Lebanon and Syrian Civil Wars - Essay Example

LEBANON AND SYRIAN CIVIL WARS Introduction Right from the year 1975 to the year 1990, the republic of Lebanon endured one among the foremost extended and bloody civil wars of the 20th century (Horowitz 2008, 215). Whereas the state of Lebanon inspired forgiveness and political associations, established sectarian elucidations of the conflict through sects of deceased leaders, activists and intellectuals, galvanized by the instance of truth as well as reconciliation campaigns in several elements of the world. This advanced the concept that tackling and basic cognitive process of the war was important for political as well as cultural rejuvenation. Through associate degree analysis of various cultural constructions, the conflict that passed off throughout the war has helped in Lebanon’s healing method (Horowitz 2008, 217). In Syria, President Bashar Al- Assad took power in the year 2000 immediately after the death of his father Hafez that had dominated Syria right from 1970. President Assad hastily dotted hopes of political reforms, as the power remained targeted within the ruling family, and therefore the system of one party gave few avenues for political opposition. With lack of nonviolent transfer of leadership since the Fifties, amendments will only happen solely through a military coup or a well-liked struggle. This report, will explain the similarities and differences of the civil wars in Lebanon and Syrian states in the Middle East and their roles in bringing political reforms in the respective nations. Comparing the civil wars of Syria and Lebanon The vicious loop of enhanced sectarian attitude, escalating sadism and out of doors support has up to now, prevented any serious attempts to resolve the conflict between the war-ridden factions in the Syrian nation (Leenders & Heydemann 2012, 142). The government and the opponent deny one another as conflict partners in an exceedingly competitive struggle however regard each other a vital enemy to tumble or destroy. Anassessmentof Lebanon provided that sectarian as well as ethnic identities had changed into settled markers for violence and thrown the nation into a destructive war (Sambanis 2004, 823). The main issue is if a power-sharing approach that resembles the one efficiently employed in Lebanon can be suitable in making sure the war in Syria is ended. Opponents to the idea the application of the Lebanon model to Syria argue that the two nations that are characterized by social compositions of a sectarian nature have administrative arrangements that are incommensurable (Ghosn & Khoury 2011, 381). The area is the foundation of the three most common monotheistic religions in the world: Christianity, Judaism and Islam. Tribalism, orthodox and heretical denominations continue to pressure the cultures of Syria and Lebanon (Ziadeh 2006, 131). Under the Ottoman control (1516–1918) and followed by the French consent (1920- 1946), tribal communities more and more fashioned social units and acquired influence as political players. The semi colonial divide‐ and‐rule policyof the French encouraged ethnic minorities that assisted them to confront the nationalism of Arabs dominated by Sunni Muslims (Fildis 2011, 54). After attaining autonomy, Syria and Lebanon have demonstrated varied distinguished resemblances as far as content development as well as politicization of social identities are concerned notwithstanding their administrative models. Up to mid twentieth century, a strong categorization in the undeveloped rural areas, peripheral and the central town demonstrated an economic and social divide that in most instances was in collision with ethnic associations (Batatu 1999, 42). In the sixties, the country was at the forefront of development politics associated with the party of Baath and President Fu’ad Shihab in Lebanon at some point sought to make sure that the areas that were marginalized could catch up at a fast pace. Numerous infrastructural reforms, mechanized farming structures as well as enhanced educational systems activated the peripheral societies and connected them to overall development of the country. An incidental effect was the great natural exodus together with the urbanization process that led to an increase of the shantytowns and suburbs (Batatu 1999, 46). The made the peripheral societies to develop direct contacts and as a consequence, resulted in competition with the urban societies that were more established while constantly resenting the peasant immigrants (Khuri 1975, 67). A partial process of modernization was not able to be effective in the dissolution of the old bonding and communities continued being unified socially through endogamy, which was a family law in both countries that received its instructions from intellectual systems that prevent interdenominational marriage arrangements. Solidarity founded on the community networks was dominant in Lebanon mainly because the nation did not nurture the creation of institutions and a modern approach to paperwork (Hazran 2010, 522). In Syria, nevertheless, the state diluted such networks, though found their re-introduction within near the beginning of 2000s (Leenders & Heydemann 2012, 147). Clientelism, discrimination and corruption control access to possibilities, economic resources and authority in each of the countries. In a very vicious loop, the idea entrenches a scarcity of transparency and accountability for universal welfare of the state that successively, enhancesocietal solidarity. In all the two nations, the phenomenon of rural to urban migration and the coming of new people created dichotomies with powerful character of ethnicity. Kurds, Alawites as well as the Druze in the Syrian nation and the Shiites found in Lebanon established their settlements in the growing urban centres where they dominated some of the quarters. Political mobilization based on sects that occurred in Lebanon in the 1970s; still receive a covering by biased dichotomy. Nevertheless, it immediately disintegrated into unions based on sects defined by militias who were Muslims and Christians that was very evident during the civil war. Mocking the Shiites as the ones with a tail is still very popular in Lebanon and this alludes to the rural background marked as uncivilized (Hazran 2010, 524). On the other hand, in Syria, city dwellers became the code world for the Muslims belonging to the Sunni sect and the coastal people, the qaf, became the covered markers of the Alawites. They refer to their land of origin as well as their original dialect. Thescent to power by the Alawite