for no obvious successor has been groomed to take his place. On several occasions, Nasser cautiously has attempted to build a bridge between the military and the civilian population. But his fear of relinquishing personal authority together with his lack of a political philosophy, have rendered these efforts ineffective. Nasser's government is authoritarian. But it is clear that a less forceful government could not have imposed the discipline necessary to achieve even the nominal development Egypt recently has experienced. Nasser now must provide for the future, for the popular support commanded by him will not automatically be transferred to his ultimate successor. Instead, a national political structure, commensurate with Egypt's new responsibilities, must be constructed. This will entail risks on Nasser's part, for it will mean granting a platform to elected representatives of the people; it will mean less censorship of the press; it will mean subjecting the military and civilians to a single standard. Indeed, such moves will encourage a political opposition which, in turn, may render governing more difficult. But only through a gradual diffusion of power--power which now is so jealously guarded by Nasser-can the Revolution be consummated. The Egyptian people owe a great deal to President Nasser. He assumed leadership over a country in a time of despair. Through courageous determination and reckless opportunism he has since managed to make his subjects proud to be Egyptians. Certainly, many of them are deluded by his government's "pie-in the-sky" promises. But today, Egypt has a far better chance to maintain, or even increase, her per capita standard of living than it had seven years ago. Nasser has made many mistakes. His foreign adventures have cost Egypt dearly. But, in the final balance, Nasser has done Egypt a great service. He has broken the vicious circle of poverty and lethargy and has started Egypt on the positive path of development. At the time of the 1952 coup, Gamal Abdel Nasser was only thirty-four years old. Since then, he has matured rapidly. No longer must he worry about being "accepted," for he has established himself as an exceptionally qualified leader. Moreover, he has the experience of seven turbulent years in power (National Bank of Egypt 210). In the past, Nasser's impulsive desire to be in the limelight has prompted him to overplay his hand. Recent events suggest that he is gaining moderation with the passage of time. His failures in Syria and Iraq have been sobering; and his frontal attack on Communism, in March and April of 1959, suggests that he will hesitate in the future before again committing himself heavily to Communist support. The ultimate decision is Nasser's. If he so chooses, he can become one of the great personalities of the twentieth century, at least within the Afro-Asian world. But, paradoxically, he can achieve this distinction only if he tempers his personal desire to dominate the Arab world and concentrates instead on meeting the manifold needs of his nation. Nasser had become an Egyptian nationalist as a young boy (St. John, 1). After attending the Military Academy he led the Free Officers coup of July 23, 1952 that removed a corrupt monarchy, declared independence from Britain, and established social reforms to give an identity to the Egyptians. Nasser continuously gained political domination and was elected President in 1956. His presidency defined sociopolitical elements and an authoritarian single-party rule. Nasser established land and health reform; public education; nationalization of heavy industry, and pan-Arabism. Egyptians remember him as a hero, and his era as one of "pride and unity" (Goldstone, 363). Throughout history and well into today, the Nile River serves as the lifeblood in Egypt. Due to Egypt's mostly desert terrain, the Egyptian population is concentrated around the banks of the Nile (Cutter, 225). During his presidency, Nasser had begun to consider rebuilding the Aswan Dam to increase production in Egyptian irrigation and provide power for other industries (Nutting, 112). The construction of the dam was to cost more than any country at the time could afford with the exception of the United States and the Soviet Union (St. John, 214). While working on his goal of completing the dam, Nasser wished for the financing to come from America, and planned on only treating the Soviet offer as a bargaining device (St. John, 214). Expecting to accept the American offer, Nasser's plans were cut short in mid May of 1956 when he recognized Communist China (St. John, 218). Almost immediately, Nasser was informed that U.S. Secretary of State John Dulles responded to the recognition by withdrawing the American offer (St. John, 243-4). Nasser, angry and offended, shouted to his Minister " 'What right has America to try to punish us for anything' "(St. John, 244) Nasser announced that they were prepared to finance his building project if he was ready (St. John, 246). Foreign Development Projects Nasser's passion for the building of the Aswan Dam pushed him into a situation in which it was necessary to depend on the Soviets. Nasser had earlier stated that he wanted his financing to come from the U. S., and he would only consider accepting the Soviet offer if negotiations with Washington fall through (St. John, 217). Clearly, Nasser was expecting American support and was extremely angry and disappointed to learn that it fell through. However, Nasser's nationalism, as portrayed in his vitriolic speech, would not allow for his dreams to become clouded. As promised, Nasser turned to the Soviets to complete his project. Bitter as he was, Nasser was a man of his country, and his nationalist beliefs forced him to turn to the only available support for the good of his country. Although on Egyptian soil, France had built and maintained the Suez Canal. Connecting the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea, which opens into the Indian Ocean, the Suez Canal was an important waterway to all of Europe. To Britain in particular, the Suez Canal was more a necessity than a luxury because of the dramatically faster route to India and the rest of the East for trading purposes. Nasser had recently become angry at Britain, France and America, due to rejected agreements regarding the funding for Nasser's high dam at Aswan. A matter of days