Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam - Term Paper Example

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Terrorism has been defined by many researchers as the systematic use of terror as a means of achieving control mainly through coercion. It has to do with people or groups of people that intend to use fear as a means of achieving their goals. This is mainly through religious organizations, political and ideological platforms provided their goals are met and substantiated (Gambetta 59; Hoffman 19). The term terrorism is mainly linked to al-Qaida and other Islamist groups that are against western influence within their regions of influence. However, looking deeper into the issue, one realizes that there are other groups that were formed before Al-Qaida and may have been the source of inspiration. One such group is the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) which has been in existence since 1976 (McConnell 60). This is one of the groups that have held a long struggle with coercion being its most imperative means of attaining control as they seek to regain control over the Tamil and cease the continued pressure exhibited by the Sri Lankan government to end its reign (Joshi 22). The report herein will look at the way this group has continued to kill and maim its enemies in a bid to control the area north of Sri Lanka, separating it into the Tamil Eelam state. History. LTTE was formed in 1976 under the command of Velupillai Prabhakaran. It consisted of a very lethal and well disciplined force that was headquartered in the Wanni region, north of Sri Lanka. It even had its own military contingent complete with an army, the air wing, and the navy. It has a significant terrorist infrastructure for disseminating propaganda and quite a subtle way of raising funds to support its operations. With a navy force in place, it could procure and ship goods into and out of the country without any interference from the government as they controlled a vast secured area. The group boasted of an elaborate network of checkpoints and informants who were tasked with keeping in touch with any new persons within their sphere of influence (Swamy and Narayan 4; Katz 16). The main reason for the formation of the group was secession. However, the precursor to this was the formation of a militant student body that was in protest of the continued limitation of Tamil students into the university by the government; this was in 1970. Within a short period, however, the group disappeared only to begin launching overt attacks and conducting terrorist activities in the larger Sri Lanka (Katz 1; Joshi 23). With time, the original group split into other factions though all had a common goal: create a separate Tamil state. However, the constitution published in 1972 created a fertile ground for attacks as the Tamil factions saw it as being largely anti-Tamil. This spurred the Tamils into action, and thus joined in the fight. In 1983, countrywide clashes with the Sinhalese that left thousands of Tamils dead saw the rise of the LTTE and the fight against the Sri Lankan government began (Swamy and Narayan 8; McConnell 61). Structure. As noted hereinabove, the LTTE had quite an elaborate command structure with almost all parts of a full government. They had a well organized leadership that was structured along two tiers: the military and the political wings. There was a governing committee whose role was to oversee the running of both wings that was headed by Prabhakaran. This is the body mandated with controlling and directing several of the group’s subdivisions such as the airborne group, the navy and the elite fighting wing. They also had a suicide commando unit and an intelligence unit aimed at gathering intelligence (Swamy and Narayan 12). They even had an international secretariat within the governing committee that was in charge of all global networks and communications. There was a truce in 2006 from the government after an onslaught carried out by government military, and this gave them a leeway to increase their strength by recruiting more than 11,000 guerrillas to increase the cadre. All the recruits had been indoctrinated to believe that they were fighting against an indiscriminate enemy that has no mercy on the people of Tamil in particular, and should thus show no mercy when they come in touch with them (McConnell 64). They even used tactics such as swallowing the cyanide pill that would be tied to their necks in case they were captured and were expected to fight to the end without any fear of the enemy. They were all sold the idea of martyrdom for the sake of their state’s liberation (Joshi 25). They were expected to observe a high form of discipline, determination, dedication and be highly motivated and innovative. They took bulldozers to act as their armored vehicles and had cadres for men, women, boys and girls with specific duties (McConnell 65). Women were assigned duties in the kitchen and medical camps. Children were recruited to offset the increasing shortage of manpower owing to casualties and increased conflict. Training was held over a four-month period with training ranging from handling crafts, communication devices, weapons and intelligence gathering (Swamy and Narayan 13). Problems arising from the LTTE’s Dominion in Northern Sri Lanka. Suffice to say that by 1980, the LTTE had made it clear that it was the sole representative of the Tamil people and that any enemy would be killed on sight. This led to a huge struggle that led to the LTTE to use terrorist tactics to win the hearts of the Tamil people and wage war on their enemy, the Sinhalese-led