Territorial Disputes as a Problematic Issue - Essay Example

A Diplomacy Failure: The 1982 Falklands War Contents Introduction 3 Background 4 Emergence of the Falklands Dispute in the 17th and 18th Centuries 4 New Dimensions to the Dispute: Post-World War Two Developments 6 Theoretical Framework: Peace and War in the International System 8 Attempts at Avoiding the War: Diplomacy and Non-Military Pressure 11 Why Diplomacy Failed? 17 Conclusion 19 References 21 Introduction Territorial disputes have always been a problematic issue, being considered the “by far the most detrimental type of interstate dispute” (Wiegand, 2011:1). Inasmuch as many states develop military capabilities especially to deal with territorial disputes, the latter, more often than not, tend to bring the states concerned into armed conflict with each other, thus not only hampering their trade, economic development, along with other bilateral, regional, etc. issues of international relations, but also threatening international security as a whole (Wiegand, 2011). Thus, in the last two centuries, about one third of all territorial disputes have developed into all-out confrontation and war, whereas many others were peacefully settled by means of negotiations, third-party mediation, arbitration by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), etc. (Wiegand, 2011). The long-drawn-out dispute between the United Kingdom and Argentina over the sovereignty of the Falkland/Malvinas islands – which lasted for more than 170 years, as against the average duration of ongoing territorial disputes of about 50 years (Wiegand, 2011) – denotes a notable example of the former. This paper is intended to critically review and evaluate the role of dialogue in the international context, namely in reconciliation and peace building; being based on a case study concerning the Falklands War of 1982, hence the failure of diplomacy at resolving the problem and preventing armed conflict, the paper expounds on the reasons why diplomatic efforts, including negotiations and third-party mediation, came to nothing. Background The Falkland archipelago is located in the South Atlantic, some three hundred miles away from the mainland South America, with a total land area of 4 700 square miles, and approximately 2000 inhabitants (Beck, 1988; Gibran, 1998). The East and West Falkland are the archipelago’s largest islands, with extremely irregular coastlines and a hilly land surface, separated by a fifty-mile long and ten-mile wide waterway named Falkland Sound, aka the Strait of San Carlos; the capital city, Port Stanley, with a population of some 1000 as of 1980, is on the northeast coast of the East Falkland (Beck, 1988; Gibran, 1998). Over the past century, nearly all of the inhabitants of the East and West Falkland, which have actually declined ever since 1931, were of British origin (Gibran, 1998). Emergence of the Falklands Dispute in the 17th and 18th Centuries Ever since their discovery in the 16th century, the Falklands have been subjected to successive occupation attempts by a number of colonial powers, including France, Spain, and Britain; it’s noteworthy that, as often as not, the islands were subsequently abandoned (Mackinnon, 1840). Being understandably adverse to other country’s settlements nearby its South American possessions, Spain doggedly expelled – either forcibly or by making representations to the respective governments – any expedition aimed at colonising the islands (Mackinnon, 1840; Khan, 2012). Thus, after the Seven Years War (1756-1763), an attempt at restoring France’s colonial power, this time at the expense of Spain, led to the erection of Fort St. Louis on the East Falkland in 1764; one year later, an expedition under John Byron established a British settlement, named Port Egmont, on the West Falkland, claiming the islands for Britain (Gustafson, 1988; Khan, 2012). Both claims on were eventually neutralised by Spain – the islands were purchased from France in 1767, whereas, after the crisis of 1770-71, namely the Spanish attack on Port Egmont under Admiral Madariaga, and a series of negotiations, including an alleged secret agreement between Britain and Spain, aka the Secret Understanding, the British relinquished control over Port Egmont and the islands as a whole (Williams, 1980; Gustafson, 1988; Khan, 2012). Nevertheless, the Spanish restoration of Port Egmont had been seen as a tacit recognition of Britain’s right to sovereignty over the islands (Gustafson, 1988). Having gained its independence from Spain in 1816, Argentina claimed sovereignty over the Falklands in 1820, based on the principle “uti possidetis”, meaning that the government of the newly-formed state entity inherited the possession of the former colony, hence the historical rights of Spain (Gustafson, 1988; Khan, 2012); by that time, the islands generally served as a supply base for the vessels of various nationalities, which dared to plough the hostile waters of the South Atlantic (Mackinnon, 1840). The Argentinian possession of the Falkland/Malvinas islands was asserted via a decree issued on 10 June 1829, which, having affected fishing rights in the surrounding waters, provoked a renewed British claim to the islands, based on “first discovery, occupation, the restitution of Port Egmont, and the intention to resume occupation” (Gustafson, 1988:23). An Argentine attempt at enforcing the fishing rights in 1831, under the governor of the islands, Louis