The Al-Qaeda Terrorist Organization - Essay Example

The Al-Qaeda Terrorist Organization The tragedy that befell the World Trade Center in New York and the United States as a country on September 11, 2001, now known as the 9/11 incident, had virtually made the al Qaeda a household name. Born in the aftermath of the ten-year resistance of combined Afghan and Arab forces against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1978 until its eventual defeat and retreat in 1989, al Qaeda is headed by the charismatic Saudi multi-millionaire Osama bin Laden. Al Qaeda had been previously linked to several terrorist activities in the past but it was the 9/11 incident that drove home the point: al Qaeda is not only a terrorist organization that has the capacity for global reach but it has no reservations in attacking helpless and unsuspecting civilians. The 9/11 created such a deep global impact that almost overnight, it virtually created a new breed of foreign, immigration and security policies not only of the United States but its allies as well. II What is al-Qaeda? Al Qaeda, which means “the base’, is an international terrorist organization that was born at the heel of the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan in 1989. It was created out of the remnants of Arab participation in the Afghan resistance against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan since 1978. As the defeated Soviets left Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden created al Qaeda to maintain the roster of mujahedins who participated in the resistance for future jihads. When bin Laden returned to Afghanistan in 1996 after he was driven out of Sudan through American pressure, he set up training camps for the training of Islamic militants under the noses of the hospitable Taliban. The group came under public glare in 1998 when it was linked to the bombing of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. It virtually became a household name however, after the suicide attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in September 11, 2001, an incident now known as 9/11 (Robinson 17). Al Qaeda’s advantage over other terrorist groups is its global reach. It is most noted for its use of suicide terrorism directed at multiple targets simultaneously. It is believed that the purpose of al Qaeda is religious – that is, the establishment of a caliphate in the Middle East. Some quarters believed however that its motivations are political and religion is a mere front concealing a goal geared at establishing global dominion. In 1998, bin Laden issued a statement urging all Muslims to kill Americans because of their occupation of the holy lands, their invasion of Iraq, and their oppression of the Palestine people (Robinson 17). Al Qaeda can both be regarded as a hierarchical terrorist organization and a network of loosely connected terrorist organizations. As a hierarchical terrorist organization, its operations are planned by a central body and as a network of terrorist organizations; it is a source of inspiration and practical support for many smaller groups with parallel goals (Robinson 17). III al-Qaeda Leaders A) Osama bin Laden. Osama bin Laden was born in 1957 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. His father Mohammed bin Laden was a construction magnate. The elder bin Laden had 11 wives, the last one of whom was Osama’s mother, and fifty-two children. When he moved from Yemen to Saudi Arabia, he developed close ties with the ruling family al-Saud as well as other affluent members of Saudi. His bin Laden Construction Corporation eventually grew and the bin Laden family established itself as the Rockefeller of that part of the world (Landau 27-29). In the 1990s, the bin Laden fortune was estimated to be worth $36 billion with diversifications into telecommunications, import/export and other businesses. Osama who,, like his brothers, was groomed to take his place in the family’s business, took up economics and management in Saudi’s finest university – King Abdul Aziz University. Like most wealthy young men, Osama spent his bachelorhood in bars, casinos and nightclubs in the cosmopolitan city of Beirut (Landau 30). However, Osama’s stint with the university opened his eyes to religious pursuits. Sayyid Qutb and Abdullah Azzam, both Islamic conservatives, his teachers in the Islamic course, introduced him to the connected worlds of politics and religion. Azzam was an advocate of jihad – or holy war - against non-Muslims. These teachers preached a return to core Islamic beliefs and against western influences (Woolf 29-30). When the Soviet Union invaded attacked Afghanistan in 1978, Bin Laden, who was twenty-two at that time, joined the Afghan resistance movement, called the mujahedeen, based in Peshawar, northern Pakistan. He helped raised the money to fund the movement and it was also during this time that Osama met Azzam again. A strong bond developed between them and together they formed the Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK, for short), with Osama acting as Azzam’s deputy (Woolf 36-37). The CIA backed the MAK movement as the Soviets were also the US’ enemy. Bin Laden used his family’s fortune to create a defensive network in Afghanistan, building roads through mountains, tunnels, hospitals, tents and other structures