He further made clear that the region remained of interest to the U.S and that any force trying to take control over it would be dealt with through all appropriate means including the use of the military (Roskin & Berry, 2010).
In order to protect the Persian Gulf, the Carter administration built the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), whose mandate was to increase the naval presence of the U.S in both the region and the Indian Ocean. RDF combined troops from the Army, U.S Navy, Marine, and Air Force to carry out operations in this region without necessarily depending on U.S allies. In the event of a conflict, The Commander of RDF sent an army of approximately 200 soldiers or 250, if the mission was in a remote area. General P.X Kelly first held the position (Colucci, 2012).
Due to lack of a clear and single communication channel, tension rose within RDF since its commander could not communicate directly to the Secretary of Defense. However, on 24 April 1981, a separation of commands was done which saw RDF given definite geographic tasks. Since it did not involve friends of the U.S in its operations, RDF caused a lot of destruction to property and death of people in the region that brought President Carter’s administration under severe criticism.
One of the effects of these diplomatic efforts was that they ensured continuous supply of oil from the region for both American and Europe. With this supply of oil, American embarked on an extensive period of economic growth. However, despite its economic benefits, the doctrine had severe long-term effects on the U.S relations with the Middle East (Colucci, 2012). The doctrine required a lot of investment in security architecture to ensure continued supply of oil. For instance, during the Iran-Iraq war in 1980’s, tankers transporting oil to foreign countries in the region had to put on U.S