United Nations Security Council Reform - Essay Example

United Nations Security Council Reform should involve the abolition of the veto Introduction Sixty years after the United Nations was formed, the international political world has accepted that it is necessary for certain reforms to be made within this body, as regards its functional and organisational capacities. One of the most important and controversial reform proposed, concerns one of its divisions, the United Nations Security Council, and it involves bringing in changes within the structure and working practice of this particular body. The Security Council plays the primary role in safeguarding peace and maintaining security, worldwide. Indeed, time and again this particular body has faced severe criticisms from its member states, UN members, and other experts; regarding a lack of transparency in its resolution adoption processes, and a lack of fair representation of all the countries, worldwide. Though in recent times we notice that the Council has moved towards having showing more transparency in many of its decisions; there has been no dearth in the criticisms directed towards this body. One of the main issues of contention, has been regarding the existence of the Council’s 5 permanent member body (France, United Kingdom, United States, China and Russia), and their capacity to exercise the ‘veto rights’. This so called ‘veto rights’ gives these 5 member states the right to stop any resolution (that may not necessarily always be procedural in nature) from being passed. This veto right is deemed as an unfair practice by most of the other non-permanent states, and is considered to be the main reason behind the Council’s failure to act in a fair manner. It faced severe criticism when it failed to take any actions during the Darfur (2004)1 and Rwanda (1994) crises; yet went overboard in its efforts, to assist the oil-rich country Kuwait, during the 1991 Gulf War. Thus, it is of little wonder that the majority of the of the council members wish to: abolish this practice of ‘veto rights’, or restrain the power to exercise this ‘veto rights’, or increase the number of permanent members, thus expanding the UNSC and in effect diluting the exclusive powers vested with these five states. In my article, I will explore to find out whether reforms pertaining to the UNSC should involve this abolition of the veto power; and will study to see that if indeed the veto power is done away with, would it enhance the quality of functioning of this UN body. Discussion The UNSC, its member states, its functional capacities as an UN body and veto rights: The UN Security Council or UNSC is one of the six main divisions that function under the capacity of the United Nations. According to Chapter 5, Article 24 of the United Nations Charter, this Council has the responsibility of safeguarding worldwide security and peace2; while under Article 25 all the member states are under obligation to follow the resolutions as adopted by the Council, “The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter”3. The Chapter 7 outlines the measures to be adopted for maintaining international peace and security, including use of armed forces, as and when necessary. This Security Council (UNSC) body consists of 15 member states, of which a group of 5 states form the body of permanent members. These 5 states are: France, United States, Russia, United Kingdom, and China4. These 5 states form the body of permanent members, and enjoy the right to exercise ‘veto rights’ when the UNSC adopts resolutions on matters that are of substantial importance, “Under Article 27 of the UN Charter, these five Permanent Members have been given the power to veto actions favored by even a majority of the Security Council (that is, a single "No" vote from any one of these five kills any action otherwise accepted by a majority of the full Council)”5. The remaining 10 members occupy the non-permanent seats and are elected by the UN General Assembly members. Each one of these 10 member states is accorded a two year term, which invariably starts from the 1st of January in any given year. The rules have been so formed that 5 of the non-permanent member states are replaced every year. From 1st January 2010 till the 31st of December 2011, Bosnia and Herzegovina; Nigeria; Brazil; Lebanon; and Gabon are the five members that have taken 5 non-permanent seats. The other 5 non-permanent members are Turkey, Japan, Austria, Mexico, and Uganda, and their terms will be ending on the 31st of December 2010. On 1st January 2011, these countries will be replaced by India, Germany, Columbia, South Africa, and Portugal, and their term will end on 31st December 20126. Veto power and the issue over its reforms: It is the non-permanent members of UNSC along with United Nations that have raised their voices against the veto powers of the permanent 5 members; and the response from these 5 members has been outright rejection of any reforms that concern the veto rights7. This is evident in a transmittal letter addressed to the Secretary General in 2004 where it very clearly states that “I undertake to draw to your attention, however, that the members of the Panel disagree about the models put forth for Security Council expansion and the method for determining criteria for Security Council membership. Some members of the Panel believe strongly that only the model involving expansion of permanent membership, albeit without a veto will equip the Security Council to deal with the new century’s threats. Others believe equally strongly that the alternative model involving elected, long-term but non-permanent members is the better way to proceed”8. This response by the permanent 5 is not entirely unexpected, since it is well known that any amendment even the smallest of changes, made to the UN charter, need the ‘yes’ vote and ratifications of these P5 members. Making amendments would signify parting with such exclusive powers and becoming one of the many members of the UNSC. UN was created in 1945 “in a spirit of optimism fuelled by the end of the Second World War and the will to avoid a repeat of its horrors and those of its predecessor...Over the subsequent 60 years...the dynamics and tensions that led to the Second World War were laid to rest, war between the great Powers was avoided and a stable peace emerged in Europe. Japan, Germany and Italy were successfully integrated into the family of nations and are currently the second, third and sixth largest financial contributors to the United Nations”9. Besides these changes, there has also been the emergence of a large number of new states that became free from their various colonial rulers, during the second half of the last century; and this process of decolonisation changed UN completely and the starting number of 45 member states has now gone up to 192. Thus it is quite evident that with a large increase in the number of member states, and with shifting economic power, and political dynamics in the world after 1945, limiting the veto power to just 5 permanent member states, will not help in the smooth and effective functioning of the UNSC. Now it is necessary that we examine from a close quarter as to how each of the 5 members have used or misused this right to veto. Fig A: “Between 1946 and 1971, the Chinese seat on the Security Council was occupied by the Republic of China (Taiwan), which used the veto only once (to block Mongolias application for membership in 1955). The first veto exercised by the present occupant, the Peoples Republic of China, was therefore not until 25 August 1972. Only a minority of vetoes have been cast in cases where vital international security issues were at stake. 