What is Qualia - Essay Example

What is Qualia? Introduction Also known as singular quale, Qualia is referring to the process of how we consciously experience things around us particularly on how things appear visually, how we perceive a sound or smell a scent (Koch, 2004). It simply means that the word ‘qualia’ is pertaining to our individual experiences with regards to the presence of sensations, feelings, perceptions, thoughts, or even the human desire. Since each individual will have different experiences on how each of us perceives an object, it is safe to conclude that the existence of qualia is basically a subjective experience. Therefore, it is not rational to question why each individual is expected to have different opinions after viewing the same object or listening to the same music. Aiming to know more about the study of qualia, the controversial issues behind qualia as argued by some of the famous philosophers will be examined followed by discussing how qualia is differed from the cognition and how life would be like in the absence of qualia. Prior to conclusion, the significance of qualia in our lives will be tackled in details. Controversial Issues behind Qualia Given that qualia is a subjective experience on how we perceive things around us, the concept of qualia has become a common point of disagreement. In line with this, some philosophers assumed that the essence of qualia is intrinsic in the sense that it is atomic, difficult to analyze and non-relational, private in the sense that any object that will be tested will not have the same result, incorrigible in the sense that to believe in something one has something is to have something, and non-physical or intangible (Dennett, 1991, 1988). Contrary to the concept made by Dennett, some philosophers consider qualia as something that are physical even though there is no clear explanation as to how qualia can be physical (Block, 2002; Nagel, 1974). One thing that is certain is that the introspective beliefs about a person’s qualia can easily be mistaken based on the point of view of scientific approach (Block, 2002). Other philosophers view qualia as visual experiences that are readily accessible for introspection, could vary without any variation in the representational contents being experienced by an individual, and are mental counterparts to visible objects such as shape, size, and colour. (Block, 1990; Peacocke, 1983) Aside from perceiving typical visual, smell, and sound representation, qualia can also be considered as a mental state related to the following: (1) bodily sensation such as the feeling of itchiness or stomach pain related to the feeling of hunger; (2) mood swings which includes the feeling of depression, happiness, and tension; and (3) felt reaction such as the feeling of delight, lust, love, grievances or fear (Haugeland, 1985, pp. 230 – 235). Although it is clear that the introspective beliefs regarding a person’s qualia can be easily mistaken due to the fact that each individual is expected to have different subjective experiences with regards to external stimuli; somehow I agree with the claim of Dennett (1988) that qualia is not physical since human experiences and feelings are non-visible qualities that are subjective by nature. As explained by Elliott (2009), light spectrum is consists of a range of wavelengths of electromagnetic radiation which we can transmit the light we see from our eyes into different colours. It simply means that colour does not really exists physically but only in the brain. In other words, it is the brain that technically defines a colour as opposed to the wavelengths of electromagnetic radiation (Sacks, 1996, Ch. 1). Likewise, the same concept applies to other sensory intervention in the sense that the brain that controls how a person would perceive the presence of internal and external stimuli. The Differences between Qualia and Cognition There are many people are confused with the differences between qualia and cognition. In line with this, several studies revealed that there are significant differences between qualia and cognition (Horgan & Tienson, 2002; Hubbard, 1996; Strawson, 1994). Cognition is referring to the process of processing information in the brain. Caused by sensory stimuli, the human experiences related to qualia are subjective rather than descriptive by nature (Raffman, 1993). Basically, human experiences that are descriptive in nature are not considered a part of qualia (Hubbard, 1996). Although qualia and cognition are being processed in the human brain, it remains a fact that cognition does not necessarily mean that external subjective sensory stimuli needs to be present in the process of cognition (Hubbard, 1996). In line with this, Strawson (1994) explained that human experiences may occur in many ways. For instance: It is possible for a person to suddenly thinking or remembering of something. With the given example, this type of experience is not similar to sensory experiences like images or sound. Similar to the position of Strawson (1994), Horgan & Tienson (2002) agree that there are some thoughts that have qualia. However, a distinctive type of experience such as the thought-related experiences is related more to cognition rather than qualia. In line with this, Strawson explained that “each sensory modality is an experiential modality whereas thought experience or understanding experience is an experiential modality to be reckoned alongside the other experiential modalities” (p. 196). Inverted and Absent Qualia ‘Isolated qualia’ are assumed to be either ‘inverted qualia’ or ‘absent qualia’ (Northoff, 2004, p. 127). Inverted qualia are possible due to problems related to neuronal functions of the brain such that a person with inverted qualia may perceive blue as green. In the case of inverted and absent qualia, the human brain is no longer integrated with the human body and environment (p. 128). Therefore, the human perception with regards to environmental stimuli cannot be perceived accurately. Based on cognitive science, human beings are being described computationally in the sense that our minds respond to our environment in an extraordinary subtle, adaptive, and specialized ways (Piccinini, 2004). Because of out mental capabilities to construct perception, memories, and intentions among others, cognitive science acknowledges that our mental capacities depend on neural mechanisms. Since the brain is considered as a computing mechanism (Piccinini, 2004; Fetzer, 2001; Globus, 1992), it is safe to conclude that there will be no function of the minds in the