Vernet, led to the seizure of two US ships and US involvement in the contentious issue; the end result of both had been the annihilation of the Argentine settlement by the USS Lexington landing party on the East Falkland on December 28, 1831 (Mackinnon, 1840; Reisman, 1983; Gustafson, 1988). Having declared the islands ‘res nullius’, or nobody’s property, the United States, in fact, made no claim to the islands but substantiated their fishing rights in the region, quite in the context of the Monroe Doctrine, which had been formulated several years ago, namely in1823 (Gustafson, 1988; Herring, 2008). On the other hand, not only did the ‘res nullius’ declaration considerably weaken the Argentine claim to sovereignty over the Falklands, it also – though forming a prima facie paradox – strengthened the British one, insofar as then US administration tacitly and prudently admitted that Britain would stay in control of its possessions; or as John Quincy Adams stated “keep what is yours and leave the rest of the continent to us” (Bemis, 1949:491-92). Not surprisingly therefore, two British warships were despatched to expel the Argentinians from the islands shortly thereafter, and as of 1833, despite Argentinian protests, Great Britain seized control over the Falklands (Reisman, 1983; Khan, 2012). As stated above, this act had been substantiated via the right of first discovery, occupation, as well as the agreement of 1770, namely the restoration of ‘status quo ante’, or, in other words, the restitution of Port Egmont (Gustafson, 1988), whereas, the US reluctance to invoke the Monroe Doctrine could be attributed to three decisive factors as follows – the American – British relations in the context of then US foreign policy, British naval superiority in the Atlantic Ocean, and, according to some authors, US intention to avoid responsibility for the Lexington incident (Reisman, 1983; Herring, 2008). New Dimensions to the Dispute: Post-World War Two Developments Having experienced an “accelerated decline” in economic and military capability after the end of the Second World War, Britain was faced with a number of difficult choices and challenges in the course of the 1950s and 1960s; here should be mentioned the costs of maintaining the empire, as against the pressures of nationalism and shifting balance of power, national security and the necessity of curbing the Soviet threat as part of the Western alliance, etc. (Donaghy, 2014). The 1956 Suez crisis actually signalled the end of Britain’s imperial might, along with the advent of a pragmatic view that post-war Britain could ill afford to maintain a global presence as known from the past; on the other hand, a process of transformation of the formal empire into informal one, i.e. keeping the newly-independent state entities within the sphere of influence of the mother country, had been set off via a series of economic and defence agreements (Donaghy, 2014). A few last outposts of the former empire, like Gibraltar, Hong Kong and the Falkland Islands, remained unaffected by nationalism and decolonisation, though subjected to rival powers’ claims (Donaghy, 2014). Within the new international realities, the Anglo-Argentine dispute over the Falkland Islands had been understandably referred to the UN General Assembly, which, with Resolution 2065, recognised the problem and recommended negotiations (Laucirica, 2000); accordingly, the latter began in 1966 (Reisman, 1983). Despite some progress in the period between 1969 and 1971, which peaked in December 1971 with a joint statement concerning “new patterns of cooperation between the Falklands and Argentina”, not only the negotiations stalled, but also the overall situation deteriorated to the degree of suspension of British – Argentine diplomatic relations in1975 (Reisman, 1983:310). The 1970s as whole are generally considered “the years of the most acute Anglo-Argentine tension”, which reached a peak during the crisis of October – November 1977, when the UK and Argentina were on the brink of war, following intelligence reports concerning the possibility of Argentine invasion of the islands (Donaghy, 2014). In 1979, the diplomatic relations were resumed and a number of vague statements by both sides’ officials came to denote attempts at bringing the dispute forward, although the issue of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands “had not been touched on” (Donaghy, 2014:185; Reisman, 1983). Thus, in the late 1980s, the British Minister of State of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office presented the Legislative Council of the Falkland Islands with three options as follows – a joint British-Argentine administration, a lease-back agreement which envisaged transferring the sovereignty to Argentina with the islands being leased back to the UK, and a twenty-five-year freeze of the dispute; in the early 1981, the Legislative Council announced its preference for the third option (Reisman, 1983). It was anything but surprise when Argentina rejected such a development and, in February 1982, the Argentine military junta under Gen Leopoldo Galtieri entered the talks with much more rigid position, presupposing Argentinian sovereignty over the islands; thus, on 1st March 1982, the Argentinian Foreign Minister emphasised the possibility that his country would “end negotiations and seek other means” in the absence of a satisfactory solution (Reisman, 1983:311). On April 2, 1982, the words were put