James Mill - Research Paper Example

James Mill The Politics of Early Nineteenth Century Economics James Mill (1773-1836) is a thinker whose importance to the history of political economy has long been acknowledged by scholars (Robinson & Groves, 2003). However, his contributions are often misinterpreted. Mill is traditionally understood as an exponent of a utilitarian perspective in which human happiness is thought largely to be connected to the satisfaction of material wants. Writing in the early nineteenth century, he was a contemporary of and intellectual collaborator with the pioneering economist David Ricardo. Mill was a frequent critic of mercantilist measures such as monopoly and price controls that restrained the free market. Because commercial advancement leads to greater material production and opportunity for individuals to share in its benefits, utilitarianism leads us to conclude that it is a universal good. Along with similar interpretations of Adam Smith and Ricardo, the "economist" James Mill is believed to endorse material progress over all other social and political goods (Robinson & Groves, 2003). The traditional interpretation of James Mill as a theorist who argued that the economic progress was an unconditional social good is in need of revision. It fails to recognize adequately the contextual reference of his theories (Robinson & Groves, 2003). This paper argues that Mill viewed the commercialization of society as a means of politically and socially liberalizing the remnants of feudal society. Though he believed that individual happiness was tied to material comfort to some extent, he also saw the advancement of the market as important because it eroded ascribed status for the purpose of allowing more equality and freedom. A large part of his advocacy of the market was motivated by the social transformations that would result from the progress of commerce. Understanding Mill's advocacy of commerce as a response to the specific conditions of nineteenth-century Britain underscores important aspects of his work that are often overlooked (Robinson & Groves, 2003). Mill's assessment of the social benefits of the market is considerably more cautious and skeptical than is often understood in "economic" interpretations of his utilitarianism. He is often mistaken for a theorist who thought that social sentiments were irrelevant to human happiness. Mill negatively assessed social sentiments because in his context the predominant social sentiments were aimed at maintaining deference to ascribed social status. He also believed that if social sentiments were egalitarian, they contributed positively to human happiness. Indeed, what is most often overlooked is that Mill was critical of an excessive preoccupation with interests. He believed that the esteem of others was a critical part of human happiness, and that it was undesirable to pursue interests to the exception of cultivating affective ties. From a contemporary perspective, it is important to understand that Mill's theory in favor of the market had a specific historical reference to the conditions of nineteenth-century Europe. For that reason, his theory does not provide a normative basis for economic liberalization today in any straightforward way. We ought to understand the early history of capitalism as a specific ideological response to the shortcomings of traditional societies-not just in economics, but in basic social and political values. Commerce was recommended by early nineteenth century utilitarians as a means for bringing about conditions in which a transition to liberal democracy could be realized. Market society's focus on economic interests would increase the expectations of the traditionally poor majority. The legitimacy of the disproportionate material benefits enjoyed by the traditional oligarchy would wane. This would erode the hierarchical social sentiments that supported the power of the oligarchy. This created the historical possibility of reforming social sentiments in an egalitarian fashion, producing social orientations that are necessary for a society to adopt and sustain a liberal democratic constitution. There is a serious question about the contemporary adequacy of early nineteenth century utilitarian theories in societies that have made the liberal transition more than a century ago. What has happened in the case of James Mill is that we have adopted his conclusion in favor of economic progress while only selectively grasping his arguments in favor of it. He did not separate his utilitarian analysis of human happiness from the effects the market would have on a traditional society. It is only by elevating the former and obscuring the latter that he can be made into an icon of contemporary neoclassicism. Historical Survey: Misinterpretation of James Mill Politics is purely the servant, the handmaiden, of economics; participation in politics is purely the instrument of that purpose. James Mill offers us an unmistakably economic theory of democracy. (Krouse 1982, 516) This is how James Mill is often interpreted today. It is actually a historical and time-worn thesis. Characterizing James Mill as an advocate of commerce as an unconditional good for societies was initiated by his contemporary Whig critics. Whigs supported the extant aristocratic order, and opposed Mill's attack against the social affections that sustained it. The most influential work in that regard was Thomas Macaulay's "Mill's Essay on Government: Utilitarian Logic and Politics" (1829). Macaulay was the first of many Mill interpreters to suggest that Mill's utilitarianism was solely based in the claim that the greatest part of human happiness lay in the satisfaction of material wants. Mill purportedly underestimated the role of social sentiments like altruism, honor, and propriety played in motivating individual action. Macaulay criticized Mill for failing to appreciate that both the satisfaction of material desires and the esteem of others were integral to human happiness. Mill had "chosen to look only at one-half of human nature" (Macaulay 1978, 