community in the 1970s, received a lot of opposition from the Sunni Muslim Brothers in the city. The chauvinism of Sunni is again very evident in the ideology of Salafist of an Islamic Emirate, which has to be under the control of the Muslims who belong to the Sunni sect. The laissez faire state of Lebanon gave out a lot of freedom to the sub-national communities in the country while ignoring the important agenda of national development that could assist in integrating the peripheral regions and its communities (Haugbolle 2010, 23). Upon the end of the civil war, the understanding emerged again with the new construction of the neoliberal policy of the Prime Minister, Rafiq Harir. This was between 1992 and the year 2004, where there were various short interferences (Ghosn & Khoury 2011, 385). The minister mostly concentrated on the central regions of Beirut and neglected both social and regional balances. The absence of government protection as well as system of welfare paved the way for party militias based on community with the aim of resuming their patronage links. On the other hand, in Syria, a different means influenced a similar outcome (Hinnebusch 2012, 97). Bashar al-Assad significantly, reduced the rule of neo-patrimonial and permitted non-governmental organisations with both communal and religious backgrounds to occupy vacant administrative positions. Under such conditions, the residents in all the two nations retreated into relationships based on kinship as well as religious networks (Dam 2011, 65). Therefore, the idea of transferring the functions of the state like administration, education, taxation, charity, prevention of crime, policy development as well as infrastructure to the militias based in the community during the civil war in Lebanon may reveal development of Syria in the days to come if fighting continues and the state remains on its path to disintegration. Another aspect that is common and similar between the civil wars in the two nations is the fact that most of the communities that reside in the Middle East have a link to the adjacent countries through ties that are ethnic, familial or religious. Indigenousbusiness-people receive the temptations to obtain such bonding to influence support from outside to help in the implementation of their own agenda or as a means of enhancing their veto authority. Inversely, both regional as well as worldwide actors put influence by means of indigenous forces utilized in the form of proxies. This means that the internal conflicts can have connection with regional or international conflicts. These sectarian or ethnic considerations contribute a decisive aspect in the establishment of regional coalitions and inducement of proxy clashes in the countries. Just like in Lebanon, the cyclic irregular conflict by the snipers, the artillery bombings of the areas occupied by innocent civilians, bombing of cars, kidnapping individuals for prisoner exchange in the future or for ransom, assassinations, sexual aggravation, genocides, the desecration of dead bodies, prisoners executions along withafflictions and vengeful murders all take place on sectarian basis (Hinnebusch 2012 101). These forms of violent actions take place with high degrees of de-humanizing activities that include cleansing, dirty Nurseries and as well as armed terrorist gangs.Various religious locations including mosques for the Sunnis, shrines used by the Shiites, Hussainiyas together with churches for the Christians became the main targets for vandals and despoliation. Every single day, violent actors develop with their main goals being the defense of their domestic and new areas of influence. The civil wars are establishing their own individual topography, understanding of the truth as well as the economy. The distinction between the inside and the outside is volatile because the supporter of today can turn to be the enemy of tomorrow and the enemy of today can be the supporter of tomorrow (Symposium discussion 2013, 21). This factor compels the people to become used to constantly changing masters. Mediatization that sometimes referred to as the innovation of Arab Spring was also an accepted factor during the civil war of Lebanon. About one hundred to two hundred radio stations owned by private individuals and around fifty televisions received maintenance from sectarian militias. They were distributing very biased information and reports as well as conspiracy stories with every one supporting a specific group and encouraging very powerful harmful stereotypes concerning the members belonging to the other groups. In Syria, the reports regarding war crimes are now a very powerful tool of propaganda used by all the sides involved in the conflict. The filming of the victims of killings occurs by the use of cameras and mobile phones and the content uploaded to various websites or transmitted through specific television networks.These include Al-Arabia and Al Jazeera or the national television of Syria with the objectives of mobilizing the various constituencies, shaping the world opinion concerning the conflict in their favors and discrediting the adversary. During the first year of the conflict, many people in Syria believed that their conflict, in contrary to that of Lebanon, did not receive influence from sectarianism (Starr 2012, 65).When the evidence of the influence of sectarianism in the violence became clear, majority of the groups in the opposition side began accusing the government of exploitation with the aim of applying the divide and rule strategy to seek a means of rallying the support of the minorities through the creation of fear (Byman 2014, 87). The government on the other hand, placed blame on external influence and the Salafis for their great role in enhancing sectarianism. Regardless of the cause or origin of the phenomenon, it is clear that just like in Lebanon; sectarianism in the civil war of Syria is real and is evident in the behaviour of the militia groups and the thinking of the people (Landis 2012, 81). It continues to pose a great threat for further disintegration of the country. The most difficult question to answer is regarding the means that can be most effective in preventing further disintegration and eliminating the problem of sectarianism that proves to be the major cause of conflict in the region. Historically, it took the warlords of Lebanon a very long time to discover that their policy of exclusive rule was ineffective and the best means of building cohesion in the country is through sharing power rather than monopolizing it and disregarding others (Norton 1991, 458). No