Decision-Making in the House of Lords - Essay Example

House of Lords Yvonne L. Academia Research The government has made changes with its Constitutional ReformAct on the House of Lords that has created a stir. Repeatedly in he past, certain groups had called on the House of Lords to properly exercise their duties and functions which may have cause the dissolution of its judicial function. This paper intends to look at the possible factors that might have caused the decision to close down part of the English History. Introduction Historically, the House of Lords has judicial functions as a court of last resort 1in the United Kingdom. Through the years, it has seen several changes especially with the hearing cases of impeachment proceedings. Today, the House's jurisdiction is limited to the hearing of appeals from the lower courts that are technically addressed to the Queen-in-Parliament. By constitutional convention these judges known as Lords of Appeal or Lords of Law hear the appeals. For several years we have heard of the deafening calls for reform and change in the highest court of this land which separates them from the second house of Parliament. The recent calls moved for the removal of the Lords of Appeal from the legislature which received full support and endorsement from the government on March 21, 2005 leading us all to believe that the Constitutional Reform Act, 20052, as a new system will reflect the independence of the judiciary from both the legislature and the executive. According to Thoroton3, the Judicial Committee would continue to exist and to undertake its work for various Commonwealth and overseas and dependent territory jurisdictions4. This has however created a constant stir that allows us to see how the Lords have fared in the last 25 years in the exercise of their duties and responsibilities which concerns every citizen in the society as a whole. Undeniably, the continuing dissatisfaction over the last 30 years on the performance of the House of Lords, has put into question their credibility and independence. Certain motivational factors that may have affected this change has created furor especially in their capacity to handle cases and effectively carry out their function. We try to entertain these motivational factors as the basis for this study that aims to look into the important aspect of their decision-making. More importantly we will look into the ratio and length of judgment in comparison with their collective judgments rendered that would reflect their capacity to handle a fair trial. Methodology Based on the total number of cases, we used the common method of random sampling to arrive at and identify at least 5 cases per year as a basis from this evaluation from 1975-2000. Theoretical Framework The emergence of the constitutional reform act has set to obtain the government's motivation for the reform act. Clearly it has set to remove the Law Lords' ability to act as both a government minister and a judge. According to the House Common Bill of Rights5, this is motivated in part by concerns that the historical admixture of legislative, judicial, and executive power, may not be in conformance with the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights. Robertson 1998 has analyzed and branded concentrates on the arguments the Law Lords use in justifying their decisions, and is concerned as much with the legal methodology as with the substance of their decisions. Very close attention is paid to the different approaches and styles of their judicial argument. Munday6 has also explained the certain application of coming to one single realization among 5 judges to arrive at 1 conclusion and gives a lot of room for unfair judgment. Robertson7 has expressed that Law Lords enjoy and fully utilise far more discretion in their judgments than is normally admitted, and that much depends on exactly which judges happen to hear a case. Data Interpretation and Analysis In a convention, it was decided that the office of Senior Law Lord was automatically assumed by the longest serving Law Lord ad serves as the Chancellor. In practice, the Lords in an Appeal carry out the bulk of the judicial work, sitting in panels of 5, but sometimes 7 for cases of great importance like in Pepper v. Hart8, later Pinochet concerning the repeat hearing of extradition proceedings against General Pinochet of Chile where the previous previous decision of the House was set aside on the ground that the Appellate Committee was improperly constituted. In the data gathered from existing records and the five cases selected by random sampling exhibited results that among contract cases required less lengthy decisions with a ration of 1 opinion against the 5 lords in attendance. Earlier, precisely before 1991, most judges were able to sound off their dissenting opinions in most cases but after 1982, opinions have declined and the length of judgments consistently diminishing. Munday 19989 explained that there is a greater possibility that judges have espoused a resembling civilian judicial procedure. Further, Munday revealed in his study an alarming rate of cases where the