108). Another Whig, James Mackintosh, interpreted Mill in a similar fashion in the Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy (1830). Utilitarians like Jeremy Bentham and James Mill mistakenly thought that the pursuit of self-interest was the "chief motive for human conduct" (Mackintosh 1845,203). The error in the Whig interpretation is glaring: Mill did think social sentiments were vital to human happiness, much more so than wealth. Mill argued that though wealth and power are often perceived as the sources of happiness, "this is not the case. Our fellow- creatures are the origin of affections of the greatest influence to human life" (Mill 1967, 2:214-5). Mill hoped that the erosion of the hierarchical social affections that supported the aristocracy would allow liberal democratic institutional change as well as the establishment of egalitarian social affections. Mill agreed with the Whigs that a society without social affections would be deficient in many ways. His criticism was only of a particular kind of social affection and not a categorical rejection of all of them. He did not advocate the pursuit of interests as a replacement for social orientations or group identities. Rather, he speculated that if the majority of individuals in the society focused upon their interests, they would make demands that the political and economic systems be liberalized. The small minority that enjoyed the benefits would have to share them more widely. Reinterpreting James Mill will bring to mind some of the original motivations that the West had for pursuing economic development. This is of crucial importance if the West's interaction with the rest of the world is to be more than simply one of promoting wealth without other desirable values and institutions. Interpreting Mill's Essay on Government Mackintosh's claim that Mill's political theory implies that all human motivation is reducible to the rational pursuit of self-interest. If read as a solitary work, Mill's Essay on Government gives the impression that Mill thought that people are made happy primarily by the satisfaction of their interests. Mill suggests that people seek pleasure and avoid pain, and he accompanies this suggestion with the additional assumption that the products of labor are "the means of subsistence, as well as the means of the greatest part of our pleasures" (Mill 1992, 4). It is an ambiguity of Government that it does not attempt to specify a more substantive account of happiness. What it implies is a simple hedonism in which "pleasure" stands for the physical pleasures that can be obtained by wealth. In the absence of any other explanation, having wealth appears to be same as being happy. In context, this was a convenient interpretation for the reform agenda because it undercuts the aristocracy's claim that it has more refined desires and therefore can rule responsibly without the fear of the electorate. Mill implies that everyone's desires are the same and therefore no group can make the claim that it would not abuse unchecked power. At the same time, this is the kind of ambiguity that invites us to interpret Mill as having a narrow conception of 'economic man' at the heart of his social theory. Yet, when we examine Mill's work as a whole, we find that he does not reduce pleasures and pains to those of the body. In the companion essays to Government, he allows that there is a variety of things that will make people happy, including the esteem of others. For example, the Essay on Jurisprudence cites public shame as an effective method of discouraging crime (Mill 1992, 68). The Essay on Education suggests that the happiness of children depends a great deal upon the approval of their parents (Mill 1992, 180). In both cases, Mill suggests that there is a direct connection between the opinion that others have of us and our happiness. If Mill's stance on social affections is confusing, it is because he regarded the standards of esteem in his society as corrupt. They led people to support leaders and policies that actually did not promote their individual happiness, be it physical or emotional. Mill's view of the human mind was based on associationalist psychology (Burston 1973). That is a view that the mind starts out as a blank slate. Different experiences help the mind connect different sense experiences into causal inferences (Mill 1992, 142-153). In the best cases of good education and upbringing, individuals learn to make choices that promote their own happiness. Unfortunately, sometimes repeated experiences can cause people to develop beliefs that are mistaken and harmful to themselves. In the worst cases, this can cause perverse situations in which the victims of oppression actually support their own condition or think it cannot be changed. Thus, for example, Mill argued that the Church of England and the aristocracy maintained their superior position in British society and politics not only by the force of law, but by a "fraud" of untrue and irrational beliefs developed and reinforced over centuries (Mill 1835, 6-8). One particularly egregious effect of this kind of conditioning was that poor people who suffered misrule by the oligarchy were still convinced that the oligarchs deserved to be held in high regard. The aristocracy had "perverted" standards of esteem in such a way as to make people love them even when they did wrong (Mill 1836). They encouraged people to view an individual as a "superior" because of the possession of certain trappings, rather than virtues of character. Estate architecture, for example, was used to reinforce the social authority of the aristocracy. Why did aristocrats build "triumphal arches" for ancient military processions that were no more? Why did they imitate Grecian pillars that had been designed for function merely as ornaments of style? In both cases, the public in general confused these signs of distinction with actual virtue, and thus were mistakenly awed and deferential (Mill 1836, 287-8). Titles of various kinds and even a certain conversational style all reinforced ascribed status and served as