to help the resistance. His participation in the resistance earned him a legendary mark as news of a Saudi sheik visiting wounded fighters in hospitals, gifting them with cashew nuts and chocolates and generous checks for their families spread around (Woolf 37-44). In 1988, the Afghan war came to a close as the Soviets announced their retreat from the country. Bin Laden renamed the resistance headquarter Beit-al-Ansar to al-Qaeda (the Base) where he created a new administrative department to keep a database for MAK members (Woolf 44). In 1990, bin Laden returned to Saudi amidst news of another conflict as Iraq invaded Kuwait. Instead of relying on his aid to defend its borders, Saudi turned to the United States, allowing the latter to establish a base within its territory. Angered, bin Laden left for Pakistan and then shortly, to Sudan where he set up training camps for Islamic fighters under the al-Qaeda umbrella. From Sudan, bin Laden organized attacks primarily against American troops forcing Saudi Arabia to revoke his citizenship. In 1996, Sudan, upon US pressure, expelled him from its territory. Bin Laden was forced to return to Afghanistan, under the control at that time of the renegade government of Taliban. Later that year, bin Laden officially declared war against the Americans through an issuance called “The Declaration of Jihad on the Americans Occupying the Country of the Two Sacred Places (Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia)” (Piszkiewicz 108-109). Bin Laden’s well-ensconced hideaway in the Taliban-led Afghanistan made him and his organization inaccessible to the world (Piszkiewicz 111). B) Ayman al-Zawahiri. Ayman al-Zawahiri was born in 1953 in Egypt and was raised in Maadi, a well-off suburb in Cairo. He belongs to a family of professionals, however, Zawahiri did not lead a luxurious life as bin Laden. He did not own a car, for example. As a young boy, Zawahiri had a reputation as a shy, intelligent, well-read and polite student. However in 1967, at the age of 14, when the Arabs were defeated in the Six-day war with Israel, the disillusioned Zawahiri joined the Muslim Brotherhood (Clarke 158; Esposito 18; Coll 381). In 1974, al-Zawahiri graduated from medical school and proceeded to take up doctorate in medicine in Pakistan, a degree he finished in 1979 (Clarke 158). That year, he turned more radical and joined the extremist Islamic jihad, as a result of which he was implicated in the assassination of Anwar Sadat, Egypt’s president, in 1981. Although his participation in the assassination could not be directly established, the jihad cell he headed was linked to Gama’a al-Islamiyya known as a front for the banned Muslim Brotherhood. He was tried on charges of possession of firearms and was sentenced to three years in prison where he was beaten and tortured. After his release in 1984, he stayed briefly in Saudi Arabia and then to Afghanistan where he was introduced to Azzam and bin Laden (Esposito 19; Clarke 158). After the retreat of the Soviets in 1989 from Afghanistan, al-Zawahiri returned to Egypt and to his activities, integrating veterans from the Afghanistan-Soviet war into his organization. In 1992, he went to Sudan where he joined bin Laden and in 1996, to Afghanistan. The Egyptian court sentenced him to death in absentia for masterminding the Luxor incident where 59 tourists were massacred. His own organization was later merged with Al Qaeda to form a group called the International Islamic Front for the Jihad on Jews and Crusaders (Esposito 19-20; Clarke 158). It was believed that the more experienced, tougher al-Zawahiri exercised an intellectual, psychological and emotional influence over bin Laden and was responsible for widening the latter’s perspective of the jihad from the Arab world to the entire Muslim world. It was even suspected that he masterminded the 9/11 attacks as evinced by bin Laden’s dependence on his judgment and counsel. In his interviews, for example, bin Laden often turned to al-Zawahiri for counsel before answering vital questions (Coll 391; Esposito 20). C) Abu Yahya al-Libi. Abu Yahya al-Libi, also known as Hasan Qaiid and Yunis al-Sahrawi, first came into prominence when he escaped from Bagram Air Base, an American prison in Afghanistan on July 10, 2005 after his capture in 2002. His escape started his rise to prominence in the al Qaeda leadership and he is now considered a top strategist for the group, having appeared in several al Qaeda videos and publications. Al-Libi, who is believed to be of Libyan origin, studied Islam in Mauritania for two years after his stint in Afghanistan in the 1990s. Upon his return, Libi spent his time visiting camps and preaching Islam. In 2002, he was seized along with others and imprisoned in Bagram and his eventual escape helped create his reputation. Today, the US State Department ranks al-Libi as a top al Qaeda leader, strategist and top promoter of jihad (Duquid; Wanted Abu Yahya al-Libi; Moss & Souad). IV How Big is al-Qaeda? A book author once likened al Qaeda to a holding company. Peter Burgen, author of the book Holy War, Inc. noted that the pattern of the al Qaeda operations makes use of affiliation and outsourcing. Thus, although major operations are planned by the central committee, the actual dirty jobs were carried out by its local affiliates. These