into deeds with the Argentinian invasion of the Falkland Islands. Theoretical Framework: Peace and War in the International System Before expounding on the diplomatic efforts and moves aimed at preventing Anglo-Argentine armed conflict over the Falklands, a theoretical discourse on the nature of International relations, the possibility of peace in the International system, and the role of the dialogue in achieving peaceful solutions to enduring territorial disputes, would shed light on the factors and mechanisms behind the respective foreign policy decisions that eventually brought Argentina and the UK on the collision course. The interactions between states, including diplomacy, trade, conflicts and war, alliances, and cooperation, are extensively explained by the dominant IR theoretical traditions, or schools of thought, such as realism and liberalism (Walt 1998). As Panke and Risse point out, the classical theories of international relations are grounded in the core principle that domestic structures or actors considerably influence foreign-policy interests of the states, hence states’ behaviour in the international arena (2007). Thus, according to liberal theorists, domestic institutions, actors, or interactions are crucial explanatory variables, which means that explanations of international processes and outcomes are located at the state level (Panke and Risse, 2007); thus, in Waltz’s level-of-analysis’ terminology, liberal approaches to considered second-image approaches (1959). According to liberal actor-centred rationalist theories, the way states define their foreign-policy interests and behaviour on the international arena is heavily influenced by domestic actors (Putnam, 1988). This process is comprised of two phases – first, domestic groups shape their policy interests as the state’s interest and second, external constraints faced by the state negotiators impact the calculations of states and facilitate behavioural adaptations on the international level (Panke and Risse, 2007). Thus liberal theorists would argue that Argentine political leadership – the ruling military Junta – decided to launch the invasion, seeking ways to remain in power, as against the country’s economic and political fragility (Freedman, 2005; Panke and Risse, 2007). Other domestic societal actors may have encouraged such a decision, pursuing various interests; here should be mentioned that conquest of the islands had been a popular cause in Argentina, being perceived as a genuine national interest (Freedman, 2005). The British Prime Minister, in turn, was faced with the necessity to implement unpopular economic reforms, hence the “political oxygen” of successful foreign policy moves aimed at defending the national pride and interest was about to serve a very useful purpose (Laucirica, 2000:85). Correspondingly, the public opinion, along with the British Parliament and the Falklands lobby – the latter being fuelled by a 1976 report which forecasted promising future for the islands – have played their role in the formation of Britain’s state interest (Laucirica, 2000). Given the next stage in the process, according to liberal actor-centred rationalist theory, the UK pursued a foreign policy consistent with the interests of the aforementioned domestic actors. Thus, the outcome of the 1982 Falklands crisis, namely the failure of the peace efforts and the outbreak of violence in the South Atlantic, could be sufficiently explained from liberal theorists point of view via the impossibility both Argentine and British state interests to be compromised at the international level, most notably the United Nations; whilst liberal institutionalists would consider the “faltering international structure” one of the key factors in the genesis of the conflict (Laucirica, 2000:83). During the Cold War, however, another school of thought, namely realism, provided much simpler but powerful explanations for a variety of international phenomena, including war, alliances, etc. (Walt, 1998). According to the proponents of realism, the balance of power is instrumental in deterring war, especially when the states demonstrate a great determination to defend the status quo (Lebow, 2007); neorealism, in turn, elaborates on the theme, stipulating that states’ interactions are dependent upon the distribution of power in the international system (Walt, 1998). In accordance with realists’ point of view, Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands could be seen as being based on the rational cost-benefit calculations; hence the Argentine military rulers weighed Britain’s declining military capabilities, the “permissiveness” of the international community, along with the potential tepid if not neutral reaction of the United States, against the benefits – in both political and economic terms – of regaining control of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands (Laucirica, 2000:85). Thus, in realists’ view, the armed conflict occurred due to a number of miscalculations made by the Argentinian Junta and decision makers, namely the British determination to defend the status quo, despite running the risk of another Suez, and ability to mobilise international support, including form the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, EC, etc. (Freedman, 2005). Attempts at Avoiding the War: Diplomacy and Non-Military Pressure Apart from the initial shock which stirred the whole nation, evoking memories of another