proxies for the possession of virtue (Mill 1836, 291-3). The key aspect of Mill's psychology is that people can make "misguided associations." They may be pursuing what they think makes them happy based upon erroneous beliefs shaped by custom and habit. Though it is highly unlikely that someone could be in error with an "immediate" cause of pain such as the lash of a whip, the "remote" causes of pleasures and pains are much harder to ascertain and subject to manipulation (e.g. Mill 1967,2: 187-8). The poor of Mill's time were very vocal that their poverty caused them suffering, yet many continued to support the traditional customs and distribution of power that were the remote causes of their suffering. What we see emerging in Mill's works is a distinction that his Whig critics were not willing to make, namely between hierarchical and egalitarian social affections. In Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind (1967), Mill offers a conception of the social affections that allows him to distinguish between two different types. We have feelings for friends, family, country, class, and humankind in general (Mill 1967. 2:214-230). These are all different types of social affections that are not reducible to one another. Mill distinguishes affections based on class from the others. This kind of affection exists only in the presence of social distinctions: "There is no Love of Class, therefore, but in a Privileged Order" (Mill 1967, 2:228). The aristocracy had, over the years, made itself into the object of affection even though its conduct did not merit such affection. Notably, when Mill enumerates desirable social affections-"the love of Family, of Friend, of Country, of Mankind"-class is left off of the list (Mill 1967, 2:215). In other words, when Mill speaks against social affections, he is referring to those hierarchical social affections that preserve the ruling oligarchy. In fact, there are plenty of other kinds of other-directed affections, from individual relationships to a most general love of other citizens or humanity, that can and do make us happy. More than anything else, "Our Fellow-creatures are the origin of affections of the greatest influence to human life" (Mill 1967, 2:215). Mill, we should be clear, was not opposed to social affections, only social affections of a particular kind. Furthermore, Mill argued that in the absence of "class" affections, the social affections were actually more important to happiness than wealth and power. In a corrupt society, we see that wealth and power bring social regard, and therefore we are prone to think they are what makes us happy. Rather, the phenomenon of the pursuit of wealth and power is just further evidence that we desire the esteem of others. It is only one means of obtaining that affection and a morally questionable means at that. There are other ways to earn the love and regard of others. Following is a complete statement of Mill’s perspective: How few men seem to be at all concerned about their fellow-creatures! How completely are the lives of most men absorbed, in the pursuits of wealth, and ambition! With how many men does the love of Family, of Friend, of Country, of Mankind, appear completely impotent, when opposed to their Love of Wealth, or of Power! This is an effect of misguided association, which requires the greatest attention in Education, and Morals. (Mill 1967, 2:215) It was a limitation of the Whigs that they refused to see Mill's positive assessment of some kinds of social affections, and instead characterized him as a theorist who rejected the affections altogether. They had so completely associated the concept of social affections with the particular affections that supported their own social rank that the only alternative they could imagine was a polity of interests. They accused Mill of neglecting the social affections because they opposed his conclusion that their party's members were not as virtuous as they claimed, and not entitled to rule unless they faced a broader segment of public opinion when seeking to obtain power. Whigs were either unwilling or unable to grasp that egalitarian social affections were possible. It was politically convenient for them to interpret Mill as nothing more than a parrot for utilitarian assumptions. That is an interpretation that has outlived them, and in the early twenty-first century is unfortunately serving the political needs of other theories. Mill's reply to Mackintosh and Macaulay in A Fragment on Mackintosh offers us another interpretation of the strong prominence of the language of interests in the Essay on Government. In that, Mill clarifies that his assertion in the Essay on Government that people pursued their interests was not intended "to explain the immense variety of political facts" (Mill 1870,2 93). The scope of his theories was restricted to the means by which the legislature should be composed for the sake of producing good legislation (Mill 1870, 291). He was not attempting to suggest that the attainment of wealth leads to happiness. He was simply reflecting the observation that wealth was the end most often pursued by those with legislative power in British society as it was at that time (Mill 1870, 278). In other words, the Essay on Government suggested that representative democracy was the best way to manage a corrupt governing class that had become nothing more than a plutocracy. Mill further clarifies this point when he argues that the "sentimental system of morals" supported by Mackintosh and the Whigs was ideal for supporting despotism, unlike the "selfish" system of morals of the utilitarians (Mill 1870, 38). In supporting the "selfish" utilitarian system, Mill is not suggesting that all people are selfish, nor that they ought to be. Rather he is suggesting that the rhetoric of social sentiments of the Whigs masks clear cases of individuals pursuing their class interests, and as long as that was the case, the logic of interests ought to inform the design of legislative systems. The Essay on Government offers the type of legislature that a corrupt society