Parfits Spectrum and Sorites Paradox - Case Study Example

Parfit’s Spectrum and Sorites Paradox Introduction Parfit’s spectrum is based on three basic claims: the first oneinvolves a number of psychological changes, another–certain bodily changes, and the third–a series of both kinds of changes (Perry, 2008). On the basis of the first two claims, a personal identity does not depend on either psychological or bodily continuity is necessary for personal identity. In case the changes on a spectrum occur, a person on a left side could be identical with the person on the right side. These claims are too challenging and it takes time to realize the real essence of these claims. At the same time, we can remember of sorites paradox, when it was necessary to differentiate when a grain of wheat is turned into a heap. Parfit’s arguments Parfit suggests the following: “But this is not the case with the final spectrum. If both my entire body and my entire mind were replaced, well, I wouldn’t be around” (Goodenough 1996, p. 113). Derek Parfit goes even further in his considerations and separates the concepts of “identity” and “survival”.  The survival in accordance with Parfit, is present in case of a character possesses “character and apparent memories” (Ibid., p. 115). Sydney Shoemaker undermines these claims of Parfit and claims that someone can be considered as a surviving person in case his/her brain is transplanted into a new body, while this person “has [the original persons] character and apparent memories” (cited by Perry 2008). Parfit would rather claim that a person would survive, but as two different persons, which would not be clearly identical. Parfit correlates a concept of survival with a concept of a personal identity. Actually, Parfit is more focused on the ontological status of persons, which considers an option of fission. The theory of Parfit has been vividly discussed since 1970. This complex and a challenging nature of his theory should be considered in relation to the sorites paradox. This unusual perspective can help to open new prospects of Parfit’s theory. Let us focus on Parfit’s personal identity theory. The existence of a person is confirmed by Parfit. At the same time, “the persons do not have to be listed separately on an inventory of what exists” (Perry, 2008). It can be said that in the majority of cases persons are separated from their bodies and psychologies, but there is a certain frame of every person’s existence. It consists of brain and body and there is a number of connected series of mental and physical events. Parfit’s constitutive reductionism is based on these main principles. It is possible to illustrate this relation by the following example: there is a golden statuette of Oscar. In case gold melts down, Oscar will not exist anymore, but a piece of gold will. Thus, it is impossible to say that these pieces are identical. From another perspective, it can be surely claimed that a piece of gold constitutes the statuette. The same can be said about persons: they are constituted by their physiology or psychology, but are not identical with them for sure. Identification of a person with respect to Parfit’s considerations can be outlined in the following way: (i) human persistence is constituted by physical and/or psychological continuity; (ii) sometimes it is impossible to determinate a personal identity, because there is no a correct answer to the question: if a person has stopped living during a certain adventure; (iii) that what has a sound meaning in survival is psychological continuity; (iv) that personal identity relations must be coherent with the other formal features of identity (Goodenough 1996, p. 117). Consequently, a psychological continuity in accordance with Parfit is reached, when a person’s identity is continually correlated with one or more persons. Parfit makes an emphasis on the fact that psychological continuity with any consistent reason is meaningful in survival, and while the personal identity does not integrate only psychological continuity with any dependant cause, personal identity does not matter in survival. Sorites paradox in relation to Parfit Now, let’s proceed to the sorites paradox. It is a well-known strategy of a paradoxical arguments’ chain, which occur “as a result of the indeterminacy surrounding limits of application of the predicates involved” (Goodenough 1996, p. 116). Sorites paradox is focused on vagueness of some terms, such as “heap”, “bold” etc. Vagueness is determined in terms of this paradox as a different feature of syntactic categories other than predicates. Therefore, it is possible to correlate sorites paradox to names, adverbs, adjectives etc. Actually, Parfit bases his arguments of sorites paradox. This can be illustrated by vague categories of “fission” and “fusion”. Whether a person can survive or not­ is a dubious question. On the one hand, both of these extremes are possible, but on the other hand, Sorites would argue that it is possible to say: “worse than dead” or “better than survived” (Nozick, 1981). Identity of a person depends on his ability to find his “uniqueness factor”. Some persons can find it in physiology, others– in psychology. Anyway, human intuition is a determinant unique factor. Goodenough (1996) raised this problem of Parfit and sorites paradox and suggested some correlation mechanisms between these two ideas. This type of argument was called by Goodenough as the “Subtraction Argument”. It is relevant to illustrate this argument in the following terms: My body has i cells If I remove one cell, I am still me and my body is still alive If i-1 cells sustains my body, then i-2 cells sustains my body Therefore, no cells sustain my body, and consequently, me (Goodenough, 1996). Therefore, there is no need for bodies’ existence. The personal identity should be differentiated by a trivial difference, or must be a one-one matching. If a personal identity depends on a trivial difference, then it is something people hate intuitively. It is more effective to depend on one-one matching. Nevertheless, there is no chance in the world to find this type of matching. In