one of the warlords succeeded in creating dominance in a big territory that could become a stable autonomous state. In contrary, they began warring in against cross-community strugglers for the control of the territory, the authority for representing the community as well as the authority of defining the identity. However, they finally resolved into a power sharing deal after losing the legitimacy amongst their own clients. Despite the fact that the Taif accord of Lebanon greatly assisted in ending the civil war in the country, it did not succeed in creating a stable nation (Norton 1991, 459). In addition, it failed to bring integration amongst the various warring groups and bring one united nation (Salamey 2009, 84). An important element of the consociation democracy required in the resolution of the conflict is the demographic distribution of the country that shapes the idea of power sharing and important posts in the country. Nevertheless, the experience in Lebanon describes the manner that the idea of proportionality determines the peril of bickering that is endless (Barak 2002, 623). The difference in birth rates, the policy of naturalization, the emigration policy, rapid urbanization, internal relocation, remigration and violent expulsion are permanentobstacles in the process of evaluating the data collected from census. The inappropriate power distribution amongst the various communities was a very serious shortcoming of Lebanon formula before the civil war (Hazran 2010, 540). The improper manipulation of the figures after the census in 1932 gave out the notion that the Christian community was the largest that led to the assignment of around fifty-five percent of the parliamentary seats in comparison with the Muslim community that only got around forty five percent of the seats. This continued until the 1990 despite the fact that the Christian population reduced even further to around forty percent of the entire population. In the Taif meeting, the delegates solved the problem by agreeing that the Muslim community take fifty percent and Christians take fifty percent of the seats in the national parliament. This provided a guarantee that there was no any side that was going to overrule the other side, a system that is most effective in creating balance of power and justice for all the communities (El-Husseini 2008, 407). However, in Syria, the situation does not appear appropriate for the implementation of the idea since the Sunni Muslims are the very dominant community with around seventy-five percent of the entire population (Byman 2014, 88). Nevertheless, several factors invalidate the argument. To begin with, it is less likely that the Sunni Muslims will behave like a single entity since the ethnic composition of the members, social and economic differences, territorial fragmentation as well as beliefs create different identities among them. The minority groups such as the Kurds that constitute ten to fifteen percent of the population, the Turkmen and the Circassia’s that make up around one to three percent of the population are all Sunni Muslims but have different political aspirations from the Arab Sunni Muslims(Leenders & Heydemann 2012, 148). Consequently, the share of the Arab Sunni Muslims is about sixty percent of the population. This means that in a majority based system of democracy where the winner takes the power; there is the great peril that the Arab Sunni Muslims will dominate the other minority groups in the country. Secondly, the strategy of power sharing provides various tools for the adjustment of the unequal statistical distributions. For example, the proportional representation of all the groups in the parliament as well as the government will provide for adequate participation of the minority groups in the process of exercising power. In addition, the minority groups can acquire veto power through the idea of consensus rule and the obligation of grand coalitions. The further complementation of this can be by reserving some important posts such as the prime minister for the minority representative. The Lebanon example can thus be a good method for reducing the dominance of the Sunni Muslims over the minorities. Thirdly, the strategy of internal fragmentation is going to prevent the Sunni Arabs from behaving like a single entity. The Sunni Arabs lack a single protective stronghold like the Alawites and the Druze communities as opposed to just a few great mono sectarian areas of the Sunni Arabs (Byman 2014, 91). They make up majority is some of the areas but minority in some other areas. In the big cities such as Damascus, they share the conventional strongholds with a good number of other members from different communities that migrated because of the process of urbanization. Fourthly, the economic and social stratification within the Sunni community is very significant as it incorporates agrarian village communities, nomadic tribes, shantytowns, workers, fellow citizens, businesspersons, industrial elite among others. This means that Sunni Muslims are not strictly, organized into a single sect with a single political aspiration paving the way for a power sharing deal. Lastly, the religious attributes of Sunni Muslims vary in terms of practice, intensity and creed. There are secularists, Sufists that are mostly apolitical mystics, fundamentalists, believers that are conservative and Jihadists (Leenders & Heydemann 2012, 148). Therefore, there is the high possibility that upon the departure of the common enemy, the regime, the Sunni Muslims are going to disintegrate. All these factors present the possibility of successfully, implementing a power sharing deal that will help end the conflict in the country. The idea is to provide a balance of power in which no any group is going to overrule others in the country. Equal representation and participation in the leadership of the country will lead to justice and hence harmony. Conclusion Civil wars in both Lebanon and Syria occur because of sectarianism and unequal power distribution in the leadership. In Lebanon, sectarianism has a well-organized structure paving the way for efficient implementation of the power sharing strategy as a means of ensuring equal distribution of power. In Syria, sectarianism is influential but not well organized like in Lebanon. However, with proper measures, it is possible to successfully, implement the power sharing strategy to bring cohesion in the country. 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Ziadeh, H. 2006, Sectarianism and Intercommunal Nation‐Building in Lebanon, Hurst & Company, London. Read More