59 vetoes have been cast to block admission of member states. Additionally, 43 vetoes have been used to block nominees for Secretary General, although these vetoes were cast during closed sessions of the Council and are not included in the table above”10. In 1970 the American Ambassador Charles Yost cast the first U.S. veto vote in relation to a Rhodesian crisis 11(Stedman 1991). Again in 1972, U.S. cast a lone veto and blocked a resolution directed at the state of Israel, and after this we find that US has quite often used this veto power against any critical resolution against Israel12. Since 2002, after the application of the Negroponte doctrine for the veto on Israel and Palestine, UN general assembly and UNSC has been at constant loggerheads, and this quite evident during the Iraqi war when US used its power and veto rights to interfere in the Iraq-Kuwait war, by forcing the UNSC to override UN’s reservations and non-endorsement on this issue. The Soviet Union foreign affairs minister Vyacheslav Molotov, was responsible for the largest number of vetoes cast during the initial years of the UNSC. In fact he was nicknamed "Mr. Veto" in reference to the large number of veto votes that he had casted during his tenure. In the first 10 years there were 79 vetoes cast, of which USSR was responsible for 50%, and most of which were directed at stopping the entry of new members. These vetoes by the USSR were cast in retaliation to U.S.s constant refusal to officially recognise the Republic of Soviet Russia. However, after the breakdown of USSR, Russia has been more sensible in using its veto rights. UK and France used their veto powers to opt for a resolution on the 1956 crisis that arose from the issue of Suez Canal. However, they were forced to withdraw, after US again bullied the UNSC and forced the General Assembly to meet for an emergency special session under the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, and this finally led to the creation of UNEF I or the United Nations Emergency Force I (Assembly resolution 1001)13. UK has used the veto seven times in total, owing to the crises in of Rhodesia. France however has not much exercised its veto powers. In 1976 it used its veto rights over the issue of Comoros independence, when it retained its hold over the island of Mayotte, keeping in view the wishes of the local residents of Mayotte. France and USA came to loggerheads over the issue of Iraq war, when the former threatened to scuttle the resolution by using its veto rights. It also threatened to use its veto rights in support of Morocco during the west Saharan conflict. In 1955, Republic of China (the then representative of China) used the veto power once; to stop the Mongolian Peoples Republic from getting a membership in the UN, however had to back down in 1960, when USSR threatened to block the admission of all African countries into the UN, if Mongolia was not given entry. The Republic of China was expulsed from UN in 1971 and its place was taken by the Peoples Republic of China, which used its veto power in 1972 to block Bangladeshs entry into the United Nations. By 2008, Peoples Republic of China had used it veto rights 6 times; though experts feel that China prefers to ‘stay away’, rather than vote ‘no,’ in matters that do not concern it. Even a casual glance at the above analysis very clearly shows that the 5 permanent member states have blatantly flouted their ‘veto rights’, in issues that brought in some sort of personal interests and gains. Thus, it is very evident that this ‘veto rights’ in maximum number of cases have been misused for personal gains; or used to settle personal scores; and to block the entry of countries into the UN that had once defied any one of the P5 members. So, seemingly the five permanent members of the UNSC have managed to form a ‘closed privileged club’, that takes care of each other’s needs; and only helps countries which promise some sort of economic returns for them, while turning a blind eye towards the poorer countries. This was clearly seen when UNSC took quick measures to protect the oil rich Kuwait; while it simply turned a deaf ear towards Rwanda14, an economically weak country without any rich natural resources that would have served these P5 members. In the Kuwait issue, not only was a resolution passed by the veto rights issued by the permanent 5, where US and its allies could attack Iraq, but later after the war “Iraq was obliged to accept onto its territory teams of inspectors in search of weapons of mass destruction that were to be destroyed and/or removed. Iraq was obliged to accept international assistance for the housing, protection, and feeding of the segments of its population that had been subjected to and fled from gross human rights violations inflicted by the Iraqi government”15( Browne, CRS-3). UNSC remained unmoved during the Darfur crisis, when the Sudanese government brought in hired assassins and murdered thousands of ethnics of a particular community. The same lack of inactivity by UNSC was noticed during the Srebrenica mass murders, when Bosnians were killed in thousands, within a region purported safe by UNSC. Here experts clearly point out that the P5, have shown more interest in representing their own country’s interest, and it comes as a little surprise that these five members are also largest arms dealers, worldwide16. Keeping in view these unlawful activities perpetrated by the P5 that were gross violations of the UN charter, led to the UN member states to declare that they were not under any obligation to the UNSC, under provisions made in Chapter VII of the UN charter, thus making the entire UNSC body loose it validity/integrity. This declaration took place under UNSC resolution 1422 (2002), which was once again reinstated under the resolution 1487 (2003), which negated all the armed operations sanctioned by UNSC (under the purview of the International Criminal Court) for one year. The 2002 Resolution 1422 was based on Chapter VII of UN Charter, but it left out the part that contained any determination towards "a threat to the peace, a breach to the peace or an act of aggression" (UN Charter, Article 39) had occurred, and without this determination, the UNSC would not be able to act; thus decreasing the scope of its powers. It has been suggested that either ‘the permanent P5 must expand to include non-nuclear member states’17; or the ‘permanent member group must be abolished permanently’18. Conclusion The veto rights of the P5 has been much abused and misused by the P5, which is clearly evident from the above discussion. Thus, reforms are certainly necessary in order to break this cosy club of the privileged P5 with their exclusive veto rights, by either abolishing the seat of permanent members, or by expanding the number of seats into the permanent membership, so that all parts of the world have a true and fair representation. 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