groups exist independently of al Qaeda but are connected to bin Laden or to his associates in one way or another. These loose patterns of affiliations make it hard to pinpoint the organization’s exact size. It is believed however that al Qaeda was built from 3,000 of the best of the 10,000 to 100,000 jihadists who took part in the training camps set up by bin Laden in the last ten years before 9/11 (Palmer 155). On the other hand, the physical infrastructure of the al Qaeda organization would be similar to that of an army or multinational corporation. Thus, it is expected that al Qaeda has divisions like recruiting centers, training camps, supply networks, communications centers, sleeper cells, weapon dumps, laboratories, safe houses, and a separate and secure quarter for the organization’s top hierarchy in addition to front organizations that take care of its propaganda activities and supply needs. This comparatively large size however makes it easy to identify al Qaeda and its components and easier to demolish them. Thus, after the attack of the US on al Qaeda’s camps in Afghanistan in 2001 to 2002, the latter was compelled to resort to its sleeper cell and other less obvious fronts to sustain its existence and activities (Palmer 173). On the financial side, the al Qaeda was known to have received money from charities, personal donations, and businesses, which are sympathetic to its cause. In addition, of course, is the bin Laden fortune. However, the real money purportedly came from its sympathizers from oil-rich countries like Saudi and Kuwait. The billion dollar narcotics trade of Afghanistan is likewise allegedly another vital source not only for al Qaeda and the Taliban but also for bin Laden who reportedly takes a ten percent cut from it (Chauhan 278-279). There is however, a view that since 2002, after the US attacks against al Qaeda lairs, only a handful of jihadists, at the most 200, remain in the al Qaeda network and the organization has become disorganized and not the purported global menace operating in 60 countries. The Power of Nightmares, a BBC three-part mini-series likewise claimed that the bin Laden legend is largely exaggerated and was largely made up to justify the so-called war on terror (Clark 179-180). V Major al-Qaeda Attacks The 1993 truck bomb attack on World Trade Center. On February 26, 1993, a bomb exploded in the parking lot of the World Trade Center in New York. The casualties: six dead people and 700 injured. The bomb, 1,100 lbs of it, was borne on a vehicle and the resulting explosion ripped through three levels of the garage and started a fire. A piece from the exploded truck was recovered and led investigators to the trail of Sheik Omar Abdel al-Rahman, an Egyptian cleric with close ties to Al Qaeda (Bolz et al 256). The 1996 attack on the Khobar Towers in Dhahran. The Khobar Towers in Dharan, Saudi Arabia served as barracks for US Air Force personnel and other foreign military servicemen who participated in the war against Iraq in the 1990s. In the evening of June 25, 1996, a large fuel truck was seen being parked near Building 131, its occupants jumping out hastily and into a waiting car. The immediate evacuation of the building’s occupants did not however stop the death of nineteen Americans and the injury of hundreds, the explosion creating an 80-foot crater estimated to have been caused by twenty thousand pounds of TNT (Gertz 9). The 1998 bombing of the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. In February of 1998, after bin Laden issued a fatwa urging all Muslims to kill Americans, al Qaeda started preparations for the bombing of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. These activities ceased by March and al Qaeda operatives left Tanzania and Kenya, leaving the few who would actually execute the plan and clear the last traces of the several months’ activities. On August 7, 1998, simultaneous explosions occurred in the embassies killing hundreds (Sundara 105-108). The 2000 Attack on the USS Cole. On October 12, 2000, a small boat carrying explosive device sidled alongside the USS Cole, a US Navy destroyer, and detonated a bomb, killing as a result 17 crew members and injured 40 more after it ripped open the ship’s side. The attack was said to be personally planned by bin Laden (9/11 Commission Report 190-191). The 2001 suicide attacks on WTC. On September 11, 2001, four commercial airplanes all departing from US cities were boarded by al Qaeda suicide operatives, commandeered while in flight and forced to veer away from their destination points. Two of them were forced to fly to New York and crashed against the World Trade Center towers. Another plane was ran into the Pentagon building while another was intentionally downed before reaching its destination as passengers fought for control of the plane from the hijackers. More than three thousand perished in the incident and the WTC twin towers were razed to the ground and a part of the Pentagon building was burned (9/11 Commission Report 190-191). The 2001 gas explosion in a Tunisian synagogue. In April 2002, a truck filled with butane gas smashed into a Jewish synagogue in the island of Djerba, Tunisia. The island is a popular tourist and pilgrimage destination of the Jews. Seventeen people were killed and the name Islamic Army for the Liberation