Did the possession of nuclear weapons prevent war in Europe after 1945 - Essay Example

Running Head: WAR PREVENTION IN EUROPE AFTER 1945 Did the possession of nuclear weapons (MAD) prevent war in Europe after 1945 By _______________________________ Introduction It was not until 1945 when policies were established in context of proposed agreements not to indulge in a nuclear war. It was decided by the European countries that whatever be the circumstances, no matter how moral, sensible, or necessary particular arms control arrangements may be, there will be little chance of governments accepting them unless the proposals seem to officials to meet the national security considerations regarding war conduct. There the need arose to come up with good arms control ideas which meet government perceptions of national security and deterrence needs, and also, to help establish a more favourable climate of international relations and official and public opinion in which government perceptions of national security requirements become less demanding and more flexible. This on one hand seemed to develop international relations among those countries that were enemies to one another; on the other hand it prevented nuclear war. In this essay we would examine all those factors, which despite nuclear possession helped war prevention in Europe after 1945. What were the main reasons behind avoiding war and what were the consequences experienced by Europe in already indulging in war conduct. Let us discuss the causes. There is no doubt that presence of nuclear programs and weapons enabled Europe to take wise decisions after 1945. The best example of European 'wise decisions' is no nuclear war has taken place since 1945. If we talk about the nuclear battlefield in the context of British Government, we would analyse the British Army of the Rhine spent much time and effort in trying to imagine what such a battlefield might look like and in preparing to cope with it. The main reason was that British Government was in debt to the USA, due to which it reduced its armed forced to one million soldiers. Beside this, all European countries were aware of the haphazard of nuclear war, since the bombing of 'Hiroshima'. During the 1950s and 1960s these efforts were taken very seriously, which involved two steps: possessing advanced nuclear weapons and visualising war with and without them. Of course war cannot be fought without them, which means war fought with nuclear weapons. 'Hiroshima' bombing is a sample view, which is still giving birth to the haphazard of a single nuclear bomb. In the context of war at the strategic level the first response was to emphasise 'counterforce'. Soviet weapons were the strategic targets and senior commanders still talked as though a nuclear war could be 'won'. Then the danger of this approach dawned with the development of Soviet Union the means of delivering a massive blow against the United States, so the notion of 'riding out' a first strike and then delivering a counter-blow on what could only be empty silos and deserted bomber bases became highly unattractive. The result was a shift back to 'city-busting', holding the people rather than the weapons as hostages; 400 one-megaton weapons able to hit area targets would suffice. This totally amoral doctrine was dressed up under the term Mutual Assured Destruction and its appropriate acronym (MAD). The tactical counterpart to this change of heart took a further five years to mature. It came to be realised that large-scale assault on NATO, while still a deadly danger, was by no means the only or even the most likely contingency. (Barnaby & Holdstock, 2003, p. 39) At that time the total nuclear stockpile of the United States, at its highest point, had an estimated explosive yield of some 9 billion tons of high explosive and the Soviet stockpile must have been much the same. In the 20 years from 1945 to 1965 nuclear warheads evolved to fill every possible ecological niche on the battlefield and in numbers far greater than any rational person could possibly have considered useful. (2003, p. 34) As in all areas, the UK's enthusiasm for pursuit of multilateral nuclear disarmament has varied from one government to the next. One reason for war prevention might be the decision of the UK Government of elimination of nuclear weapons as it has long been the UK's officially recognised objective. While making generally constructive contributions to international disarmament work, however, including playing an important role in the prohibition of nuclear testing, the UK has in the main only been able to operate at the margins of the nuclear issue, with the arms race dictated by the United States and the Soviet Union. Today the UK places a strong emphasis on multilateral verified arms control. A serious and independent commitment to nuclear disarmament on the part of the UK, a longstanding nuclear-weapons power, which is a member of NATO, the European Union, the G-8 and one of the five permanent members of the Security Council, would place it as a leader among the growing band of 'middle powers' campaigning for a nuclear weapon-free world. (2003, p. 36) There are two important points that lead us to think about war prevention after 1945. First, all the warheads for these weapons were in American ownership and custody. One-third were for use by American forces, the rest were for use by other nations under 'dual key' control. This meant that bilateral agreements had been reached with the governments of Britain, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy and Greece whereby the aircraft, missile or gun belonged to the 'host nation' while the warhead, shell or bomb remained the property of the US, even after launching. When the moment came to fire, this needed the concurrence both of the American and the 'host nation' officers at the firing point, each having been properly authorised via his own national chain of command by his respective national release authority. This could all take a long time, even days. A second very