government. Since their springing, the LTTE has led an onslaught of millions of people with those killed, while defending it were countless. It engaged child recruitment and gender-based discrimination that saw women fit into the army; they were trained as hard as the men, and that was seen as a way of hardening them (Katz 18-19; McConnell 68). They also targeted and killed top government officials amongst them a former Indian Prime Minister, a Sri Lankan president and top government aides in the country. This was carried out by the suicide commandos’ subdivision within the large contingent of the military. They became a feared and revered outfit in the whole of Sri Lanka and gave some inspiration to other freedom fighters within Asia (McConnell 64). They gave them a reason to indulge in lawlessness as a means of getting the government to accept their demands as well as make their demands be respected and attained whether by spilling blood or through a coup. However, their activities led to the disorientation of livelihoods in the north (Katz 21). People had to fear and support the group as a way of showing their solidarity with the movement. Women often regarded as weak, were forced to prove their worth by getting involved in the war (Joshi 25). Instead of offering solace to the people of Tamil origin, they instilled fear and a sense of violence that was aimed at aiding them to achieve what they thought were the interests of the larger Tamil sub-tribe. Their leaders used the discrimination leveled against them by the government as oxygen to fire-up the irate Tamils and gain their support against the government (Swamy and Narayan 22). Though suppressed in 2009, the damage done within the three decades of existence has been worrying. The main aim of the LTTE was to create social solidarity by turning this into a militant outfit. Its main political agenda was to get a free state in the north that would be free of the Sri Lankan interference. This brings about one of the most debated issues on democracy versus domestic terrorism. People believe that these two are connected but others are of the opinion that their intricate relationship does not mean they are applicable and part of everyday life. Instead, they should be weighed and determined based on the methods that they use to achieve that which a reasonable and rational person would term as democratic (Katz 21). Researchers have found that terrorism dealing with a state that has had a high degree of political freedom was on the increase especially in the 1980s and the 1990s. Suicide bombings killed India’s Prime Minister Sri rajiv in 1991 and Sri Lanka’s president Premadasa in 1993 (Joshi 29). These are just the most high profile leaders to have borne the brunt of the terror attacks. They became accustomed to wearing vests full of explosives; tactics that have been made a common trend by militant groups such as the Hamas, AL-Qaida and Hezbollah in Palestine and Afghanistan (Gambetta 64; Katz 24). This is a similar trend that the Taliban used against American soldiers during their fight against the Islamic regime. The fight for democracy has for a long time been leveled along the lines of war, coercion and assassinations. The issue of terrorism is seen to play a considerable role in giving the impetus to such hideous acts which need to be repressed as a way of maintaining peace. However, most governments give up on the aspect of dialogue and diplomacy as they seek to regain their territory and their right to rule. Military fighting has always led to severe casualties as people look for ways through which they can retain control over the areas they perceive to be theirs by right (McConnell 70). The LTTE used their numbers to blockade much of the northern territory and utilize the available resources to make the government submit to their demands. They killed, maimed and tortured just to send the message home. They killed about 8,000 fellow Tamils who were considered to be traitors or government informants (Katz 58). They bombed villages, attacked towns and stalled developments as they concentrated on fighting the government. They engaged in illegal trade to gain access to firearms and military weapons (Hoffman 29). They also received funding from opulent Tamils living abroad and who were in support of the LTTE’s agenda. They had global networks that included investments in real estate, mining industry, hospitality, shipment sector and media with control of large charitable organizations funded by Tamils in the Diaspora. Force and coercion were also other means of collecting money (McConnell 72). Having seen the unruly behavior of the LTTE, there is a need to regulate such interferences into state functionality. As people get closer and become acquainted to each other, democracy states that people should work from one front rather than from a divided perspective. The Sri Lankan government launched a key offensive on the group and this saw its end with their leader Prabhakaran killed and cremated before any independent autopsies or medical examinations could be done. More leaders of this militant outfit were killed and this led to the disintegration of the LTTE. The people felt hopeless and thus surrendered to the government and peace has relatively been achieved in the country and especially in the Northern part (Swamy and Narayan 25). COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICIES The U.S has a bureau of counter terrorism (CT) which aims at providing a leeway for the forging of partnerships with non-state actors and foreign governments as well as multilateral organizations as a means of advancing