nous people, or women start to win significant seats, legislative dynamics transform since newcomers may require scarce political resources that certain class of people controls. For instance, in case of a political party, the incumbents have incentives to limit the newcomers from accessing the resources because they want to protect their personal interests. In turn, the new group is locked out of the legislative process in the sense that they are not fully incorporated. The authors assert that newcomer groups like women are denied full representation via different means. For instance, traditionally dominant group use chamber-level constraints to frustrate the newcomers in the sense that they are challenged to get seats proportionally to their numbers in the house or chamber. Other methods traditional dominant groups use to sideline women in legislature include control over committee assignments where the party leaders decide who fills the seat, legislative experience, party ideology, individual-level and party-level constraint, and structure of the committee system.
In this paper, the authors discuss the existence of inequality in Latin America. The authors argue that the traditional question of the discipline regarding the distribution of power and resources still haunts the continent. This is because the question of who gets what and why has never been answered. The authors assert that in Latin American the allocation and distribution of services, goods, and basic opportunities is unequal since some few individual control the resources. The authors have discovered that the inequality that exists in Latin America is a problem created by the continents leaders since top 5% of the Latin American income ladder gets twice the comparable share of their OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) partners while the bottom gets half of what they would in those same countries. In turn, this distributive model has led to marginalization of some