He explains that a lot of failure is often attributed to the use of external interventions that do not recognize the nature of issues on the ground.
The best strategy for resolving civil wars is through the effective analysis of the causes and the political and economic demands on both sides. It is also useful to engage such wars through a carefully selected team of representatives and institutions that both sides may clearly engage and understand. In the event the external forces are deployed, like the U.N. or NATO, their presence in the scene need to recognize the limits that are acceptable to the parties and they must be accompanied by relevant political agencies. If interventions are defined in terms of human rights like those that the Bush administration did in Iraq and Afghanistan, the percussions might be inconsistent because other nations are already sharply divided on their approach to international law and humanitarian assistance discourses and theory.
James Kurth is very categorical of the imperatives for dialogue and deployment of forces as a solution to civil war. He particularly hails the necessity for effective selection of the forces that can ever intervene in a conflict and their credibility in the estimation of the actual wrangling factions. Suffice it to say, civil war erupt within a historic and economic context that must be yielded if a solution could ever be attained in addressing them conclusively.
The Syrian situation is one that is unique and involves complex international and diplomatic nexus. Nevertheless, the United States after the war in Iraq and Afghanistan have lost important credibility in its international standing as a super power. The Iraq and Afghanistan have led to a considerable contestation of the basis of America’s international hegemony as a super power. If America will intervene in Syria, it might take a different form rather than official national deployment of forces. On this basis, the U.S. can supply the