anti-terrorism objectives in the country. This is what has led to the war against terrorism that was launched by the Bush administration and which led to the overthrow of the Iraqi regime under Saddam Hussein (Purpura 45). It is aimed at creating strategies that will lead to the capture of the leaders or completely eliminate foreign threats both within and without the U.S borders. This is what countries have been toying around with as an idea of dealing with terrorist factions within their borders (Pape 6). Each creates its own rules based on the social-economic platforms and the political leanings in matters such as these. For instance, Iran is completely opposed to the help that the U.S is according to the Israelis in regards the war against Palestine and Hezbollah militias. The UK and France, on the other hand, are also supporting any offensive that will bring peace to the troubled Gaza region. These leanings are common everywhere and Sri Lanka was no option (Purpura 48). When peace truces were rejected or eventually backfired, the LTTE did not care about the outcomes. It wanted its demands to be respected and fully satisfied (McConnell 72). However, the government had other opinions. They wanted either peace or complete dismantling of the militant outfit. They had the rights of the innocent people that had been butchered for having conflicting opinions and wanted to ensure that democracy was not overruled by autocracy (Abrahms 86). Protection of human rights by ensuring that national security and public safety were taken into consideration was a critical attribute altogether. However, what triggers people to accept military invasions to areas under militia control? Is it the fear for their safety or the CT objectives devised by those in power? For instance, the twin attacks on 9/11 were enough reasons for the CT measures to be legislated, passed and implemented within the shortest period (Pape 8). The Sri Lankan government took more than 3 decades to react to the LTTE menace. Were the twin attacks the result of the hurried passing of terrorism bill in the US? There is an array of speculations on that. Getting back to the issue at hand, the Sri Lankan government had tried to no avail to win over peaceful negotiations with the LTTE. They had tried severally but failed owing to the hard-line stunts pulled by LTTE commanders and more so Prabhakaran. There were peace talks held in 1985 but no headway was made (McConnell 62). In 2002, there were fresh attempts, and this led to a four-year truce and a ceasefire. In 2006, the two parties affirmed that the truce was to last for four years only for LTTE to emerge fiercer after using the truce period to regroup and recruit more militias (Pape 10). They led a series of attacks in the spring of 2006 and there were consistent fights between the government military and the LTTE militia. This is when the 2009 retaliation was seen as the best way out. The 30-month operation led to the fall of the LTTE administration and secure base as the government launched an offensive that saw the death of top commanders and leaders in the LTTE hierarchy (Swamy and Narayan 96). Maybe that is the best way of protecting the nation from such intolerable acts. Nevertheless, is that what human rights protection is all about? Truth be told, any military onslaught affects both the guilty and the innocent. There is no prescribed method that they can be distinguished from the other but sometimes nations and governments, no matter how democratic they claim to be, will always agree with a full throttle kind of attack that expresses the might of the government and weaken the bases and beliefs held about or by the militias (Pape 12). Policies are thus a direct impetus of the situation at hand had the government not led the military attack, probably; Sri Lank would be grappling with more innocent deaths than it is at the moment. Furthermore, the cries of the people will have to be taken into consideration to help integrate the Tamils into the system rather than provide temporary truce and lead an eternity of discrimination towards them. They deserve to be recognized as a part of the country and issues that led to the emergence of such headliners as Prabhakaran to take advantage of the new found loyalty and bring them back on board (Abrahms 87). Therefore, policies are only good if they place the interests of all citizens in the front line with everything being done to bring the country together. Works Cited Abrahms, Max. What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy. International Security 32 (4) (March 2008): 86–89. Print. Gambetta, D. Making sense of suicide missions. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Print. Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. New York City: Columbia University Press, 1998. Print. Joshi, Manoj. On the razor’s edge: the liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Studies in conflict and terrorism, 19 (1996): 19-42. Print. Katz, Samuel M. At Any Cost: National Liberation Terrorism. Twenty-First Century Books, 2004. Print. McConnell, D. The Tamil people's right to self-determination. Cambridge Review of International Affairs 21 (1) (2008): 59–76. Print. Pape, Robert A. The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. American Political Science Review, 97 (3) (2003): 1–19. Print. Purpura, Philip P. Terrorism and homeland security: an introduction with applications. Thousand Oaks, CA: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2007. Print. Swamy, M. and Narayan, R. The Tiger Vanquished: LTTE's Story (1 ed.). London: Sage Publications Pvt. Ltd, 2010. Print. Read More