British humiliation, namely the 1956 Suez crisis, as well as some inadequacies, like lack of formal planning on such crises besides a major confrontation with the Soviet bloc, the British Government under Margaret Thatcher approached the recent crisis in rather a prompt and organised way (Freedman, 2005). Thus, a special Ministerial Sub-Committee of the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee on the South Atlantic and Falkland Islands, aka the War Cabinet, had been established to “keep under review political and military developments”, or in other words to manage the crisis; the War Cabinet included a number of key members of the Government – the Prime Minister, Home Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Defence Secretary, etc. – being supported by the Cabinet Office (Freedman, 2005:18). Furthermore, the whole Cabinet was kept associated with a number of critical decisions and a new Sub-Committee on the Management of Political and military Emergencies Overseas was created, whilst the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), Admiral Sir Terence Lewin, became one of the key members of the War Cabinet (Freedman, 2005). In turn, the military chain of command “passed directly from the Prime Minister to the Chief of Defence Staff and then on to the Task force Commander” (Freedman, 2005:21). Broadly speaking, the British response to the Argentinian act of aggression is considered to have fallen into two broad categories as follows – non-military pressure, which included gaining international support for the British cause and economic sanctions, as well as the use of force by the British navy and army in order to expel the Argentine troops from the Falklands (Freedman, 2005). The first and probably most immediate task faced by the British Government had been to garner support amongst the international community; apart from the precariousness of then international affairs, i.e. the East-West rivalry and “a Soviet Union fishing in troubled waters“, this task was further complicated by disarray in the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO), manifested in a number of changes and resignations, including those of the Head of the Diplomatic Service, and three Cabinet Ministers (Freedman, 2005:33). Furthermore, considerations such as the probable ambivalence of the US position – the Argentine junta was amongst the US-backed dictatorships in Latin America – the possibility of retributive action against some 17 000 British subjects in Argentina in the case of war declaration, third countries with their own interests, and finally, UK reputation stained by ill-interpreted actions against Argentina, namely as retribution, rather than self-defence, actually put British diplomacy to the test (Freedman, 2005). On the other hand, there had been little comprehension amongst other governments, even though the most friendly ones, of the UK motives for investing so much effort and embarking on such a risky project to recapture an asset “with so little real value” (Freedman, 2005:34). Therefore, Britain needed to establish its case, employing dialogue across the UN Security Council and the whole international community. While solidarity from the members of NATO and EC, as well as from the Commonwealth states, had been logically expected, the United Nations appeared rather a difficult arena (Freedman, 2005). On the one hand the UK had the advantage of being a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council, with the capacity to impose a veto on any unfavourable decision, but on the other hand strong anticolonial sentiment, which originated amongst the Third World countries, dominated the General Assembly by that time (Freedman, 2005). Additionally, two Non-Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, namely Ireland and Spain, were themselves in territorial disputes with the UK; the ambassador of the United States to UN, in turn, was “closely associated with the Reagan Administration’s Latin America policy”, hence even the support from the closest UK ally could not be taken for granted (Freedman, 2005). After a series of talks, consultations, careful drafting and debates in the UN, Resolution 502 had been passed on April 3rd, demanding “an immediate cessation of hostilities”, withdrawal of all Argentine troops from the islands and a diplomatic solution of the UK-Argentine dispute over the Falklands/Malvinas sovereignty (Freedman, 2005). Even though Resolution 502 didn’t go so far as to accuse Argentina of being an aggressor, it could be considered a triumph for the British diplomacy against all odds (Freedman, 2005), which, in turn, epitomises the role of dialogue in international affairs. The option to declare war on Argentina had been contemplated and consequently rejected, even though it appeared the proper UK response in the light of the Argentinian invasion (Freedman, 2005). Such a decision was grounded in several important considerations, as follows – the immediate implications for over 5000 Argentine citizens residing, either temporarily or for an indefinite period, in Britain, the possible problems with third countries that would be otherwise co-operative in terms of logistics of the Task Force, the number of British subjects in Argentina, as well as branches and subsidiaries of British companies operating in the country, who would suffer the consequences of retributive action, and perhaps most notably to keep the door opened to a peaceful