judges tend to deliver a single, composite judgment.10 In Hansard 200011, deciding who is eligible to sit on an appeal, the Lords of Appeal agree to be guided by the same principles as apply to all judges. These principles were repeated by the Court of Appeal in the case of Locabail (UK) Ltd v. Bayfield.12 In this case principles and guidelines were laid down regarding the disqualification of judges on possible grounds for bias. With the extent of judicial sittings by Lord Chancellors in recent years has varied. Figures were given in the course of a debate, and in his second period of office from 1979 to 1987, for 53 days; Lord Elwyn-Jones, 1974 to 1979 has sat for only 8 days; Lord Havers, who was Lord Chancellor for a short period in 1987, did not sit at all; Lord Mackay of Clashfern, 1987 to 1997, for 60 days as enumerated in Robertson13. Lord Irvine himself sat for 17 days, the last being on 25th October 2001.14 In the same speech, Lord Irvine stated the circumstances in which it is generally regarded as inappropriate for the Lord Chancellor to sit judicially, as follows: "I am unwilling to lay down any detailed rules because it is ever a question of judgment combined with a need to ensure that no party to an appeal could reasonably believe or suspect that the Lord Chancellor might, because of his other roles, have in interest in a specific outcome. In McFarlane v Tayside HB and Emeh v Kensington as Tort cases the judges had summarily failed to recognize the many non-pecuniary detriments to be balanced against the benefits gained in having a child. The arguments they used were either flawed or insufficient to justify the limited damages rule15. Similarly, they were correct to consider the moral aspects of the claim in Cane 199716,that skewed their singular moral view and failing to do justice to a complex question. Furthermore, although each of their Lordships tolled the bell that their decision was not policy-based, their claims ring hollow. Given that policy was at the root of the decision to first allow damages for. Later Irvine further added that "The Lord Chancellor would never sit in any case concerning legislation in the passage of which he had been directly involved nor in any case where the interests of the executive were directly engaged" he associated himself, as regards eligibility to sit on appeals, with the statement made by Lord Bingham on behalf of all the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary on 22nd June 2000.Over the past five years the judicial workload of the House has steadily increased, although appeals from Scotland and Northern Ireland have declined. Conclusion Thoroton explained that there was no dissatisfaction with the performance of the House of Lords as our highest Court of Law that has motivated the implementation of this constitutional reform. This paper does not tend to judge the House of Lords; rather it just tried to look into certain possibilities that might have caused its change and dissolution from holding the power of judicial proceedings. However we have seen through the results gleaned from this study and the minimal published work of Munday and Robertson that offered similar explanations. Munday, has pointed out the areas of collective judgment that gives more room for the possibility of collaborating decisions in cases most especially as the Peerage Act was only applied in 1999. The mounting calls for the creation of a Supreme Court is rather timely, however, this study and other studies would help lawmakers determine how even the highest positions are prone to manipulations. References United Kingdom. Lord Falconer of Thoroton. Consultation Papers on Constitutional Affairs. http://www.dca.gov.uk/research/resrep.htm May 20,2006. Munday, Roderick. (July, 2002). All for One, One for All. Cambridge Law Journal,61(2),321- 350. Robertson, David. (1998) Judicial Discretion in the House of Lords. London: Clarendon Press. United Kingdom. House of Lords. June 2000. Judicial Business. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199900/ldhansrd/vo000622/tex t/00622- 01.htm May 20,2006. United Kingdom. Research Paper 2005. http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_publications_and_archives/resear ch_papers/rpsummary05.cfm Pepper v. Hart [1993] A.C.593. Locabail (UK) Ltd v. Bayfield Properties Ltd and others and four other actions [2000 1 All E.R. 65 (CA)] Cane, P (1997) The Anatomy of Tort Law Oxford: Hart Publishing. IB Group (UK) P.L.C. v. Martin. Hamilton v Al Fayed [1999] 3 All ER 317 The Independent May 18th 2003. Letter by Dawn Oliver Rose LJ in Tolstoy v. Aldington [1996] 1 WLR 736 Reidy, A. And Russell, M. 1999. Guardians of The Constitution and Protectors of Human Rights. London:The Constitution Unit. Russell M. 1999. Territorial Representation in The Upper Chamber; Lessons From Overseas. London: The Constitution Unit.. McFarlane v Tayside HB [1999] 3 WLR 1301 Emeh v Kensington, Chelsea and Westminster Area Health Authority [1985] QB 1012. Donnelly, M (1997) The Injury of Parenthood: The Tort of Wrongful Conception' 48 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 10 Read More