In the first game, player 1’s best response is in UL where he gets 3 pay offs. This is his best response since 3>2. At the same instance, player B has his best response of 4 playoffs (4>3 and 3>2).In the first game, player 1’s best response is in UL where he gets 3 pay offs. This is his best response since 3>2. At the same instance, player B has his best response of 4 playoffs (4>3 and 3>2).In the second game. At the same point (UL), both players have their best responses. For player 1, 3 playoffs (3>2) while for player 2, 4 playoffs (4>0).Nash equilibrium exists when player 1’s best response is the same as that of player 2. At (UL), both players have their best responses.The Condorcet loser in the elections is candidate C. The results indicates that his percentage preference in orderings (CAB and CBA) are 25% (24% +1%). This is the lowest since that of candidate B is 33%.a. In a plurality formula the candidates would get their votes as A (15000); B (15500); C (14500); and D (5000). This is the sum of all the votes where each of the candidates is preferred over the rest. Candidate B would be favoured by the system and win with 15,500 votes. As shown by the figures, candidate A would be the runner-up with 15,000 votes.b. Runoff system.Total votes cast in the election are 50000. Therefore, none of the candidate makes it 40% of the votes (20,000). In a runoff, candidates A and B will be considered. Dropping candidate C would give 3500 votes to A, and 2500 to B as the second ranked. Dropping candidate D will then give 1500 votes to A, and none to B in the same way.The system will therefore favour candidate A, who will be the winner with 15000+3500+ 1500 votes. A total of 20,000 votes.