solution of the crisis (Freedman, 2005). With the Task Force on its way to the South Atlantic, the British efforts aimed at preventing armed confrontation between the UK and Argentina included a set of tough economic and trade sanctions, i.e. a ban on the military and other strategic equipment, freeze on financial assets, etc.; this, in turn, required not only talks with allies in order to ensure similar bans in place, but also direct discussions with companies which could have been subjected to the consequences of the sanctions (Freedman, 2005). Given the inability of Britain alone to inflict massive damage on the Argentine economy, the reference to UN Security Council Resolution 502 and Article 224 of the Treaty of Rome was quite understandable (Freedman, 2005). Accordingly, Germany, for instance, reported their readiness to halt the building of submarines and frigates for the Argentinian navy, whilst some Commonwealth countries, like Canada, Australia, New Zealand, etc., banned exports and military supplies; other countries, like Sweden, Switzerland and Portugal, Norway and Austria imposed similar bans (Freedman, 2005). Having the greatest ability to produce a significant effect on Argentine economy, the United States were rather ambivalent about imposing sanctions, being wary of the consequences for their relations with Latin America as a whole; moreover, during their mediation effort, the United States appeared “unwilling to take any action on trade” (Freedman, 2005:85). On the other hand, the Andean Pact, the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI), as well as the Latin American European System (SELA), issued declarations which were supportive of Argentina and offered assistance in trade (Freedman, 2005). Such statements, however, failed to produce any pragmatic result; furthermore, many of the delegations, which attended the meeting of the so-called Organ of Consultation of the Rio Treaty, convened on 26 April, sought to avoid confrontation and abstained on a Resolution calling for the removal of the import ban introduced by EC (Freedman, 2005). All in all, the support for Argentina remained in the field of “extravagant statements of solidarity”, without any practical actions (Freedman, 2005:97). In the diplomatic field, the Argentine Junta under General Galtieri had undertaken a move, which at first sight promised a settlement of the conflict; following a meeting with a six-member delegation of prominent Anglo-Argentinians, who had visited the Islands in order to “allay the fears of the islanders about becoming part of Argentina”, Galtieri submitted a proposal, which apparently guaranteed that there will be no changes in the islanders’ way of life, hence nothing they should worry about (Freedman, 2005:92). On the UK’s side, a number of options for a compromise had been identified, starting from the most preferred “unconditional withdrawal of Argentine forces and re-establishment of British administration”, to the most humiliating of all, namely the withdrawal Argentine forces and continued Argentine administration, with the anticipated departure of many islanders to Britain or other countries (Freedman, 2005:101). The probable means of achieving the respective outcomes also varied, including negotiations, third party mediation (UN and/or the United States), the International Court of Justice (ICJ), etc.; other options for a settlement included an interim administration of the Falkland Islands – either UN or US – lease-back agreement, and even ceding dependent territories to Argentina in exchange for keeping the East and West Falklands (Freedman, 2005). According to Laucirica, three major attempts at mediations were undertaken as follows – first, Ronald Reagan’s attempt at preventing the Argentinian invasion in his conversation with Gen Galtieri, along with the diplomatic shuttle of the US Secretary of State, Alexander Haig in the period between April 8th and April 14th; second, by the Peruvian president, Fernando Belaunde Terry, and third, by UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar (2000). The shuttle diplomacy of Haig, along with the other attempts at preventing the outbreak of violence in the South Atlantic, however failed, being largely described as too little, too late. Why Diplomacy Failed? As seen from the previous section, the UK employed dialogue across a variety of instances, including the United Nations, its allies in Europe and the Commonwealth countries, etc., as a part of its diplomatic strategy aimed at gathering international support for Britain’s cause and applying pressure on Argentinian Junta, which would eventually lead to a peaceful solution to contentious issue. Thus, the British Government succeeded to establish Britain’s case internationally, being based on the self-defence concept, hence claiming the moral high ground. Furthermore, the British decision makers were inclined to the view that a peaceful settlement of the conflict can be achieved even at the expense of not that desirable outcomes of the situation, whereas, the Argentine position presupposed that all possible solutions should eventually include Argentine sovereignty over the contested island; thus, after another round of bilateral negotiations, which took place in New York on February 27 and 28, 1982, the ruling Junta issued a communique threatening to “freely choose the procedure that best suits its interests” (Laucirica, 2000:86). Some observers would argue that