requires. His apparent ontological statements, therefore, are actually critical reconstructions of the ideological obfuscations of the British ruling classes. Political development and commerce Mill's The History of British India followed Millar's (1990) suggestion that the less economically developed countries would also be culturally more backwards. Along these lines, James Mill argues that there are certain general political benefits to commercial modernization. Commerce enables the types of communication necessary for democracy to work, weakens the physical and ideological power of the traditional ruling groups, and allows for the creation of an administrative and legal system that curbs the abuse of power. All of these developments contribute to the transition to democracy and help democracy function. As did his teacher Dugald Stewart, Mill suggests that the printing press was one of the most politically significant results of the gradual progress of commerce. Liberal democracy was faced with the problem that, unlike the Athenian democracy, it was not possible to gather the whole set of citizens together in one place (Mill 1992, 7). Mass communications are necessary if a public in a large-scale, modem republic is to have any sense of it self. Only with a widely available knowledge of the workings of government in various parts of the polity could citizens rationally evaluate claims by rulers that they served the public interest. Abuses of power become harder to hide. Because it enabled political accountability, Mill described the invention of the press as "the grand revolution of modem times" (Mill 1992, 228-9). To Mill, the most important political influence of commerce was that it helps weaken the power of orthodox religion and the aristocracy. The Church of England was losing membership due to "a people improving, now at last improving rapidly, in knowledge and intelligence." The progress of science had already dispelled many of the superstitions that had been used to scare and intimidate the faithful into tolerating abusive behavior by priests (Mill 1835, 271). The political power of the aristocracy was reduced by commerce in two ways. The transition from feudalism and mercantilism to capitalism and free trade moved economic power from the hands of landowners to artisans and merchants (Mill 1992). In addition, the diffusion of rationality and science through culture weakened the ideological supports of the aristocracy. The advancement of political science would allow people to see that though aristocrats often had the trappings of being social "betters," they were in fact using those forms to distract from the fact that they were incompetent and self-serving rulers (Mill 1836). Finally, economic progress is important because it generates the wealth and sophistication of administration required for a modem state. Mill distinguishes between politics and government (Mill 1992). He draws this distinction because he wants to prevent political leaders from administering the law in such a way as to attack enemies and personally profit. A professional bureaucracy and independent judiciary contribute to good government by making the abuse of power by political leaders more difficult. These are all examples of commerce effecting social transformations that are favorable to liberal democracy. Conclusion In this paper I argued that the Whig interpretation of James Mill as a philosopher who based his social and political theory solely upon the interests was mistaken. His advocacy of a liberal system that allowed the pursuit of interests was not exclusive with the social affections, as the Whigs suggested. When interpreted in context. Mill's critique of the affections is clearly directed at the hierarchical affections that supported the social position of the aristocracy. He hoped that after the transition to democracy, egalitarian social affections could take stronger root. He did not suggest, as the Whigs often intimated, that happiness lay solely in material things. Mill argues that commerce does have a positive but limited role to play in the development of democracy. Commerce weakens the groups that were most powerful during feudalism, both economically and ideologically, and it provides the technical means by which democracy can take place in the large-scale republics of modern times. Yet democracy also requires an egalitarian character that results not from commerce but constitutions. Political institutions adopted in a moment of intentional change are necessary to allow democratic character to develop. Without such change, even citizens in highly commercial polities will continue to adhere to a social deference that makes mechanisms like elections meaningless. References Primary Sources Mill, James. Political writings. Edited by Terence Ball. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992 Mill, James.. “Aristocracy”. London Review 2, no. 4, 1836: 283-306. Mill, James. Analysis of the phenomena of the human mind. New York: August M. Kelley, 1967. Mill, James. A fragment on Mackintosh. London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1870. Mill, James. “The Church, and its reform.” London Review 1, no. 2, 1835: 257-295. Secondary Sources Burston, W. H. James Mill on philosophy and education. London: The Athlone Press, 1973. Krouse, Richard W. “Two concepts of representation: James and John Stuart Mill.” Journal of Politics 44, no. 2, 1982, 509-537. Macaulay, T. Mill's Essay on Government: Utilitarian logic and politics. In Utilitarian logic and politics, ed. Jack Livey and John Rees. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978. Mackintosh, James. Dissertation on the progress of ethical philosophy. Philadelphia: Lea and Blanchard, 1845. Majeed, Javed,. Ungoverned imaginings: James Mill's The History of British India and Orientalism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. Millar, John. 1990. The origin of the distinction of ranks. Edited by John Valdimir Price. Bristol: Thoemmes. Robinson, Dave & Groves, Judy. Introducing Political Philosophy. Icon Books, 2003. Read More