important point is that, with a few years time lag perhaps, the Soviet Union matched the Americans in nearly all this weaponry. But they did not make their weapons available to Allies under a 'dual key' system, no doubt because they did not trust them. For many years their inventory of tactical nuclear weapons was assessed as being about half that of NATO, but this imbalance had little operational significance. For all practical purposes, where tactical nuclear weapons were concerned, the situation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact was symmetrical. (2003, p. 37) In addition to these problems for neighbouring countries, unilateral reductions also imposed a large burden on the threat assessors and military planners of each country who were required to accurately assess the threat and define the necessary response in the interest of their country's national security. If the implementation of the measures were uncertain and there were no agreed measures for monitoring their execution, threat assessors and military planners were placed in a difficult position. They must have called up what they saw, which may be a greater capability than what actually existed in the military forces of the other party. (Susiluoto, 2002, p. 4) While experiencing several wars, soldiers were experienced enough to be rooted one of the most powerful myths of the war that of 'combating', on which several postwar political movements, including fascism, were to draw. The idealisation of the frontline war experienced and saw the comradeship and fraternity of the trench 'community' as an embryonic new society, the model and basis for changes in their own societies after the war, with the ex-combatants due a special place and status because of their sacrifice and commitment to the national cause during the war. This mood was strengthened by the way the governments of the countries at war had mortgaged their own political futures from 1917, promising their soldiers a better post-war world in an attempt to overcome the general war weariness, and to offset the appeal of revolutionary change opened up by the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. The soldiers' sacrificed for the nation in war was unambiguously linked to the rewards they could expect for that service in the post-war renewal of society. (Morgan, 2002, p. 25) The fascist version of the 'combatant' myth was that since soldiers had fought for the nation, they had won the right to remake the nation and become its new ruling class, or rather, their officers had. For the fascists, the trench community was both egalitarian and hierarchical. Troops and junior officers were 'equal' in the sense that all differences of class, wealth and social background were immaterial in the new group solidarity forged around the common danger and deprivation, which they all faced in the trenches. The classless 'egalitarianism' of belonging to a community of like-minded people was what fascists regarded as 'socialism'. But the trench unit was also a military formation; there had to be leaders who gave the orders, and troops who obeyed. The junior officers were the meritocratic elite of the trench community, whose leadership qualities were continuously being tested and proved in battle, and were acknowledged and respected by their troops because they were together in the same mire. This idealised relationship between junior officers and their men, comradely yet elitist, was the basis of the hierarchical organisation which post-war fascist leaders imposed in their movements, and of the hierarchical organisation they wanted to impose on their own societies. The point was that this hierarchy was new. Based on performance, the merit earned by self-sacrificing service to the nation, it replaced the conservative hierarchy of birth and wealth. (2002, p. 26) After the failure of the Nazis to conquer the Soviet Union and their headlong retreat to Berlin, the region from 1945 until 1989, laid down a new template over the preceding European order: the Soviet model. In part a rebuke of Europe and European culture, this Stalinist model was also the latest in a long series of attempts to modernise Eastern Europe out of its predicament. The region was not so much wrenched from the European context as pushed along a much-heralded shortcut to modernity, a shortcut, which in the final analysis turned out to be little more than a dead end, a shortcut that would leave Europe bloodied but still defiant. (Feffer, 1992, p. 56) Conclusion Time has arrived when all the nations possess its own nuclear weapons, therefore one cannot afford to confront another war. Therefore nuclear weapons have not only put an end to war but also have come up with a new threat of universal war. There is now an almost universal consensus that general nuclear war would constitute a global catastrophe, threatening the survival of civilisation and perhaps of all humanity. Few people defend the possession or use of nuclear weapons on any grounds other than its prevention. There is wide agreement that, to the extent national security permits, everything possible must be done to control these weapons. Moreover, nations have reached a number of international agreements, which constrain the development, possession, deployment, and use of nuclear weapons in a variety of ways. (Selwyn, 1984, p. 5) Therefore risk of war cannot be taken at this time, when everyone has the possession and global access to nuclear weapons. References & Bibliography Barnaby Frank & Holdstock Douglas, (2003) The British Nuclear Weapons Programme, 1952- 2002: Frank Cass: London. Feffer John, (1992) Shock Waves: Eastern Europe after the Revolutions: South End Press: Cambridge, MA. Morgan Philip, (2002) Fascism in Europe, 1919-1945: Routledge: London. Selwyn Arthur Miller, (1984) Nuclear Weapons and Law: Greenwood Press: Westport, CT. Susiluoto Taina, (2002) Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Time for Control: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research: Geneva. Read More