such a position was a natural concomitant of a “cogent, if not a conclusive legal case ...consistent with a good deal of international practice regarding decolonisation” (Reisman, 1983:313). The presumption that Argentinian nation as a whole was convinced in the rightness of Argentina’s claim and consequent actions (Reisman, 1983) provides very little evidence, if any, that such a blatant violation of the international norms is admissible under any circumstances; on the other hand, perhaps very few in the UK were not convinced that the Falklands denoted a national cause. Given the islanders’ unanimous support for the UK, the conflict may well be considered anything but a war against imperialism or colonialism, despite the Argentine claims for doing so; rather, the Argentinian position appears ill-formulated and ill-defended, insofar as the claim to the islands was solely grounded in relied the historical rights of the country as a successor state of eighteenth-century Spain (Laucirica, 2000). The close relations between one of the world superpowers, namely the United States, and both Argentina and the UK, spoke undoubtedly against the Cold-war character of the conflict; moreover, until the late 1930s there had been strong UK-orientated sentiment, especially amongst the Argentine political establishment (Laucirica, 2000). Thus, one would tend to ascribe the genesis of the conflict solely to the popular sentiment of either side, which is just as wrong as justifying the Argentinian aggression on the grounds of disputed rights; there is no doubt, however, that popular sentiment could be, and, in actual fact, was manipulated for the purposes of national mobilisation (Laucirica, 2000). This was especially true in the case of Argentina, where sovereignty over the islands had become part of Argentina’s national identity (Laucirica, 2000). As pointed out in the section dealing with theoretical issues, the genesis of the conflict could be variously explained, i.e. either due to domestic influences or because of the nature of the international system per se, as the case might be; which, in turn, presupposes the possibility, or alternatively, impossibility given conflict to be prevented. Thus, domestic politics are considered amongst the most powerful influences that actually complicated the Falklands dispute; besides theories of international relations, however, Argentine intellectuals, for example, viewed the dispute over the islands as serving the sole purpose to distract public attention from other political and/or economic issues (Reisman, 1983). If this point of view is taken seriously, the possibility of conflict prevention via diplomatic means would seem rather an unattainable goal, especially in the presence of economic interests and lobbies; not surprisingly therefore, the position of Argentine Junta on the negotiations hardened over time. On the other hand, shuttle diplomacy and last-minute attempts at conflict mediation are by no means pre-emptive diplomacy, especially when hostilities have begun as in the case of the UK-Argentine confrontation over the Falkland Islands (Laucirica, 2000). Moreover, diplomatic failures, along with failures of the international system, in the past – when a conflict, such as the Falklands territorial dispute, lasted for over a century – have laid the foundations of, and largely predetermined such failures in the future. In other words, as Laucirica points out, the inadequate preventive measures imply greater probability of crisis diplomacy and peace-making efforts failure (2000). Conclusion Dialogue play crucial role across the international context, which became obvious in the way Britain established its case internationally; on the other hand, dialogue alone was not sufficient means to prevent Argentinian aggression, as well as the outbreak of the hostilities, which claimed nearly one thousand lives in the South Atlantic. The outcome of the 1982 Falklands crisis, as manifested itself in the failure of diplomacy at preventing violence, was predetermined by the following factors – the duration of the territorial dispute per se, lack of adequate pre-emptive measures, weakness of the international community, and finally, the presence of domestic influences, including political and economic ones, which, being transformed into state interests, were not compromised at the international level. Hence, dialogue could be considered instrumental many aspects of international relations, but is by no means a panacea for all problems; therefore, the Argentine occupation of the Falkland Islands was terminated by the British army and navy, but not by diplomacy. References Beck, Peter J. (1988) The Falkland Islands as an International Problem. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge Bemis, Samuel F. (1949) John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy, New York: Alfred A. Knopf Donaghy, A. (2014) The British Government and the Falkland Islands 1974-79. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan Freedman, Lawrence (2005) The Official History of the Falklands Campaign: Volume II, War and Diplomacy. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge Gibran, Daniel K. (1998) The Falklands War: Britain Versus the Past in the South Atlantic. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc. Gustafson, L. S. (1988) The Sovereignty Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc. 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