after Nasser had decided to accept the Soviet's help, he made a radio announcement to his fellow Egyptians: The Cabinet and the Council of Ministers have ordered the dissolution of the Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez and all other foreign bodies connected with the canal . . . The Ministry of Commerce of the Sovereign state of Egypt will run the canal. The Suez Canal belongs to us. The income will be ours in the future. The Canal was built by Egyptians. One hundred and twenty thousand Egyptians died digging it. A new Suez company will be formed. From now on we will rely on our own strength, our own muscle. The Canal will be run by Egyptians, Egyptians, Egyptians! Do you hear me Egyptians! (St. John, 247) Nasser's main objectives by nationalizing the canal were to release Egypt from domination of a foreign body and to partially finance the dam through profits from the canal (St. John, 247-8). Nasser's European foes quickly responded with Britain's Cairo protest, France's favoring of military occupation, and Dulles' comment that nationalization upset world confidence (St. John, 248). However, the Soviet Union approved of Nasser's actions (St. John, 248). Quickly after the loss of the canal, Britain, France and Israel created the secret tripartite collusion, an agreement they publicly denied (Werling, web source) and made an agreement for Israel to attack Egypt. Britain and France assumed that if they called for the fighting to stop on behalf of Israel, Egypt would not comply. This would give the British and French forces an excuse to step in and save the canal (Frankel, 151). Gulf Issue and Egyptian Role Israel attacked on October 29th, 1956 and the British and French invasion went ashore in early November (Frankel, 151). However, the action was not favored by either the United States or the Soviet Union because it was a symbol of Western domination in the area (Werling). Britain's Prime Minister Anthony Eden left the situation humiliated because he "had attacked only weeks after the bloody crushing by the Soviets of the anti-Communist Hungarian Revolution . . . [depriving] the West of the high moral ground by showing that democratic countries could be equally single-minded in pursuing their interests"(Frankel, 151). Britain and France together with Israel attempted to show the world that Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal had been too sporadic and only motivated by recently acquired Egyptian nationalism. As shown by their bitter failure, Nasser's established Egyptian control of the canal proved to be effective. The condescending tone of the tripartite collusion's attacks motivated Nasser to demonstrate that he was an able leader. The fact that the West had so desperately attempted to take what Nasser passionately believed was Egypt's angered him enough to turn away from the West to the one group who approved of his actions thus far, the Soviets. After the Suez Crisis of 1956, Israel had stepped into Egyptian politics as an enemy. Nasser, calling for a "united Arab front against Israel"(Aburish, 220) had the Soviets claiming that "Israel is an 'outpost of American imperialism'"(Sachar, 140). Britain and France were still humiliated after 1956 and supported the Israeli effort to complete the job they had failed to do (Nutting, 417). Furthermore, the Israelis were completely prepared to remove Nasser from his position of authority (Nutting, 413). These hatreds brought on the attack known as the Six-Day War of 1967. On the morning of June 5, Egypt, Syria and were struck by Israel, demolishing Nasser's air force and killing approximately 20,000 (Nutting, 417-8). After hearing the news of the attack, Nasser suspected there was significant American and British military aid to the attack (Nutting, 420). Following these criticisms, Nasser continued to accuse the American Intelligence service of plotting with Israel after the U.S.S. Liberty was caught patrolling the Egyptian coast and sending intercepted Egyptian messages to Israel. He quickly followed with the announcement that "diplomatic relations with the United States were at an end"(Nutting, 421). Conclusion With the Soviet financial help in building the Aswan high dam, the British, French and Israeli humiliation after the Suez Crisis, and Israel's victory in 1967, Egypt had ended relations with the West and associated with the Eastern bloc throughout Nasser's presidency. Through these events, there was a continuing progression of detachment from the Western world and a haven found in the Soviet's Egyptian policy. During Nasser's governing, the Soviet influence proved to be a positive factor to the establishment of the Egyptian Republic. Egypt desperately wanted to put an end to the Israeli threat as Israel wanted to remove Nasser from his position of authority. At each other's throats, Israel proved to be the stronger of the two by a massive Egyptian defeat. Nasser knew Israel was the puppet of United States power and, ended all further connections with the U. S. Nasser not only suffered from the loss of his renowned air force as well as 20,000 of his own people, but he continued to make connections of other examples of the American-Israeli union and their plotting against his country. Although politically staying out of Egypt's Israeli conflict, the Soviet Union continued to verbally encourage Nasser in his anti-Western fight, securing a role as an inactive supporter of Nasser's efforts. Bibliography Aburish, Sad K. A Brutal Friendship: The West and the Arab Elite. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997. Cutter, Charles H. Africa 2000: 35th Edition. Baltimore: United Book Press, Inc., 2000. Dar el Maaref, (1954). Gamal Abdel Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution, Cairo, p. 19. Frankel, Benjamin. The Cold War: 1945-1991. Detroit: Gale Research Inc., 1992 Frederick A. Praeger, (1954). A History of Modern Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Relations, 1800-1953, New York, pp. 268-69. Goldstone, Jack A. The Encyclopedia of Political Revolutions. Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc. 1998. Heikal, Mohamed. The Cairo Documents: The Inside Story of Nasser and His Relationships with World Leaders, Rebels, and Statesmen. New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1973. 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