The processes of WTO dispute-resolution are biased against these countries. Developing countries lack resources that will help defend them against rich countries’ complaints. The threat of a complaint compels them to settle disputes in favour of transnational organizations and against the interests of many people. The dominant governments often take their signals from influential industry consortia that include Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue (Costantini 2013). It exerts an inconsistent influence on the organization’s decision-making, much stronger than many governments of poor countries. The U.S and other powerful countries are the main financiers of the WTO. It simply implies that they will have a big say in the affairs of the organization.
Liberalizations of trade have involved adjustment costs for developing countries and LDCs. Preference erosion has been onerous for small countries. Even though preference erosion is not new, what strikes now is the level to which preference erosion is dominated by policy consensus that views the process as unavoidable and desirable (Heron 2013). Trade liberalization has succeeded in opening up foreign markets, something that has left developing countries’ market vulnerable to the domination of Western agricultural markets.
Liberal theorists say that there is an irresistible and unmistakable trend in favor of global governance thus reflecting interdependence and willingness of nations to participate engage in collective actions. Nevertheless, global governance is an emerging process, not an established system. The Bretton Woods system originally supervised the economy of the world through the upholding of stability in exchange rates. The system broke down as floating exchange rates were replaced by fixed exchange rates. The breaking down of floating exchange rates started the process where Bretton Woods’s institutions caused economic liberalization (Heywood 2013).