for Holy Places, a known al Qaeda pseudonym, claimed responsibility (Kushner 185-186). The 2002 bomb explosion in Bali. The October 12, 2002 bombing in Bali, Indonesia is considered to be the second largest terrorist act after the 9/11 attacks. The casualties included 200 dead, many of whom were Australians, and scores injured. Moreover, Bali’s reputation as a prime tourist destination also became a casualty. Although the bombing was attributed to Jemaah Islamiyah, authorities see the hands of al Qaeda behind the attack (Salim et al 103). The 2003 explosions in Istanbul. Four bombings occurred in Istanbul on November 15 and 20, 2003. The first was in two Jewish synagogues and the second in the HSBC Bank and the British consulate. Fifty-eight people were killed all in all while 750 others were injured (Feldman & Shapir 53). The 2004 Madrid Attacks. In the morning rush hour of March 11, 2004, several bombs planted in commuter trains exploded one after another in the city of Madrid. The casualties included among others 190 people dead (Enders & Sandler 251). VI The United States’ Response to Al Qaeda The US’ response to al Qaeda only became palpable to the public after the 9/11 attacks. The response came in two shapes: military and legislation. Militarily, the US and its allies decimated the al Qaeda lairs in Afghanistan and legislatively, the US enacted laws and adopted policies to guarantee a repeat of the incident that shocked the world. On September 20, 2001, just nine days after the attacks on the US, the creation of the Homeland Security Council was announced which was tasked to coordinate all agencies relevant to a speedy response to 9/11 (9/11 Commission Report 327-328). In November of the following year, the Homeland Security Act was formally passed creating the Department of Homeland Security entailing the biggest government reorganization in years. It abolished some departments and merged 22 government agencies and 170,000 government employees. The Act specifically prohibited internal investigation of the Inspector General into its affairs (Burgess 2003). On the immigration front, a total of 768 aliens were detained as “special interests” and denied bond until they were cleared of any involvement in the 9/11 attacks. They were all eventually cleared except for eight persons (9/11 Commission Report 327-328). This saturation drive against foreign-born nationals started immediately days after the 9/11 incident as the Immigration and Naturalization Services amended the detention limit of foreign nationals from 24 hours to 48 extendible indefinitely (Romero 72-74). The beginnings of the PATRIOT Act began to take shape that same month with the removal of the barrier that precluded information sharing between intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The following month, the PATRIOT Act was enacted into law (9/11 Commission Report 328). It stands for Uniting and Strengthening America by Promoting Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act and it details secret searches, telephone taps and internet usage that the government may invoke in the name of national security. It also provides for the limitations of movements by foreign nationals within the country and allows the government to detain and deport aliens suspected of engaging in terrorist activities without the benefit of trial. It also mandates banks to check the identities of aliens who open accounts (Furnam 42-46). On September 13, the USA demanded Pakistan’s help against al Qaeda or else suffer the country’s wrath by ceasing giving support to bin Laden, stopping oil shipments to the Taliban, giving the US and its allies landing rights and allowing them to conduct operations against al Qaeda within its borders, and, once Taliban is implicated in the 9/11, breaking off diplomatic relations with it (9/11 Commission Report 331). The US also launched operation “Enduring Freedom” an attack against Afghanistan both in the air and on the ground beginning December of 2001 (9/11 Commission Report 337-338). VII Conclusion The advent of the international terrorist organization al Qaeda has made quite a global stir in part because of the audacity in which they executed their attacks, particularly the 9/11 incident, and in part because of the targets which they choose to hit. Al Qaeda’s method of terrorism thrive on the most daring, the boldest and the most horrific – simultaneous multiple attacks on the most defenseless of people. Whether or not al Qaeda remains a threat today or has been rendered innocuous by events following the 9/11 incident, the fact remains that it has to date done the most horrendous and appalling deed in contemporary times – made more so because of the vulnerability of the target and its seeming remoteness to armed conflict. Works Cited 9/11 Commission Report. http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf Bolz, Frank Kenneth J. Dudonis, and David P. Schulz. The counterterrorism handbook: tactics, procedures, and techniques. CRC Press, 2005. Burgess, Susan. Immigration the Easy Way. Barton’s Educational Series, 2003. Chauhan, S. S. The Al-Qaeda Threat. APH Publishing, 2003. Clark, William. Petrodollar warfare: oil, Iraq and the future of the dollar. New Society Publishers, 2005. Clarke, Peter Bernard. 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