absence of brain. Created by the human brain, qualia exist in our mind. In the absence of qualia, it simply means that the human brain is no longer functioning. To avoid false representation of claims, issues related to qualia is being discussed after conducting a series of actual experiments that will support the claims of the philosophers. One of the most common topics that are being experimented is the absence of qualia. A lot of philosopher researchers have been conducting past experimental studies with regards to the case of robot. In line with this, the common question asked is that whether or not it is possible to create a robot in the future that has the capacity to create qualia given that robots do not have the qualities of a human brain? (Block, 2002; White, 1986) Considering that some of the modern robots are bilt with the capacity to perform a computational or functional role similar to that of the human beings, it is wrong to conclude that robots have qualia due to the fact that robots so not have the human brain which controls the human mind. Even if a robot has the capacilty to represent the physical properties that can be found in this world – including color, shape, and sizes; it is arguable that it is still not possible for robots to have qualia for the reason that representationism is merely a view of qualitative character of experience which has been pre-programmed identical to some representational content. Discussion The main objective behind the study of qualia is to enable us to have a better understanding on how we perceive things around us through our consciousness. Although the main objective of qualia is rational in making us more knowledgeable on analyzing the factors that could affect how a person would perceive something, it seems very difficult to perfectly achieve this goal since the study of qualia is focused on trying to analyze the personal experiences of each individual which is literally subjective by nature. The fact that the factors that could significantly affect each moments of our life are very broad adds up in making the concept of qualia more complicated. Qualia are referring to the human experiences caused by sensory input. As explained between the differences of qualia and cognition, we need to understand that not everything that is being processed in the human brain is directly related to qualia since there is a possibility that “furious activity in legions of cortical neurons will not be able to produce conscious percept” (Koch, 2004). For instance: There is a possibility for a person to remove his hand on stove even if he did not feel the heat coming from the hot stove. Upon analyzing the given example, it is purely a reflex action that made the person removed his hand from the stove and not the presence of sensory stimuli which is often being experienced consciously. Based on philosophical theory, mental states related to functionalism is often caused by the impact of stimuli, overt behaviour, and other inner mental states (Jacoby, 1990). When we talk about consciousness, it simply means that the person who is currently experiencing mental phenomena has decided to perform physical action in response to the sensory stimuli (Moody, 1986). In the case of the example we have discussed regarding the person who unconsciously removed his hand from the hot stove was done due to reflex action and not the will of the person involved in the given scenario. In other words, the experiential state of the person related to functionalism was not at all triggered by sensory stimuli per se. Based on this point-of-view, functionalism cannot be considered to have a direct relationship with qualia. Considering the fact that qualia is focused on analyzing the human experiences and feelings that are internal, subjective, and non-physical by nature; the concept of ‘explanatory gap’ on qualia was created to bridge the gap which is necessary to enable philosophers derive into a conclusion (Levine, 2000). With the presence of ‘explanatory gap’ some philosophers believe that it is possible to connect qualia-related issues that are not currently available in subjective and objective perspective. Conclusion Qualia are a subject that makes philosophers focus on trying to understand the nature of the human consciousness particularly on how we perceive the world. Since the human brain functions continuously even when we are sleeping, philosophers believe that qualia will always be present in the lives of human beings. In line with this, qualia are considered as an integral part of our daily lives since nobody can escape from experiencing qualia unless we are in a state of coma or death. This is the primary reason why people could dream while they are sleeping. As part of giving order to all information that is being processed by the human brain, the study of qualia enable us to predetermine how the brain will function even before the captured data passes through our senses. Even though cognition and qualia requires the necessary brain intervention in terms of processing the input we receive from the external stimuli, philosophers made it a point that there are evidences showing that cognition is totally different from qualia such that cognition does not require the presence of external sensory stimuli which is required in the case of qualia. Qualia are not always perfect. There are cases wherein problems with neuronal functions of the brain or the lack of integration between the human brain, body and environment could result to either inverted or absent qualia. Given that qualia are focused on analyzing the human experiences and feelings that are internal, subjective, and non-physical by nature; most of the modern philosophers are focused on establishing the study behind the ‘explanatory gap’ to enable them to improve the way they address sensitive issues related to qualia. *** End *** References Block, N. (1990). "Inverted Earth" Philosophical Perspectives, 4, Tomberlin, J. (ed). Northridge: Ridgeview Publishing Company. Block, N. (2002). The Harder Problem of Consciousness. The Journal of Philosophy , XCIX(8):1 - 35. Dennett, D. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. Dennett, D. (1988). Quining Qualia. In Marcel, A. & Bisiach, E. (eds) 'Consciousness in Contemporary Society'. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Elliott, L. (2009). Biotele. Retrieved August 20, 2009, from Magenta Ain't A Colour: http://www.biotele.com/magenta.html Fetzer, J. (2001). Computers and Cognition: Why Minds are Not Machines. 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