this case, people have nothing more than to leave their absolute identity and be satisfied with a vague spot. From the psychological perspective, it is possible to measure this vague spot, but it is more interesting to measure it from a physical perspective. Generally speaking, a personal identification in accordance with Parfit raises many unresolved questions. How is it possible to measure a personal identity if to combine both psychological and physical factors? Whether these factors will be unique or not? Many other questions can also occur. To my mind, it is possible to decrease a vagueness of a personal identity concept if to correlate both psychological and physical factors. First of all, Parfit underlines that the survival of our intentions lays a very important role in our lives. Secondly, in accordance with Parfit people should avoid vague questions. Sometimes people select the question and the answer arbitrarily, but this is not helpful in a personal identification. Thirdly, Parfit has also been focused on a continuing relation between survival and death. To avoid vagueness of terms used in the process of a personal identification, it is relevant not to make binary choices. It is impossible to find an answer to a personal identification with the help of psychological or physical continuity model. Vice versa, there is a need to look for the answer on the basis of meshed factors. Physical continuity and psychological continuity are binary oppositions, outlining a frame of a personal identification. Even if the answer is found, it can be applied to a human being at a given moment of time. There are different background factors influencing our personal identification, such as approximity inherent in any world of interest, the actual world of empirical evidence etc. A correlation between sorites paradox or little-by-little argumentation can be considered a favorable background for a solution of a challenging choice of Parfit. Therefore, the case of a personal identification is structurally similar to ‘paradox of the heap’. For example, no one knows when a grain of wheat turns into a heap. There is no quality or quantity answer to that question. The same can be asked about ourselves: whether some changes influenced me and I am not me anymore…The answer to this question is rather stipulated and it cannot be definitely answered at all. Parfit claims that only memories matter. In case there is a sharp dividing line somewhere in our brains, then the psychological spectrum is changed and a person is already a different one. In any case, a changed person is “me”. Actually, the question “whether a person who results from some change to me is me” is an empty question and it can be answered only by stipulation. If, in any case, every person is me, then this is the most appealing answer. At the same time, we are avoiding an option of answer from the physical perspective. Therefore, people should make a Hobson’s choice: whether to depend on or psychological or physical condition. Neither of these options is appropriate to the fullest extent. A mixed view is a perfect option for a potential solution. A combined spectrum seems to be the only way out of this challenging situation. Two unresolved questions still remain: “there is a sharp dividing line somewhere in the combined spectrum, or sometimes there is no fact of the matter about personal identity, and the question ‘Is x the same person as y?’ is an empty question” (Goodenough 1996, p. 120). Parfit hopes that in case some changes occur in a person, then it is possible to find those situations, when it will be possible to say “yes” or “no” or even “yes and no. Parfit bases his arguments on two main criteria: the Psychological Criterion of personal identity and the Physical Criterion of personal identity, or any combination of the two criteria (Perry, 2008). People, who want to identify their personality and base their argumentation on these criteria, are propagating “reductionism.” It means that they think about people as creatures consisted of psychological connections or physical parts. These criteria can continue during a certain period of time and the person can continue over a certain period of time. It is evident that Parfit is not interested in finding the unique criterion of personal identity, but he rather claims that it is impossible to identify a personal identity. A possible solution The following argument can be suggested as an alternative interpretation of Parfit’s arguments: 1. We can suppose that it is impossible to determine if I am the same person as B. 2. It cannot be determined whether I see the same tree that B sees. 3. Then it cannot be determined if I see the tree. 4. Therefore, it can be claimed is I am the same person as B. From the perspective of Parfit, there is something that people do not and cannot understand, but these things are possible to occur. Nevertheless, people are in the constant search for something, which was considered to be impossible earlier. A person has nothing left, but to exist. Therefore, Parfit’s argument though correlated with sorites paradox, presents a perfect philosophical problem to be solved. It is possible to provide different arguments, but the beauty of this philosophical argument is in the absence of the only one correct solution. A correlation between Parfit’s argument and sorites paradox cannot be denied. Moreover, it was possible to find out a solution to Parfit’s problem basing on sorites paradox. A little-by-little argumentation enabled me to agree with Parfit that a personal identity can be identified basing on combination between psychical and psychological factors. A strong argument of Parfit is related to individuals and it is relevant to correlate his ideas to empirical evidences from the real world of every individual and find a possible solution. Works cited Goodenough, J. M. “Parfit and the Sorites Paradox Philosophical Studies”. Vol. 83 (1996) , pp. 113-120. Nozick, R. Philosophical Explorations. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1981. Personal Identity. Ed. John Perry. University of California Press, 2008. Read More